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Part Three: EU Tax Law in WTO and International 
Arbitration Litigation
Chapter 7: A Game of Snakes and Ladders – Tax Arbitration in an
International and EU Setting
7.1. Introduction
There is an apocryphal anecdote of Mahatma Ghandi, where he was asked what he thought about Western civilization,
and he answered: “Yes, I think that would be a very good idea”. One is tempted to give the same answer when asked
about tax arbitration. For it would seem to be conventional wisdom that arbitration has not yet reached the tax field, and
that any response to the question would have the contours of a hypothetical and speculative exercise.
To be entirely fair with states and tax authorities, they have engaged in an honest effort to expand the availability of dispute
resolution mechanisms beyond ordinary administrative or judicial processes. Isolated examples of such mechanisms were
already present in the 1990s and 2000s in the Germany-Sweden and Germany-Austria treaties;[2]as well as in the European
“Arbitration” Convention (which should be more accurately called the “Transfer Pricing Convention”).[3]The idea seems,
however, to have received a new impetus with the inclusion of an “arbitral” mechanism in the Model Tax Conventions of
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)[4]and the United Nations (UN),[5]as well as in the
modified bilateral tax treaties between the United States, on one side, and Belgium,[6]Germany,[7]Canada[8]and France,[9]on
the other. With the “arbitral” solution being supported by the international community, and actively promoted as part of
their tax treaty policy by the United States and Germany (at least), “tax arbitration” seems a reality; so, are the inverted
commas, and the skepticism they convey, justified at all?
The answer is that even if “tax arbitration”, as an issue, deserves more than a condescending smile and a frown of disbelief,
even if the effort made by states and international organizations is undeniable, whether such efforts have been enough to
establish full-blown arbitral proceedings is still a legitimate question, and still an inconvenient one.
It is still legitimate because states, even when accepting the introduction of arbitration as a positive move, have fought
hard to give themselves extra room for manoeuvre. In that regard, the abovementioned instruments include important
variations that clearly depart from “conventional” commercial or investment arbitration.
It is inconvenient because such variations have an influence on the aspects that are considered essential to classify
a dispute resolution process as an “arbitration” mechanism. Rather than being a matter of semantics, concluding that
2. See Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, 24 August 2000, Austria-Federal Republic
of Germany, 2001 WTD 36-15; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation on Income and Capital, Sweden-Federal Republic of Germany,
1995. Other treaties provided for the possibility of resorting to arbitration if the tax authorities consented to it. Article 25(5) of the former 1991 treaty
between the United States and Germany stipulated that “If a disagreement cannot be resolved by the competent authorities it may, if both competent
authorities agree, be submitted for arbitration” (thereby requiring ad hoc consent in each case, rather than establishing an automatic right to begin
arbitral proceedings). See William W. Park, Income Tax Treaty Arbitration , George Mason Law Review, vol. 10 (2002), at 803-804 and 811-812.
3. Article 7 of the European Convention 90/463/EEC on the elimination of double taxation in connection with the adjustment of profits of associated
enterprises. The Prolongation Protocol entered into force on 1 November 2004, 3 months after all Member States had ratified it. Article 3.2 states
that it took effect from 1 January 2000 and thus provided for a retroactive application of the Arbitration Convention.
4. Art. 25(5) OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, 2010.
5. Art. 25 (alternative B), para. 5 United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing Countries, New York, 2011.
6. Convention between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Kingdom of Belgium for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, 27 Nov. 2006 (hereinafter “US-Belgium Convention”).
7. Protocol Amending the Convention between the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital and to Certain Other Taxes, 1 June 2006 (hereinafter
“US-Germany Protocol”).
8. Protocol Amending the Convention between the United States of America and Canada with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, 21 Sept.
2007 (hereinafter “US-Canada Protocol”).
9. Protocol Amending the Convention between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the French Republic for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, 13 Jan. 2009 (hereinafter “US-
France Protocol”).
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something is “arbitration” or not makes an enormous difference in the protection dispensed by the domestic, and
international, legal order.
Section 7.2. of the present study will address such concerns, whereas sections 7.3. and 7.4. will deal more directly with all
the aspects of a dispute’s resolution, from the moment of the consent to the moment of the decision and its enforcement.
The focus will be on examining whether the differences between such mechanisms and those contemplated for commercial
and investment arbitration justify a conceptual distinction between “arbitration” and “tax dispute resolution”, and whether
the distinction, in turn, implies a need for such differences.
Therefore, the present study has a two-pronged approach. On the one hand, it goes into the detail of how the different
mechanisms would work in practice, with special emphasis on those that most closely resemble arbitration, and anticipates
possible issues, drawing from the experience of commercial and investment arbitration. On the other hand, it does not
lose sight of the fact that all the answers are qualified by the acceptance of the procedures as “arbitral” mechanisms.
Since this is a big if, the study is practical and existential in equal measure, and it reflects the difficulties of the scholar
and practitioner in reconciling the states’ conflicting needs.
7.2. Tax arbitration’s lack of pedigree: Sheer snobbery or legitimate concern?
One can hardly think about a more incongruous combination with “arbitration” than “tax law”. In itself, the reference to “tax
arbitration” can look more like a provocation than the definition of a subject matter of analysis, hence the question mark
added in the title to this section.
The question is whether a question mark is justified. Granted, there are important legal hurdles to overcome in order to
resolve tax matters in arbitration, but regardless of technicalities and academic discussion, the truth is that tax disputes
(especially international ones) where the decision is taken by a body of experts that does not form part of the regular
system of administration of justice is a reality.[10]Thus, as a first contention, this chapter describes the existing examples
where, despite preconceptions, tax issues are decided through “arbitration” ( see section 7.2.1. ). It is only then, with a more
reflective perspective, that we go beyond such preconceptions, and explore the legitimate objections to lend credibility to
those examples as manifestations of “tax arbitration” ( see section 7.2.2. ).
7.2.1. “Tax issues are not arbitrated”
This could be the obvious response from an arbitral practitioner who is used to combining in his practice, disputes
on commercial contracts, construction, corporate, investment or even intellectual property and securities. Tax does not
normally come under the radar. But this focus on more developed disciplines is deceptive, because tax is the subject
matter of discussion in commercial and investment disputes ( see section 7.2.1.1. ), and even in “pure” tax disputes
( see section 7.2.1.2. ).
7.2.1.1. Tax issues in commercial and investment arbitration disputes
If the question guiding the present preliminary stage is whether “tax” is “arbitrated”, or “subject to arbitration”, the answer
is that it depends on what we consider as “subjecting tax to arbitration” and this, in turn, depends on the distinction
between an arbitration “case”, and an arbitration “issue”, or an issue subject to arbitration. If we settle for the latter, any
arbitration practitioner will tell us that tax issues are, indeed, subject to arbitration (and hotly contested).[11]In commercial
arbitration cases, tax and, more particularly, tax liabilities are a normal source of analysis in cooperation agreements,
joint ventures and, especially, M&A cases, where the size of the liability can clearly influence the price-per-share paid in
the transaction;[12]hence, the care placed by experts when accomplishing their due diligence, and the potential source of
conflict if expert reports disagree (as they are bound to do when commissioned by both buyer and seller).
Commercial arbitration disputes, of course, cannot alter the nature and amount of the tax liability of the taxpayer vis-à-
vis the tax authorities; not only as a matter of the authorities’ mandates under public law, but as a matter of the scope of
10. Professor Park likens the situation to that of the parishioner who, when asked by a priest whether he believes in infant baptism, answers “Believe,
Father? I have seen it done”. William W. Park, Arbitrability and Tax in Loukas Mistelis & Stavros Breoulakis (eds.), Arbitrability: International and
Comparative Perspectives , Kluwer Law International, 2008, at 179.
11. See the special number of the Revue de l’Arbitrage 2 (2001), and the contributions by Pascal Ancel, Arbitrage et ordre public fiscal , at 269-289;
Maurice Cozian, Arbitrage et incidences fiscales des clauses de garantie de passif , at 289-299; Ibrahim Fadlallah, Arbitrage international et
litiges fiscaux , at 299-311; Sébastien Manciaux, Changement de législation fiscal et arbitrage international , at 311. The latter is more focused on
investment arbitration, but the other three focusing on commercial arbitration.
12. Maurice Cozian, supra n. 11 , at 289-299.
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the consent to arbitrate. Even if two parties have explicitly agreed on the amount of tax liability to be satisfied by each of
them (for example, by means of an indemnity for tax amounts),[13]such agreements are not binding on the tax authorities,
nor is the arbitration clause that may accompany them.
But if we move outside commercial arbitration disputes, it is not difficult to see that the subject matter of the dispute may
not be the private party’s tax liability, but the legitimacy of the tax itself. In investment arbitration disputes it has not been
infrequent for defendant states to have passed tax measures in breach of some of the state’s duties under the terms of an
investment treaty, where it has committed itself to protect the investment transactions in its territory undertaken by nationals
of the other contracting state. In such cases, where the subject matter of the treaty violation under the investor’s claim is the
state’s taxation measures, one could argue that tax has ceased to be “an issue”, and has become a “case”. Examples of
arbitration disputes where state taxation measures were subject to scrutiny under investment treaties, are abundant,[14]and
will increase in importance as governments, rebuffed in expropriation cases, resort to more indirect measures, consisting
of regulatory and tax changes.
7.2.1.2. Tax issues in tax disputes
Outside the commercial and investment arbitration circuit, tax issues are also discussed (and resolved) in out-of-court
settings, in “proper” tax disputes. In such disputes it is not the incidence of the tax rule and the tax liability arising from it,
that are discussed. It is rather the determination of the tax liability that constitutes the subject matter of the dispute.
In fact, it was arbitration that seemed to have support as the mechanism of resolving international tax disputes in the
1920s and 1930s, when arbitration provisions were included in treaties between Ireland and the United Kingdom (1926)
or Czechoslovakia and Romania.[15]It was only in the 1960s when, after efforts to establish such mechanisms seemed
to have stalled, the OECD gave them another push. On the understanding that member countries were not prepared
to relinquish sovereignty as an arbitral mechanism requires, it did so by introducing into its Model Treaty the mutual
agreement procedure (MAP) which, as its name indicates, consists of a negotiation procedure between the competent
authorities (CAs). It was only later (in the 1980s) that mechanisms involving the opinion of a third party (rather than relying
on negotiation only) were re-introduced in individual (i.e. not “Model”) bilateral tax treaties (BTTs) as a result of the support
given to them by countries such as Germany or the United States.[16]
Then, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms started to develop as an actual possibility, hailed not only by single states,
but also by the community of nations with sophisticated tax systems, albeit through a restriction of the scope of the disputes
from the generality of “cross-border taxation”, or even “double taxation” cases, to the more specific field of transfer pricing
disputes. The reason for this is that, in such disputes, given the complexity of industry (and services) processes, the
methods for determining transfer prices between entities of a single group became an incredibly cumbersome issue and
one which increasingly required the constructive engagement of both taxpayer and tax authorities. Moreover, even if the
success and widespread use of the so-called advanced price agreements (APAs) is well-known, the contested nature
of the problem, with minor adjustments resulting in a changes of millions in the monetary value of tax liabilities, and the
involvement of several tax authorities with diverging interests, began to require the use of independent and impartial third
parties in such “agreements”, thereby turning the final outcome into something that, at first glance, resembled an arbitral
mechanism.[17]The EU Arbitration Convention (which should be called the Transfer Pricing Convention) is a result of the
acknowledgement by states of this necessity.[18]
It is only after such a long process that arbitration has been re-introduced as a more “general” mechanism of dispute
resolution for all kinds of international tax disputes: first, in the Model Tax Convention of the OECD, in paragraph 5
13. This type of clause has so far been the main focus of analysis by contribution on the subject of “tax and arbitration”. See Maurice
Cozian, supra n. 11 , at 289-299; Pascal Ancel, supra n. 11 , at 269-289.
14. They include Tokios Tokeles v. Ukraine ; Plama Consortium v. Bulgaria ; Chevron Texaco v. Ecuador ; Pan American Energy v. Argentina ; Occidental
v. Ecuador ; Nykomb Synergetics v. Latvia ; Goetz v. Burundi ; Feldman v. Burundi ; Duke Energy v. Peru ; Corn v. Mexico ; Continental Casualty v.
Argentina ; Cargill v. Mexico ; Archer Daniels v. Mexico ; Amto LLc v. Ukraine , and many others.
15. Czechoslovakia-Romania double taxation convention of 20 June 1934. A board was formed by the Fiscal Committee of the League of Nations.
16. See Sharon A. Reece, Arbitration in Income Tax Treaties: ‘To Be or Not To Be ’, Florida Journal of International Law, vol. 7 (1992) at 288 and 289,
referring to the treaties between the United States and Germany, the United States and Mexico, and the United States and the Netherlands.
17. In the United States, for example, some famous transfer pricing disputes have been resolved by means of arbitral courts/boards/panels. See , for
example, Stipulation for Resolution through Voluntary Binding Arbitration under Tax Rule 124, Apple Computer Inc. v. Commissioner , no. 21781-90
(T.C. 1993). In the case the arbitral board indicated that, applying the proper transfer prices between entities of the same group, an important amount
of the taxable income/base had to be re-assigned to the United States, rather than Singapore. See William W. Park, supra n. 2 , at 824-825.
18. Convention on the elimination of double taxation in connection with the adjustment of profits of associated enterprises, 90/463/EEC, OJ L225/10,
20.8.90.
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of article 25, which otherwise regulates the MAP,[19]and thereafter, by means of Protocols to the BTTs between the
United States and Belgium,[20]the United States and Germany,[21]the United States and Canada,[22]the United States and
France,[23]or the United States and Spain,[24]a number that is bound to increase as arbitration makes its way to the top of
the US and German (as well as Austrian or Dutch) policy agenda vis-à-vis BTTs.[25]All these facts militate against the idea
that arbitration and tax are mutually exclusive, and find no common ground, or do they?
7.2.2. “Tax arbitration is not arbitration”
One would be tempted to answer the above question with an unqualified “yes” answer, were it not for the fact that the re-
discovered pro-arbitration zeal in some states masks a more complex reality, where states (and their tax authorities) wish
to have the benefits of arbitration without giving up the privileges of their sovereign status. This leads us to answer with a
cautious “it depends”, and to elaborate on this idea by stating that it depends on what we understand for arbitration.
With it being such a developed field, one might be tempted to conclude that the idea of “arbitration”, as that of “beauty”, is
in the eye of the beholder. Fortunately for us, academic treatises attempting to define the term tend to be fairly coincident
on most of its features. First, arbitration constitutes an “ alternative ” dispute resolution mechanism, as opposed to the
jurisdiction of normal courts. As opposed to courts, which are constituted, and remain in place to decide on a range of
cases determined by abstract rules, arbitral tribunals are constituted for one specific dispute, and dissolved once the
dispute has been resolved.[26]Second, arbitration is a “ private ” mechanism, which is selected and controlled by the parties
to the dispute.[27]The arbitrators may be empowered to decide on the outcome of the dispute, and the procedure to be
followed until a conclusion is reached, but such power stems from a voluntary act by the parties; an element that manifests
itself in the ability of the parties to control the proceedings, provided they act together by agreement.[28]Such action by
the parties has a clear goal: to resolve the dispute, which gives us the final characteristic of arbitration because, for the
purpose of resolving the dispute, arbitrators are empowered to make a determination of the parties’ rights and obligations
that is “ final and binding ”.
Greater insight will be gained, in order to classify alternative mechanisms for resolving tax disputes, if, besides defining
what arbitration “is”, we contrast this with what arbitration “is not”. First of all, arbitration is not a mechanism relying on the
decision of regular courts. Submitting a dispute to one of such courts may have some of the elements of arbitration such as
“consent”, but the “alternative” element is missing. Also, it is questionable whether and to what extent such a court can act
as the parties’ “private” court, and thereby be asked to consider not only the issues, but also the legal sources, indicated by
the parties, and pursuant to the procedural rules agreed upon by them. Courts are typically not that malleable. Therefore
examples of “voluntary jurisdiction”, such as the submission of disputes to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the
Germany-Sweden tax treaty,[29]or to the European Court of Justice, in the one between Germany and Austria,[30]cannot
be considered examples of “arbitration”.
19. The reasons to include arbitration in tax treaties relate to the shortcomings of the MAP (lack of a requirement to achieve a solution, excessive
duration, lack of transparency, and limited intervention by the taxpayer) and the evolution of the context of disputes and policy views (increase, in
number and importance, of transfer pricing disputes, ratification of the European Convention in 1995, the evolution of the United States’ position,
and the inclusion of the issue in the Fiscal Affairs Committee of the OECD). See Adolfo J. Martín Jiménez, Chapter V.2. Procedimiento Amistoso , in
Carmen Fernández (coord.) Convenios Fiscales Internacionales y Fiscalidad de la UE , CISS, 2012, at 6.2.
20. Convention between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Kingdom of Belgium for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, 27 Nov. 2006 (hereinafter “US-Belgium Convention”).
21. Protocol Amending the Convention between the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital and to Certain Other Taxes, 1 June 2006 (hereinafter
“US-Germany Protocol”).
22. Protocol Amending the Convention between the United States of America and Canada with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, 21 Sept.
2007 (hereinafter “US-Canada Protocol”).
23. Protocol Amending the Convention between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the French Republic for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, 13 Jan. 2009 (hereinafter “US-
France Protocol”).
24. Protocol Amending the Convention between the Government of the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, 14 Jan. 2013.
25. Arbitration has found its way into more improbable places, such as article 25(5) of the Spain-Switzerland treaty, added by the Protocol of 27 July
2011.
26. Julian Lew, Loukas Mistelis & Stefan Kröll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration , Kluwer Law International, 2003, at 4.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Article 41(5) of the German-Swedish tax treaty, which applied parts of the European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, such as
chapters I (jurisdiction of the ICJ), or II (conciliation), but not III (arbitration). However, it provided that, instead of such proceedings, the parties could
agree on a court of arbitration whose decision would be binding on them.
30. Art. 25(5) Germany-Austria double taxation convention.
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Nor can the examples of what is generically called “third-party determination” be considered to be arbitration. In the private
arena, this encompasses situations where, for example, an expert is called to decide on a contentious issue of fact between
the parties, such as the quality of goods in a commodities contract, or of the works performed (a matter typically decided
by an engineer), under a construction contract.[31]Some complex contracts may stretch the idea, and provide for middle-
of-the-road solutions, such as the so-called “adjudication” in construction contracts, where a person (or, more generally,
a “board”) decides on the parties’ dispute, as a matter of expediency, a “dispute” that, given the lack of specificity of
construction contracts in that regard, can be legal as well as factual.[32]
The description of the task entrusted to experts and adjudicators can well fit the description of some mechanisms of
alternative resolution typical in tax cases, such as those designed for some types of factual issues (typical in disputes over
prices), both under the domestic law of some states[33]or international, as the one contemplated under the EC Convention,
which deals primarily with matters of determination of transfer prices, i.e. disputes of fact. [34]
Finally, arbitration is not one of the mechanisms that requires the parties’ agreement for a solution to be reached, nor does
it sit in parallel with them. “Negotiation”, laudable as it is, only coins the process by which the parties involved reach an
agreement. “Mediation”, also known as conciliation, refers to a system where a third party is involved in that process.[35]As
much as a lot of expertise is needed, and the field has become increasingly sophisticated and specialized both according
to the matter, and to the role played by the mediator/conciliator, the common ground remains the same: it is the parties’
agreement (or the acknowledgement of the failure to reach such agreement by the mediator/conciliator) that puts an end
to the process, and has the legal value of a contract, rather than an arbitral decision.
With that in mind, it is difficult not to draw a parallel with the dispute resolution mechanism envisaged in the OECD
Model Convention, and followed by the US-Germany, US-Belgium or US-Canada Protocols. The so-called arbitration is
contemplated not as an autonomous mechanism, but rather as an appendix to the MAP between competent tax authorities,
to the extent that it is regulated in an additional paragraph to the provision on MAP, and for issues where such MAP fails
to result in an agreement (under the OECD Model the authorities can still resolve the case by mutual agreement, and
it will be the specific issue that will be resolved in arbitration).[36]In addition to this, the emphasis on the parties’ control
before, during and after the “arbitral” proceedings[37]is such that it can suggest an “enhanced” conciliation as much as a
“diminished” arbitration. Finally, the effect of the decision rendered by the arbitral board will be that of an agreement (as
if under the MAP) between the two CAs.[38]
Since the previous discussion could be dismissed as a matter of semantics, it is worth returning for a second to the initial
statement that “arbitration” may be in the eye of the beholder. This association of ideas is not as casual as it may seem.
Being a predominantly practical (as opposed to academic) discipline, “arbitration” can evoke in many practitioners not so
much abstract concepts as an aesthetic canon, as to how a type of proceedings tends to run, and what issues tend to
arise. As with the US judge who was asked to define “pornography”, an arbitral practitioner may shy away from defining
31. Andrew Tweddale & Keren Tweddale, Arbitration of Commercial Disputes , Oxford University Press, 2005, at 10 et seq. See also Julian Lew, Loukas
Mistelis & Stefan Kröll, supra n. 26 , at 10-12.
32. Andrew Tweddale & Keren Tweddale, supra n. 31 , at 15-17.
33. See IRS Rev. Proc. 2006-44 Appeals Arbitration Program , Internal Revenue Bulletin: 2006-44, 30 Oct. 2006; with regard to IRM 8.26.6 and
35.5.5.1-35.5.5.3; and also Announcement 2008-111 Test of Procedures for Mediation and Arbitration for Offer in Compromise and Trust Fund
Recovery Penalty Cases in Appeals , Internal Revenue Bulletin: 2008-48, 1 Dec. 2008, available at http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Arbitration-
Procedures-for-Appeals.
34. See , for example, articles 4 and 7 of the 90/463/EEC Convention.
35. Andrew Tweddale & Keren Tweddale, supra n. 31 , at 6-10; Julian Lew, Loukas Mistelis & Stefan Kröll, supra n. 26 , at 13-15.
36. Paragraph 62 of the OECD Commentary to Article 25 (paragraph 5) states that:
The arbitration process provided for by the paragraph is not an alternative or additional recourse: where the competent authorities have
reached an agreement that does not leave any unresolved issues as regards the application of the Convention, there are no unresolved
issues that can be brought to arbitration even if the person who made the mutual agreement request does not consider that the agreement
reached by the competent authorities provides a correct solution to the case. The paragraph is, therefore, an extension of the mutual
agreement procedure that serves to enhance the effectiveness of that procedure by ensuring that where the competent authorities cannot
reach an agreement on one or more issues that prevent the resolution of a case, a resolution of the case will still be possible by submitting
those issues to arbitration. Thus, under the paragraph, the resolution of the case continues to be reached through the mutual agreement
procedure, whilst the resolution of a particular issue which is preventing agreement in the case is handled through an arbitration process.
This distinguishes the process established in paragraph 5 from other forms of commercial or government-private party arbitration where the
jurisdiction of the arbitral panel extends to resolving the whole case.
See also Adolfo J. Martín Jiménez, supra n. 19 , at 6.4.
37. See sections 7.3. and 7.4.
38. See , for example, US-Belgium Protocol No. 6, (k), US-Germany Protocol No. XVI, 22, (k), US-Canada Protocol, article 21, which introduces new
article XXVI, paragraph 7(e); or US-France Protocol, article X, which introduces new article 26, paragraph 5(e).
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“arbitration” but would be sure to recognize it when seeing it. The problem with this is that so far, “tax arbitration” is in
an embryonic stage, with no well-documented international tax arbitration disputes. In the absence of a sample for him
to examine, our arbitration practitioner cannot conclude whether international tax arbitration has confounded its critics,
and revealed itself as the quick, flexible and no-nonsense practical mechanism that he identifies with arbitration, or rather,
it has materialized as the clumsy and bogged-down procedure prone to the type of stalling and strategic behaviour that
could be anticipated from provisions in tax treaties.
Again, these objections could be dismissed, not as a matter of semantics, but of snobbery. Surely, arbitration is not always
that quick, flexible and practical, and even if it were, different degrees of speed and flexibility could be tolerated without
stretching the definition too much. As such, “tax arbitration” could be regarded as a specific type of arbitration, with its own
peculiarities, not unlike other varieties, such as investment arbitration or securities arbitration.
The initial reluctance to accept a new field among the (already crowded) arbitration “club” always involves some snobbery,
and also insecurity. For an arbitration practitioner who presents as a multi-faceted expert with all-encompassing knowledge,
the inclusion of tax as a discipline suitable for arbitration is particularly forbidding; as a result of the peculiarity and
complexity of the disputes, but also of the need to reflect on whether some procedural specificities are needed as well.
However, the reluctance is also a manifestation of legitimate concerns about the suitability of current mechanisms for tax
dispute resolution to achieve the same “results” that arbitration has been providing for decades, and that have made it
worthy of the special protection dispensed by the legal order, in the form of court assistance and enforcement by regular
courts.[39]
This protection is based, as a matter of law, on the parties’ agreement, entered by their own volition prior to the dispute but,
as a matter of history, is legitimated by the arbitral tribunals’ record to serve the interests of the parties which appointed it.
In other words, protecting and supporting a system of justice that presents itself as an “alternative” to the justice dispensed
by ordinary courts, is only sound if that system proves to be a better mechanism for those types of dispute and the
parties involved in them.[40]“Better”, of course, does not mean that the substance of the decision must leave all parties
equally happy. It means that all parties have an equally “fair” chance to present their case, and that, after having given
due consideration to all views, arbitrators can give closure to the problem in a way that is both quick and definitive, but
also sufficiently flexible to adjust to the parties’ interests. From that perspective, the answer to the question of whether
“tax arbitration” is, or is not “arbitration” is not in itself important, but is important as a means of ascertaining whether the
mechanisms for resolving tax disputes serve the parties’ interests, and grant them a level of effectiveness akin to those of
“arbitral” mechanisms; one that justifies an equivalent legal protection to the “final”, “binding” and “enforceable” solution.
The answer to the question is “no”, or, at least, “not without qualifications”, which shows that sometimes disputes about
concepts go beyond mere linguistic purity. This can be seen in the fact that the attempts to create arbitral solutions for tax
disputes vary in the way the mechanism is referred to in the norm itself. Some, like the EC Convention, refer to an “advisory
commission”.[41]Others, like the OECD Model Tax Convention, the UN Model Tax Convention or the US Convention, talk
about “arbitration”,[42]but the names of the bodies entrusted with making the decision, albeit varying between “arbitration
board”[43]or “arbitral panel”,[44]fall shy of “tribunals”. This ambivalence goes far beyond semantics, and encapsulates
very well states’ and tax authorities’ mixed feelings towards arbitration: they want its advantages (professionalism, full-
dedication, flexibility or expediency) but none of the disadvantages (discretion by the tribunal, and loss of control on the
parties’ side).
39. See the New York Convention of 1958 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, or articles 5 and 6 of the UNCITRAL Model
Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985 with 2006 amendments).
40. The understanding of arbitration as a “service” to the parties involved in it, and the claim that the current state of arbitration law can only be
understood from that “service” perspective are ideas that first entered the academic discourse in the 1960s by means of Ms Ruvelin Devichi. Today
they are coined as the “autonomous” theory of arbitration, as an alternative to the classic debate between the “contractual” theory of arbitration,
which bases arbitration’s legal standing on the parties’ consent and agreement; and the “jurisdictional” theory of arbitration, which argues that such
standing is based on the consideration of arbitration as an “alternative” jurisdiction, but jurisdiction after all; and the synthesis of the two: the “mixed”
or “hybrid” theories. See Julian Lew, Loukas Mistelis & Stephan Kröll, supra n. 26 , at 79-82.
41. Art. 7(1) EC Convention 90/463/EEC.
42. Art. 25(5) OECD Model Tax Convention; art. 25(5), para. 2 (alternative B) UN Model Tax Convention; US-Belgium Protocol, no. 6; US-Germany
Protocol, XVI, 22; US-Canada Protocol, introducing new article XXVI(6); US-France Protocol, new article 25(5).
43. US-Belgium Protocol, no. 6, (b); US-Germany Protocol, XVI, 22, (b); US-Canada Protocol, introducing new article XXVI(6)(d).
44. OECD Model Tax Convention, Sample Agreement, nos. 12, 13(d), 15, commentary paragraphs 3, 9, 18, 30, 64, of which paragraph 64 is referenced
under paragraph 18 of the commentary to the UN Convention; and the provisions of the Sample Model Agreement are referred to in the annex to the
Commentary on Article 25; US-France Protocol, new article 25(5)(e).
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The process set forth in tax treaties could evolve into a full-blown arbitral process, but it contains too many inadequacies
and uncertainties to consider it tantamount to arbitration. In the following sections it will be shown that states and CAs
have done a thorough job in clipping the system’s wings, and undermining its potential for effectiveness and usefulness.
The system, as such, can be praised as “consistent”, albeit it is, alas, consistent in its mediocrity. And while that may work
in the authorities’ short-term interests, it is self-defeating in the long run, since it also leaves the authorities’ (not just the
taxpayers’) issues unresolved, to say nothing of the fact that such a “hybrid” system creates problems of its own, to which
conventional arbitration principles have no easy answer. To these we now turn.
7.3. Consent and jurisdiction
No matter the perspective one has on arbitration, the concept that consent provides the basis for arbitral jurisdiction is
settled. This single-minded focus poses serious questions for tax arbitration, as to who has consented to have their disputes
arbitrated, and what kind of disputes are encompassed by such consent. The answer to both questions determines, in
turn, the jurisdiction rationae personae and rationae materiae of the arbitral tribunal in tax disputes. These issues will be
examined under section 7.3.1. , preceded by an inquiry into the configuration of competence to decide on the arbitrators’
jurisdiction, which, worryingly – albeit unsurprisingly – presents (again) specialties in the tax context. Section 7.3.2. will be
dedicated to the specific issue of “two-tier” proceedings, where arbitration is preceded by a period where one or both parties
are expected to resort to a different mechanism to try and resolve the dispute. The visible (some would say oppressive)
presence of the “previous” stage in tax disputes makes the subject worthy of separate attention.
7.3.1. Jurisdiction/Arbitrability
7.3.1.1. Jurisdiction rationae personae
Consent is the basis of arbitration. The commitment of free will to resolving all future disputes arising in a certain context
by arbitration is what justifies the parties’ waiver of their rights to access other fora. Yet, consent is a tricky issue in
tax arbitration. First, there is the issue concerning the state, with its sovereign powers on taxation, and its sub-state tax
authorities ( see section 7.3.1.1.1. ). Second, there is the investor or taxpayer, whose actual status as a party is a subject
of controversy ( see section 7.3.1.1.2. ).
7.3.1.1.1. The state and its authorities. Issues with sovereign immunity and sub-state entities
When focusing on the state and its public authorities vis-à-vis arbitration proceedings, the first question we are confronted
with is whether a public authority can actually be a party to such proceedings. The same issue could well be addressed
under the heading on jurisdiction rationae materiae . If it is included here it is because the primary obstacle one has to deal
with is the state’s status as a party (and, more specifically, as a respondent) in judicial or arbitral proceedings.
The state’s immunity of jurisdiction and execution has long been a matter of controversy, as to its sources and its limits.
Until recently, there were still doubts as to whether it was an issue of comity, and thereby based on reciprocity, or else a
matter of law. The ICJ has greatly contributed to the clarification of this and many other aspects, in its ruling Germany v.
Italy ,[45]where immunity was considered to be a matter of law,[46]and thereby not one of comity.
In so doing, the ICJ confirmed much of the conventional wisdom on sovereign immunity, including the “functional”, rather
than “absolute” approach to sovereign immunity,[47]and this permits the possibility of waiver by an act of consent by the
state. Whether a sovereign state can be the subject of (arbitral) proceedings involving organs other than its own courts
is a settled matter. The extent of such jurisdiction could, potentially, be a more controversial issue, but one that bears a
more direct relationship with matters of jurisdiction rationae materiae .[48]
A second aspect of the “state” side of the dispute concerns the doubt as to who is really a party to the proceedings. In
both the OECD and UN Model Tax Conventions, as well as in specific treaties, the MAP, to which arbitration is attached,
45. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State ( Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervening ), 3 Feb. 2012, General List 143.
46. Id., paragraphs 54 to 58 (specifically, customary law, in the case of both countries). Furthermore, the ICJ also clarified the uncomfortable relationship
between sovereign immunity and human rights, by definitively holding that state courts cannot adjudicate on a dispute with another state, even
in cases of gross violations of human rights since human rights law is a matter of substance, whereas sovereign immunity has an incidence on
procedure. See id., paragraph 93.
47. The “functional” approach, i.e. that immunity (of jurisdiction, primarily) depends on the nature of the acts performed by a state. See Karl M.
Meessen, State Immunity in the Arbitral Process , in Norbert Horn & Stefan Kröll (eds.), Arbitrating Foreign Investment Disputes , The Hague, Kluwer
Law International, 2004, at 387, and references to the approach in Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States.
48. See section 7.3.1.2.
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takes place between CAs (i.e. tax administrations or agencies).[49]This would imply that, if arbitration ensues, the same
authorities are parties to the proceedings.[50]This solution is far from satisfactory, as it creates a duality between the parties
to the treaty, i.e. the states , and the parties to the proceedings, i.e. the authorities .
This duality of sorts is not unknown in international arbitration, and investment arbitration is a case in point. In this context,
it is not uncommon for investment contracts to be subscribed with a governmental department or agency, rather than the
government itself, on behalf of the state. If a controversy arises, one of the first issues to be determined is whether the
investor can resort to the dispute resolution mechanisms enshrined in investment treaties, which presume that the state is
a party to the proceedings. This, in turn, requires determination of whether the department or agency, or the state itself is
bound by the agreement. The Treaty that establishes the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID) contemplates the matter explicitly, by indicating that the state is expected to approve the consent of the subdivision
or agency of the state.[51]
In tax treaties, the matter is slightly more complicated. On the one hand, recourse to the dispute resolution mechanism
is made by direct reference to the treaty itself. On the other hand, there is a clear indication that participation in the
proceedings is restricted to the CAs.[52]The question, thus, is whether they participate in those proceedings on their own
behalf, or on behalf of the state. On the one hand, state consent to the treaty by means of ratification justifies that the state
itself should be bound by the award.[53]On the other hand, if one accepts that, in cases already decided by the courts, the
solution can be altered by negotiation and horse-trading between parts of the administrative branch, allowing the state
as a party to the proceedings could seriously impinge upon separation of powers and judicial review.[54]This is one of the
reasons why arbitration should be dissociated from the “agreement” procedure. Meanwhile, however, the conclusion of
the issue is not easy; it would require an in-depth analysis of the theory of the state and its organs and the discussion
would, in any event, be mostly fruitless. Even if one concludes that the authorities participate in the proceedings on behalf
of the state, the restrictions on the effects of the decision, and the (private) parties who can be subject to it as procedural
parties, already cripple the mechanism.
7.3.1.1.2. The private (non-)party as the catch in the game
As much as one can be surprised by the idiosyncratic treatment of the “official” parties to the tax arbitration proceedings,
that is nothing compared to the baffling status of the taxpayer. The private citizen having the status of a party is not unknown
in arbitral disputes involving states, where the investor can sue the state directly. This possibility, stated in a clear-cut
manner,[55]constitutes one of the keys to the success of investment arbitration and investment law.
The solution is much more complicated in tax arbitration. According to Model, and actual, tax treaties, arbitration
proceedings are initiated as a result of a request by the taxpayer (the matter is more complicated, as the taxpayer only
requests the initiation of a MAP, and after the expiry of a time period varying between 2 and 3 years, arbitral proceedings
“shall” or “may” follow).[56]
Notwithstanding that the initiative may be his, the taxpayer does not enjoy “party” status in the proceedings.[57]He does not
have any say in the appointment of the arbitrators.[58]The possibility to present his views is only given express provision in
49. Article 25(5) OECD Model Tax Convention; art. 25(5) (alternative B) UN Model Tax Convention; US-Belgium Protocol, no. 6; US-Germany Protocol,
XVI, 22; US-Canada Protocol, introducing new article XXVI(6); US-France Protocol, new article 25(5).
50. OECD Model Tax Convention Sample Agreement nos. 8, 9, 10, 12, 13(e), 14, 15, 16, 17; UN Model Tax Convention, commentary to article 25(5)
(alternative B) paragraphs 12, 13, 14, 16 (to name some); US-Belgium Protocol, no. 6, para. 1; US-Germany Protocol, XVI, 22, para. 1; US-Canada
Protocol, introducing new article XXVI(6), para. 1; US-France Protocol, new article 25(5), para. 1.
51. Article 25(3) of the ICSID Convention states: “Consent by a constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting State shall require the approval of that
State unless that State notifies the Centre that no such approval is required”.
52. This is reinforced by the fact that, in bilateral tax treaties, the decision from the arbitral board will be equivalent to an agreement of the two CAs
pursuant to the MAP.
53. The OECD Model leans towards this solution, since its Sample Agreement includes a reference to the fact that “The arbitration decision shall be
final”, and limits the grounds of non-enforceability (Sample Agreement, para. 18). Bilateral tax treaties ratified by the United States also indicate
that “the determination [of the arbitration board] shall constitute a resolution by mutual agreement under this Article and shall be binding on both
Contracting States with respect to that case” ( see , for example, article 13(6)(e) of the US-Germany treaty, which has been replicated in treaties with
Belgium, Canada or France, the italics are ours).
54. Some conventions try to introduce rules to avoid this problem. As such, the arbitral tribunal cannot decide on the issue if the matter has already been
subject to the decision of domestic courts. See section 7.5.2. , the subsection on parallel proceedings.
55. Art. 36(1) ICSID Convention.
56. The “shall” formula is the one under the OECD Model Tax Convention, whereas the “may” is a direct implication of the UN Model, where another act
of initiation is required from the tax authorities. See UN Model Tax Convention commentary to article 25(5) (alternative B), paragraphs 12 to 15.
57. Adolfo J. Martín Jiménez, supra n. 19 , at 6.4.
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the OECD Model[59]and the EC Convention.[60]In fact, the taxpayer has no right to have the issue resolved by arbitration.
Rather, the taxpayer has the right to petition for a MAP (and can insist that arbitral proceedings are initiated), but that
does not pre-determine the decision of the CAs, who can simply refuse.[61]Although the grounds of refusal are more
restricted once the authorities have initiated the MAP, and after the deadline stipulated in the instrument has passed, if
they have failed to reach an agreement, the authorities must initiate arbitration (at least under the OECD and US Models),
it is still the CAs, and not the taxpayer, who have the key to access the MAP.
If the status of the taxpayer has to be associated with a known institution in arbitration, it would be that of the “third party”
intervening in the arbitral proceedings.[62]Yet, in this sort of game of mirrors and shadows that states play with tax arbitration,
the instruments indicate that, even if the taxpayer has no right to initiate the proceedings, he can end them.[63]
This middle-of-the-road solution, in addition to its being ironic (no matter the legal status, from an economic perspective
the taxpayer is the one with more at stake) has a crippling effect on the guarantees of the proceedings and the finality of
the decision,[64]which have been key to arbitration’s expansion as an actual alternative to ordinary justice. No matter what
the legal argument may be, this approach can only be justified by the public authorities’ desire not to relinquish control over
proceedings and decisions. While one can be sympathetic with that position, the consequences are sufficiently serious as
to beg the question of whether the price has been too high.
7.3.1.2. Jurisdiction rationae materiae , and arbitrability
In the previous section we have briefly analysed the issues concerning the jurisdiction of the tribunal in tax
arbitration rationae personae , and reached the preliminary conclusion that the arbitral proceedings envisaged in tax
treaties err by far on the side of caution. In this part we will see that states’ tendency to be overcautious manifests itself
even more clearly in the issues of jurisdiction rationae materiae . For example, in investment treaties, tax is one of those
subjects that, despite receiving a more extensive treatment (or because of it), gives rise to the greatest uncertainty. When
one moves from investment to tax treaties, the potential scope for jurisdiction broadens but overzealous behaviour is still
the default rule.
Tax has been a controversial issue in international disputes involving state responsibility from their origins. Early in the
twentieth century, in the so-called Silesian claims ,[65]the controversy revolved around whether the arbitral tribunal could
adjudicate on a matter of taxes. As a result of the post-World War I arrangements, parts of Upper Silesia had been
given to Poland, and a system of protection against expropriation by the host state was set up. The Polish government
imposed a sort of tax (it was called a licence fee, but worked similarly to an excise tax) that was claimed to be tantamount
to expropriation, as a result of which a German brewer had to close his business. In the further proceedings, the
arbitral tribunal held an extremely formalistic interpretation of the notion of “expropriation”, in the sense that, since a tax
presupposed the existence of a business, there could have been no expropriation of that business.[66]
Today, fortunately for investors, there is an increased awareness of the endless varieties of plundering by states, and,
as a consequence, a more substantive, rather than formal, concept of expropriation is employed, one that takes into
consideration what the measure does, rather than what the measure is called.[67]
Still, even if protection against expropriation constitutes a cornerstone of investment protection, it is not the only standard of
treatment contemplated in investment treaties: national treatment (NT), most-favoured nation (MFN) or fair and equitable
(F&E) treatment are standards customarily used, depending on the level of protection that the host wishes to dispense
58. OECD Model Tax Convention Sample Agreement, para. 5; US-Belgium Protocol, no. 6(e); US-Germany Protocol, XVI, 22, (e); US-Canada
Memorandum of Understanding by the Competent Authorities, no. 6; US-France Memorandum of Understanding, no. 6.
59. OECD Model Tax Convention Sample Agreement, para. 11.
60. Art. 10 90/463/EEC Convention.
61. Ehad Farabh, Mandatory Arbitration of International Tax Disputes: A Solution in Search of a Problem , Florida Tax Review, vol. 9 (2009), at 713-742.
62. Bernard Hanotiau, Complex Arbitrations , Kluwer Arbitration, 2006, at 384; Stavros Brekoulakis, Third Parties in International Commercial Arbitration ,
Oxford University Press, 2011, at 272.
63. US-Belgium Memorandum of Understanding, no. 17; US-Germany Memorandum of Understanding, no. 18; US-Canada Memorandum of
Understanding, no. 17; US-France Memorandum of Understanding, no. 18.
64. See sections 7.5.2.1. and 7.5.2.2.
65. Kügele v. Polish State (1932), 6 ILR 69 (Upper Silesian Claims Tribunal).
66. Id. See analysis in William W. Park, supra n. 10 , at 188.
67. “Indirect” expropriation is currently accepted on an equal footing with direct expropriation, and the debate focuses on its boundaries, rather than on
the category itself. See OECD “Indirect Expropriation” and the “Right to Regulate”, in International Investment Law Working Papers on International
Investment , no. 2004/4, Sept. 2004; sec. IV World Bank Guidelines on Expropriation and Unilateral Alterations or Termination of Contracts; art. 13
Energy Charter Treaty; art. 1110 North American Free Trade Agreement.
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Jiménez-Valladolid de L'Hotellerie-Fallois eds., IBFD 2014), Online Books  (accessed 16 April 2019)
  9
©  Copyright 2019  IBFD: No part of this information may be reproduced or distributed without permission of IBFD.
Disclaimer: IBFD will not be liable for any damages arising from the use of this information.
Exported / Printed on 17 Sep. 2019 by IBFD.
Litigating EU Tax Law in International, National and Non-EU National Courts - Online Books (Last Reviewed: 1 July 2013 )
to investors from a signatory state. That variety, together with the growing number of treaties, and the unpredictable
relationships that can be created between them (something on which the MFN standard has a strong influence) make
states uneasy about the prospect that “policy” measures can come under close “legal” scrutiny. As a consequence, states
tend to insert carve-outs in the treaties so as to exclude from the applicability of certain standards, the policies deemed
crucial for the well-functioning of the state, or otherwise politically sensitive. Unsurprisingly, tax is among them.
Yet, the provisions employed in investment treaties to exclude tax policy from the scope of protective standards tend to
be extremely protracted, and work in a way that professor Park likens to that of the matryoshkas , or Russian dolls, as a
provision includes an exception, which, in turn, includes an exception to it, etc.[68]
A clear example of this tendency is, for example, article 2103 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
The provision begins: (i) by stating that nothing in the treaty shall apply to taxes (paragraph 1), and nothing in the article
shall affect the rights and obligations under tax conventions.[69]Then, (ii) notwithstanding this exclusion, market access
provisions requiring an NT, and those specific to export taxes, will apply;[70]and then, (iii) subject to the tax conventions NT
provisions for cross-border services and financial services shall apply to taxation measures on income, capital gains or on
the taxable capital of corporations , and to taxes related to the purchase or consumption of particular services ; and that
NT and MFN provisions for investment, cross-border services and financial services shall apply to all taxation measures,
other than those on income, capital gains or on the taxable capital of corporations, taxes on estates, inheritances, gifts
and generation-skipping transfers and on the purchase or consumption of particular services.[71]Yet, (iv) those provisions
will not apply to any collection measure, (v) to the extent that it does not arbitrarily discriminate between persons, goods or
services or nullify or impair the benefits accorded under them. However, (vi) the expropriation provisions act as a sort of
general guarantee, since they apply to (all) taxation measures,[72]bearing in mind that customs duties are not considered
as “taxes” under NAFTA.
The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) provides another example, which also: (i) begins by stating that the Treaty will not apply
to taxation measures;[73]then, (ii) that provisions on “transit” of energy materials, and NT provisions shall apply to taxes (iii)
except to taxes on income and capital;[74]and also (iv) with an exception made for collection measures, (v) except where
the measure arbitrarily discriminates or arbitrarily restricts benefits .[75]Then, (vi) expropriation provisions apply to taxation
(to the extent that a tax is expropriatory),[76]bearing in mind that (vii) the terms “tax provisions” and “taxes” do not include
customs duties .[77]
The difficulty of applying such a “cascade” of provisions is shown in the Occidental and Encana awards. These awards
have been compared by scholars such as Park to show how two separate tribunals could reach opposite conclusions on
the same single issue (Ecuador’s refusal to refund value added tax for purchases made by foreign oil companies) subject
to two treaties (Ecuador-United States, Ecuador-Canada) in which the language differed only slightly.[78]
The complexity of the legislative technique leading to this provision reflects a seemingly unstable compromise between the
governments’ willingness to signal their commitment towards investment protection to the international community – and to
68. In a witty comment, Park expands the remark by saying that tax carve-outs, however, differ from matryoshkas in a significant way, because
“[w]hile the doll releases smaller figures, treaty exceptions often reveal other exceptions that prove as capacious as the provision from which they
derogate” See William W. Park, supra n. 10 , at 188-189.
69. Paragraph 2 of the provision states that: “Nothing in this Agreement shall affect the rights and obligations of any Party under any tax convention. In
the event of any inconsistency between this Agreement and any such convention, that convention shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency.”
70. Art. 2103(3) NAFTA.
71. Art. 2103(4) NAFTA.
72. Art. 2103(6) NAFTA.
73. Art. 21(1) ECT.
74. Art. 21(2) and (3) ECT.
75. Art. 21(2) ECT.
76. Art. 21(5) ECT.
77. Art. 21(7)(d) ECT.
78. The provision in the Ecuador-US treaty began by stating that the treaty applied to taxation measures, albeit it later limited the applicability, whereas
the Ecuador-Canada treaty began by denying such applicability, and then established exceptions. Also, the provision on taxation in the Ecuador-
US treaty included a reference to the need for the states to “strive to accord fairness and equity” to foreign investors in their tax policies, a provision
that could have been interpreted as a policy aim, but that was held to be a legal standard similar to that of “fair and equitable” treatment (i.e.
ignoring the difference between “accord” and “strive to accord”). As such, in Occidental the tribunal held that such standard had been violated,
whereas in Encana the tribunal held that this and other standards were inapplicable to taxation, and that the tax measure did not amount to an
“expropriation”. See Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. Ecuador , 1 July 2004, American Journal International Law, vol. 99 (2005), at
675 et seq.; Encana v. Republic of Ecuador , 6 Feb. 2006, ILM, vol. 45 (2006), at 895. See especially William W. Park, supra n. 10 , at 194-200.
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Jiménez-Valladolid de L'Hotellerie-Fallois eds., IBFD 2014), Online Books  (accessed 16 April 2019)
  10
©  Copyright 2019  IBFD: No part of this information may be reproduced or distributed without permission of IBFD.
Disclaimer: IBFD will not be liable for any damages arising from the use of this information.
Exported / Printed on 17 Sep. 2019 by IBFD.
Litigating EU Tax Law in International, National and Non-EU National Courts - Online Books (Last Reviewed: 1 July 2013 )
preserve their sovereignty and the national interests of their citizens.[79]Nowhere is the delicate compromise more obvious
than in the so-called “joint tax veto”,[80]where, in expropriation and non-discrimination cases, the investor is required to
present the issue to the CAs, which have 6 months to decide jointly if there has been an expropriation. Only if no such
agreement has been reached, can an investor go to arbitration.[81]
7.3.2. Nature of consent and two-tier proceedings
7.3.2.1. Pre-dispute or post-dispute consent
In arbitration, a well-known (and logical) distinction is the one made between consent given after the dispute arises, and
consent given before any dispute arises. An expression of consent of the first kind is called “submission agreement” or,
in French compromis arbitral , whereas one of the second kind is an arbitration “convention” or “agreement” (or clause
compromissoire ).[82]Commercial and investment arbitration typically relies on the second kind, which explains an important
part of arbitration’s success. This is not to say that arbitration has always enjoyed such public support. For a large
part of the twentieth century, and earlier, commercial arbitration was received with hostility and contempt in the United
States,[83]which resulted in the ability of the parties to revoke consent to arbitration until the very moment when the award
was rendered.[84]Only the Federal Arbitration Act and its interpretation by the US Supreme Court[85]as an indication of a
policy change in favour of arbitration reversed the course, and gave rise to arbitration expansion.
The trouble with post-dispute consent is that, once a controversy has arisen, one can presume that the parties’ relationship
has soured, which makes it very difficult to agree on something, even if it is the best option for everyone, not to mention
the incentive to stall, or use dilatory tactics, especially for the party who has the least to lose from a delay in the solution.
Therefore, solutions like those of the former US-Germany[86]and the current Germany-Austria tax treaties or the UN Model
Tax Treaty, which require the authorities’ consent to initiate arbitral proceedings,[87]err on the side of caution, by yielding
too much to the states’ concerns about loss of sovereignty.
In this regard, the framing of the issue in the tax context has been particularly unhappily worded. First of all, for
someone coming from the arbitration field, it is very confusing to see references to “mandatory” arbitration as opposed
to “voluntary” arbitration.[88]Arbitration has to be voluntary, and not mandatory; that is what distinguishes it from other forms
of jurisdiction.[89]
79. Even if some early tax treaties included an arbitration provision its scope was very restrictive. For example, the US-German tax treaty of the
nineties excluded: “matters concerning either the tax policy or the domestic tax law of either country” (which seemed to lie at the discretion of
the International Revenue Service – IRS). See Paul D. Tutun, Arbitration Proceedings in the United States-German Income Tax Treaty: The
Need for Procedural Safeguards in International Tax Disputes , Boston University International Law Journal, vol. 12 (1994), at 191; David R.
Tillinghast, Choice of Issues To Be Submitted to Arbitration under Income Tax Conventions , in Essays on International Taxation (Herbert H. Alpert &
Kees van Raad eds., 1993), at 353.
80. William W. Park, supra n. 10 , at 193; William W. Park, Arbitration and the Fisc: NAFTA’s ‘Tax Veto’ , Chicago Journal of International Law, vol. 2
(2001), at 231-241; Abba Kolo, Tax ‘Veto’ as a Special Jurisdictional and Substantive Issue in Investor-State Arbitration: Need for Reassessment? ,
Suffolk Transnational Law Review, vol. 32 (2009), at 475-492.
81. Art. 2103(6) NAFTA; art. 21(5) ECT.
82. Andrew Tweddale & Keren Tweddale, supra n. 31 , at 98-99; Julian Lew, Loukas Mistelis & Stefan Kröll, supra n. 26 , at 100-101.
83. Allegedly a sentiment inherited from England. See Gary B. Born, International Commercial Arbitration , 2nd edn, Kluwer Law (2001), at 35.
84. Restatement (First) of Contracts , paragraph 550, Comment a (1932), not to mention the fact that, according to some courts, arbitration agreements
were contrary to public policy, as they ousted the courts from their jurisdiction. See Home Ins. Co. v. Morse , 87 U.S. 445, 457 F. (1847); Dickinson
Mfg. Co. v. American Locomotive Co. , 119 F. Supp. 488 (M.D.Pa. 1902).
85. Even though the FAA was enacted in 1925, the main cases by the US Supreme Court, which helped change the attitude towards arbitration for
good, were much later in time. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Company , 417 U.S. 506, 94 S.Ct. 2449 (1974); Southland Corp. v. Keating , 465 U.S. 1
(1984); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. , 514 U.S. 52 (1995), to cite only some.
86. The US-German tax treaty in the 1990s did establish pre-dispute consent, in the sense that it contemplated arbitration proceedings for cases
where the CAs could not reach an agreement, but it required CAs to begin the proceedings (it seems by mutual agreement, with the consent of
the taxpayer, but not prompted by him). Thus, in practice the consent was post-dispute. Furthermore, it stated that parties “may” submit a dispute
to arbitration. Nothing in the provision required that any case be submitted to arbitration. See US Treasury Treasury Technical Explanations of
1989 US-German Income Tax Treaty and Protocol 2 Tax Treaties (CCH) 39,066, at 39,060 (A-Z). See Paul D. Tutun, Arbitration Proceedings in the
United States-German Income Tax Treaty: The Need for Procedural Safeguards in International Tax Disputes , Boston University International Law
Journal, vol. 12 (1994), at 190. The mechanism was never tested (no dispute was ever submitted to arbitration). Nor under the similar US-Mexico tax
treaty. See Ehab Farah, Mandatory Arbitration of International Tax Disputes: A Solution in Search of a Problem , Florida Tax Review, vol. 9 (2009), at
742.
87. Art. 25(5) (alternative B) UN Model Tax Convention.
88. Ehab Farah, supra n. 86 , at 705 et seq.; Michael Mcintyre, Comments on the OECD Proposal for Secret and Mandatory Arbitration of International
Tax Disputes , 7 Florida Tax Review 9 (2006), at 624 to 630; William W. Park, supra n. 2 , at 811.
89. William W. Park, supra n. 2 , at 811.
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Jiménez-Valladolid de L'Hotellerie-Fallois eds., IBFD 2014), Online Books  (accessed 16 April 2019)
  11
©  Copyright 2019  IBFD: No part of this information may be reproduced or distributed without permission of IBFD.
Disclaimer: IBFD will not be liable for any damages arising from the use of this information.
Exported / Printed on 17 Sep. 2019 by IBFD.
Litigating EU Tax Law in International, National and Non-EU National Courts - Online Books (Last Reviewed: 1 July 2013 )
A more measured examination of the issue reveals that tax arbitration is, as could be expected, always voluntary. The
distinction refers to the moment when consent is given. That is, a distinction akin to that of compromis and convention: in
“mandatory” arbitration consent is pre-dispute and a right to arbitration is triggered automatically; in “voluntary” arbitration
further consent is necessary. The choice of words is important. “Mandatory” is a term associated with obliging someone
to adhere. Hardly appealing if the aim is to persuade a party to give up his ultimate choice over the dispute resolution
mechanism (which, in the case of states, involves sovereign rights).
Even if one accepts consent as the premise in the language employed, using words such as “irrevocable” hardly
ameliorates the issue. Of course in arbitration one knows that consent in an arbitration clause is irrevocable (unless
otherwise stated), but this can be employed as a descriptive term in arbitration circles, not as a selling point. A party who
is constantly reminded that he cannot backtrack on what he said is likely to have second thoughts about the wisdom of his
commitment. Therefore, the conclusions are quite clear. First, arbitration, in its pure form, is always a voluntary mechanism,
as it is based on consent. Second, the word “mandatory” in “mandatory arbitration” is incorrectly used, and, what is worse,
has a sort of ominous connotation for sovereign states. Third, to ensure that arbitration remains a useful mechanism to
resolve disputes, consent should be given prior to the dispute, and simply called “pre-dispute” consent.
7.3.2.2. Two-tier proceedings
Despite the discussion about the jurisdiction rationae personae, rationae materiae , and the nature and irrevocability of
states’ consent the key that messes-up everything is the two-tier nature of the proceedings. In all known tax treaties (Model
or real) the possibility of arbitration proceedings materializes only after a lengthy, and unsuccessful, negotiation process:
the MAP.
7.3.2.2.1. Two-tier proceedings in commercial and investment arbitration
Two-tier proceedings are not unknown in arbitration. In commercial contracts it is common to insert a clause that refers
disputes to an arbitral tribunal, but only after the parties have engaged either in negotiation, or mediation/conciliation
during a period of time, and this has turned out to be unsuccessful.[90]The controversy arises in the enforceability of such
clauses.[91]Does non-compliance of the negotiation/mediation period deprive the arbitral tribunal of jurisdiction?
The traditional view held in some jurisdictions like England was that, in general, agreements to negotiate (not necessarily
restricted to dispute resolution) were not enforceable.[92]This was taken perhaps a bit too literally by some courts which
held that the first tier of the dispute resolution procedure was unenforceable, even when it did not make reference simply
to negotiation, but, rather, to a more “structured” conciliation process, with reference to the International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC) Conciliation Rules.[93]Another alternative was to take a closer look at the rationale of the decisions on
the enforceability of agreements to negotiate, which was the courts’ concern: that this could give rise to the enforceability
of agreements to negotiate “in good faith” for an unspecified period of time.[94]This indicates that the sources of tension are
twofold: (i) the specificity of the conditions under which negotiation or mediation is to be conducted; and (ii) the standards
applicable to the parties’ conduct during the negotiation process.
90. Julian Lew, Loukas Mistelis & Stefan Kröll, supra n. 26 , at 182-185.
91. For a very clear and systematic analysis of the issue in comparative law, see Peter Tochtermann, Agreements To Negotiate in the Transnational
Context – Issues of Contract Law and Effective Dispute Resolution , Uniform Law Review (2008) at 685-712. For another clear and interesting
analysis, this one focused in the United States, see James Coben & Peter N. Thompson, Disputing Irony: A Systematic Look at Litigation about
Mediation , Harvard Negotiation Law Review, vol. 12 (2006) at 43 et seq.
92. Walford v. Miles [1992] 2 WLR 174 [1992] 2 AC 128, [1992] 1 All ER 453. In the case at hand, the agreement provided that the seller of a business
would negotiate in good faith with the prospective buyer, and would cease negotiations with third parties provided the prospective buyer gave certain
conditions. See also Courtney & Fairbairn Ltd. v. Tolaini Brothers (Hotels) Ltd. [1975] 1 W.L.R. 297.
93. Paul Smith Ltd. v. H & S International Holding Inc. [1991] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 127.
94. The decision of the House of Lords is a good indication of English courts’ reluctance to enforce open-ended standards such as good faith:
I believe it is helpful to make these observations about a so-called “lock-out” agreement. There is clearly no reason in English contract law
why A, for good consideration, should not achieve an enforceable agreement whereby B agrees for a specified period of time not to negotiate
with anyone except A in relation to the sale of his property [...] The agreement alleged in para 5 of the unamended statement of claim
contains the essential characteristics of a basic valid lock-out agreement, save one. It does not specify for how long it is to last. Bingham LJ
sought to cure this deficiency by holding that the obligations upon the respondents not to deal with other parties should continue to bind them
“for such time as is reasonable in all the circumstances” [...] However, as Bingham LJ recognised, such a duty, if it existed, would indirectly
impose upon the respondents a duty to negotiate in good faith. Such a duty, for the reasons which I have given above, cannot be imposed.
See Walford v. Miles [1992] 2 WLR 174 [1992] 2 AC 128, [1992] 1 All ER 453 per Lord Ackner.
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On the first count, English courts themselves have shown a move towards enforcing provisions where the “first tier” of the
resolution process was sufficiently specified, as the court did in the Channel Tunnel case,[95]albeit the default mood was
one of reluctance to give effect to agreements to negotiate.[96]In other countries, such as France or Australia, the courts
have signalled a willingness to enforce mediation agreements provided the agreement sets out the conditions under which
mediation will be conducted in a sufficiently clear manner.[97]
Perhaps the jurisdiction most likely to enforce the first tier of dispute resolution clauses is the United States. The pro-
arbitration policy of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), vehemently reinforced by the US Supreme Court jurisprudence,[98]has
led some courts towards an extremely liberal interpretation of “arbitration” as including almost any dispute resolution
mechanism decided by the parties, and thereby to enforce under the FAA clauses providing for non-binding expertise[99]or
mediation.[100]Albeit without the semantic confusion, there are aspects in common with the evolution in the United Kingdom.
The Woolf report[101]led to reforms designed to encourage the parties to solve their disputes outside the courts,[102]and this
led to decisions where “first-tier” clauses were enforced in a less hesitant manner, by making reference to the will of the
parties.[103]Provided the parties’ will is established, what was relevant was what the parties wanted, rather than the court’s
pre-conceived ideas about a “proper” dispute resolution process. In the international arena, Switzerland seems to be one
of the few examples where the courts remain prejudiced against the enforcement of clauses providing for a “first tier” in
dispute resolution proceedings.[104]
Even after having established the courts’ increasingly favourable policy towards clauses providing for “non-jurisdictional”
mechanisms, doubts remain in relation to mere “negotiation” clauses, which lack the structure that the presence of a third
party gives to dispute resolution processes. True, some of the reluctance of English courts to enforce such clauses lies
in the fact that such clauses have typically included a duty to negotiate “in good faith”, a concept abhorrent to the English
lawyer, especially in a context where parties adopt an adversarial attitude, as in negotiation.[105]But there are legitimate
concerns in this reluctance, since an agreement setting up a process of negotiation (in good faith or not) is tantamount to
an “agreement to agree”, which is unenforceable for lack of certainty.[106]In addition, the absence of a third party deprives
95. In Channel Tunnel Group Ltd. v. Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd [1993] AC 334 the dispute-resolution clause provided a resort to arbitration, but, in
its first part, it read as follows:
Settlement of disputes (1) If any dispute or difference shall arise during the progress of the Works [...] then [...] such dispute or difference
shall at the instance of either the Employer or the Contractor in the first place be referred in writing to and be settled by a Panel of three
persons (acting as independent experts but not as arbitrators) who shall unless otherwise agreed by both the Employer and the Contractor
within a period of 90 days after being requested in writing by either party to do so, and after such investigation as the Panel thinks fit, state
their decision in writing and give notice of the same to the Employer and the Contractor. (2) The Contractor shall in every case continue to
proceed with the Works with all due diligence and the Contractor and the Employer shall both give effect forthwith to every such decision of
the Panel [...] unless and until the same shall be revised by arbitration as hereinafter provided [...]
In the opinion of Lord Mustill, it was not the courts’ role to second-guess the choice made by sophisticated parties in arm’s length negotiations, but to
give effect to what they had chosen.
96. In Halifax Financial Services Ltd. v. Intuitive Systems Ltd [1999] 1 All E.R. (Comm) 303 McKinnon J held that the clause was “nearly an immediately
effective agreement to arbitrate, albeit not quite” (as Lord Mustill did in Channel Tunnel ), but concluded that the negotiation part, despite the fact that
it provided for the assistance of a mediator, did little more than to “make provision for the parties to negotiate, hopefully towards an agreement” and
held that it was unenforceable. The decision has been subject to criticism. See Julian Lew, Loukas Mistelis & Stefan Kröll, supra n. 26 , at 184.
97. In France, see Cour de Cassation , 14 Feb. 2003, Revue de l’arbitrage (2003) at 403 et seq., where the Court held the arbitral claims to be
inadmissible for not having fulfilled the mediation period. In Australia, see Hooper Bailie Associated Ltd v. Natcom Group Pty Ltd (1992) 28 NSWLR
194 (where the agreement was enforced); and Elizabeth Bay Developments Pty Ltd v. Boral Building Services Pty Ltd (1995) 36 NSWLR 709,
and Aiton Australia Pty Ltd v. Transfield Pty Ltd (1999) 153 FLR 236 (where the agreement was not enforced for lack of certainty). One could say
that, despite the approach being similar, the reluctance towards enforcement is greater among Australian courts. In Aiton Australia , for example, the
Court held that it could not enforce the agreement directly, through specific performance, but only indirectly, by decreeing a stay of proceedings, and
that, given the circumstances, it would refuse to do the latter as well. The lack of certainty was circumscribed to the determination of the mediator’s
remuneration. See Peter Tochtermann, supra n. 91 , at 708.
98. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Company , 417 U.S. 506, 94 S.Ct. 2449 (1974); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. , 514 U.S. 52, 115 S.Ct.
1212 (1995).
99. AMF, Inc. v. Brunswick , Corp. , 621 F.Supp. 456, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
100. Cecala v. Moore , 982 F.Supp. 609 (N.D. Ill. 1997). See Peter Tochtermann, supra n. 91 , at 699-702.
101. Lord Woolf, Master of the Rolls, Access to Justice. Final Report to the Lord Chancellor on the Civil Justice System in England and Wales , July 1996.
Available at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dca.gov.uk/civil/final/index.htm.
102. Peter Tochtermann, supra n. 91 , at 690-692.
103. Cable & Wireless Plc v. IBM United Kingdom Ltd. [2002] EWHC 2059 (Comm Ct). In fact, this was the key element of the Channel
Tunnel decision. See Channel Tunnel Group Ltd. v. Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd. [1993] AC 334.
104. Peter Tochtermann, supra n. 91 , at 709 and 710 with reference to a decision by the Swiss Kassationsgericht Zürich.
105. See the excellent analysis of Peter Tochtermann, supra n. 91 , at 686.
106. Courtney & Fairbairn Ltd. v. Tolaini Brothers (Hotels) Ltd [1975] 1 W.L.R. 297; Walford v. Miles [1992] 2 A.C. 128; Paul Smith Ltd. v. H & S
International Holding Inc [1991] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 127; but see also CertainTeed Corp. v. Celotex Corp. and Celotex Asbestos Settlement Trust , no.
Civ.A. 471, 2005 WL 217032 (Del. Ch. Jan. 24, 2005), in the United States.
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the process of much of its structure, and eliminates the main arguments employed by some courts to uphold such “first-
tier” resolution processes.[107]Even the most liberal of judges would hesitate before enforcing a clause that may give rise
to open-ended and pointless negotiations, not only for its lack of certainty, but because it is difficult to conclude that this
was the parties’ choice.
A similarly pragmatic stance (perhaps excessively pragmatic) has led arbitral tribunals in investment disputes to disregard,
as a matter of course, two-tier clauses as they view these clauses as an impediment to their exercise of jurisdiction.
International investment law and arbitration have significantly evolved from the times of the Calvo doctrine, where protection
under international law of the nationals of one state against another state was only possible when the former state itself
acted as claimant, by espousing the claims of its nationals through diplomatic protection, which required that an individual
had already exhausted the domestic remedies of the defendant state.[108]Even though some treaties follow this historical
practice and include a requirement that the investor exhausts the domestic remedies of the host state before starting
arbitral proceedings, most bilateral investment treaties (BITs) currently provide for a two-tier structure that resembles the
one just examined for commercial disputes, i.e. one that, before resorting to arbitration, only requires an attempt to settle
the differences amicably, through negotiation. Some treaties employ a more vague style (US Model BIT),[109]but others
make a clear reference to specific periods for negotiation (typically 6 months).[110]
Arbitral tribunals confronted with cases where a private investor had not waited until the end of the period stipulated
in the treaty to bring a claim, have tended to dismiss this omission, by holding that the 6-month negotiation period
was a procedural, rather than jurisdictional, requirement, and that non-compliance with it could not affect the tribunal’s
jurisdiction.[111]
However, the view is not unanimous, and there have also been arbitral awards, like that under the Enron v. Argentina case,
where the arbitral tribunal – albeit finding that it had jurisdiction – did so because the waiting period had been complied with,
and added in an obiter dictum that, had it not been complied with, the objection would not have been merely procedural,
107. In Hooper Bailie Associated Ltd v. Natcom Group Pty Ltd (1992) 28 NSWLR 194 the Court dwelt extensively on the issue of why a court should
enforce a process that required cooperation to be successful despite the reluctance of one party being taken to presume its lack of cooperation. The
Court stated that:
Conciliation or mediation is essentially consensual, and the opponents of enforceability contend that it is futile to seek to enforce something
which requires the cooperation and consent of a party when cooperation and consent cannot be enforced; equally, they say that there can
be no loss to the other party if for want of cooperation and consent the consensual process would have led to no result. The proponents of
enforceability contend that this misconceives the objectives of alternative dispute resolution, saying that the most fundamental resistance
to compromise can wane and turn to cooperation and consent if the dispute is removed from the adversarial procedures of the courts and
exposed to procedures designed to promote compromise, in particular where a skilled conciliator or mediator is interposed between the
parties. What is enforced is not co-operation and consent, but participation in a process from which co-operation and consent might come .
[Emphasis added]
This argument, which constitutes the centerpiece of Australian courts’ current, and relatively liberal, stance towards “first-tier” clauses, disappears
with the third party (mediator or conciliator), who is the one creating the “process” from where cooperation might come.
108. The doctrine was originally formulated in Carlos Calvo, Derecho internacional teórico y práctico de Europa y América , Paris: 1868. See Alwyn V.
Freeman, Recent Aspects of the Calvo Doctrine and the Challenge to International Law , 40 The American Journal of International Law 1 (1946),
at 121 et seq.; Paul C. Szasz, The Investment Disputes Convention and Latin America , Vanderbilt Journal of International Law, vol. 11 (1971),
at 256 et seq. For a more modern take on how the doctrine has been excluded in the ICSID Convention, and how it has made a (more discreet)
comeback, see Christopher Schreuer, Calvo’s Grandchildren: The Return of Local Remedies in Investment Arbitration in The Law and Practice of
International Courts and Tribunals , Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2005, at 1-17.
109. Article 23 (Consultation and Negotiation) of the US Model BIT states that: “In the event of an investment dispute, the claimant and the respondent
should initially seek to resolve the dispute through consultation and negotiation, which may include the use of nonbinding, third-party procedures”.
Article 24 (Submission of a Claim to Arbitration), for its part, states that: “In the event that a disputing party considers that an investment dispute
cannot be settled by consultation and negotiation”. Thus, leaving the decision on whether the dispute can or cannot be settled by negotiation to each
party, it is difficult that the clause is determinant of an arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction.
110. See , for example, article 1120 of NAFTA (Submission of a Claim to Arbitration) which states that: “Except as provided in Annex 1120.1, and
provided that six months have elapsed since the events giving rise to a claim, a disputing investor may submit the claim to arbitration”; or article 10
of the German Model BIT, which, after stipulating for the need to settle divergencies amicably “as far as possible”, states in its clause (2) that: “If
the dispute cannot be settled within six months of the date on which it was raised by one of the parties to the dispute, it shall, at the request of the
investor of the other Contracting State, be submitted to arbitration”.
111. Ethyl Corp. v. Canada , Decision on Jurisdiction, 7 ICSID Reports 12, paras. 76-88; Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi AS v. Pakistan ,
Decision on Jurisdiction, 14 Nov. 2005, paras. 88-103; Ronald Lauder v. The Czech Republic, Final Award, 3 Sept. 2001, 9 ICSID Reports 66,
paras. 183-187; SGS v. Pakistan , Decision on Jurisdiction, 6 Aug. 2003, 8 ICSID Reports 406, para. 184. See , for an excellent summary of the
situation, Christoph Schreuer, Travelling the BIT Route – Of Waiting Periods, Umbrella Clauses and Forks in the Road , Journal of World Investment
and Trade, vol. 5 (2004), at 232 et seq.; and, from the same author, Consent to Arbitration in Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino & Peter Schreuer
(eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law , Oxford University Press, 2008, at 844-846.
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but jurisdictional, and the tribunal would not have found itself competent.[112]Furthermore, in a recent case, the Court of
Appeals of the District of Columbia[113]reversed the prior decision of the District Court[114]and vacated the arbitral award in
the case BG v. Argentina ,[115]on the grounds that the tribunal, by disregarding the 18-month waiting period, had exceeded
its authority.[116]The case has not yet been finally settled, as it is pending before the Supreme Court, and numerous petitions
for amicus briefs have been presented,[117]but it is an indication that both the relevance of “first-tier” procedures, and the
competence to examine them, are still a matter of contention.
7.3.2.2.2. Two-tier proceedings in tax arbitration, and the parties’ initiative to start proceedings
This all leaves us with quite a bit of uncertainty when it comes to analysing the issue from the perspective of tax treaties.
In principle, the way the dispute resolution mechanism is conceived in the OECD Model, UN Model or all of the ratified
treaties containing an arbitral clause, means that it is difficult even to talk about “two-tier” proceedings, since “one-tier with
epilogue” would be more accurate. Arbitral proceedings are contemplated not in separate provisions, but in a paragraph of
the MAP.[118]What is worse is that there is a tendency among tax experts to see the arbitral proceedings as a sort of “sword
of Damocles”, waiting to fall on the states’ heads should they fail to resolve the dispute by means of negotiation within
the allocated time.[119]For someone coming from the arbitration field, it is a bit odd – not to say shocking – to see arbitral
proceedings turned into a threat, rather than an opportunity, and perhaps this – more than anything else – contributes to
their bizarre configuration in tax treaties.
The provisions make reference to the fact that, once the 2-year period for the MAP has elapsed, the issue shall be resolved
in arbitration,[120]or that binding arbitration shall be used to determine the application of the treaty provisions.[121]This does
not, however, say much about how arbitral proceedings are supposed to be initiated, or the respective roles of the CAs
and taxpayers therein.
The access to MAPs has been clarified in the commentaries to the treaties, and in (judicial and administrative) practice.
Taxpayers can “request” the initiation of a MAP, but they have no “right” to such proceedings.[122]The CAs must decide
whether it is “pertinent” to start them. In some countries, like Spain, the courts have held that, while having wide powers,
the CA’s decision is not entirely discretionary;[123]in other countries this is unclear, but it seems obvious that CAs have
ample scope to grant, or deny, access to a MAP. If taxpayers do not have a right to “access” the proceedings, they do not
have a right to obtain a “solution”, that is, unless 2 years have passed without an agreement that resolves the matter in
which case a reference to arbitration shall be made. The question is how do such arbitral proceedings begin.
On the one hand, it seems odd that the taxpayer, who has no party rights to initiate the MAP, should be vested with them to
set arbitral proceedings in motion. On the other hand, if the taxpayer had no such right, this would render the reference to
arbitration meaningless. In examples like the UN Model Tax Convention, or the Germany-Austria treaty, there is a reference
to the need for the authorities to “agree” again to arbitral proceedings (a sort of arbitral compromis )[124]but this sits in
contrast to those other examples where recourse to arbitration seems to follow automatically from the exhaustion of the 2-
year period. Since arbitration does not commence automatically (a party has to submit a dispute, appoint an arbitrator, etc.)
it follows that one of the CAs can begin the proceedings without the other CA’s agreement.[125]The troublesome scenario
112. Enron Corp. and Ponderosa Assets, LP v. Argentina , Decision on Jurisdiction, 14 Jan. 2004, 11 ICSID Reports 273, para. 88. See also Goetz v.
Burundi , Award, 10 Feb. 1999, 6 ICSID Reports 5, paragraphs 90 to 93. See also Peter Schreuer, supra n. 111 , at 846.
113. Republic of Argentina v. BG Group PLC, 764 F. Supp. 2d 21 (D.D.C. 2011).
114. Republic of Argentina v. BG Group PLC, 715 F.Supp.2d 108 (D.D.C. 2010).
115. BG Group plc v. Republic of Argentina , Final Award, 24 Dec. 2007.
116. A ground of annulment under section 10(a) of the FAA.
117. Sebastian Perry, BG v Argentina appeal draws amicus briefs in Global Arbitration Review, vol. 7, issue 5, 4 Sep. 2012.
118. Art. 25(5) OECD Model Tax Convention; art. 25(5) (Alternative B) UN Model Tax Convention; art. 25(5) and (6) US-Germany tax treaty; art. 24(7) and
(8) US-Belgium tax treaty; art. XXVI(6) US-Canada tax treaty.
119. See Adolfo J. Martín Jiménez, supra n. 19 , at 6.2. Also, according to Desax and Veit, “Possibly, the mere existence of the supplemental arbitration
procedure will cause the competent authorities to reach agreement, and to reach agreement before the two-year waiting period to institute arbitration
proceedings expires”. See Marcus Desax & Marc Veit, Arbitration of Tax Treaty Disputes: The OECD Proposal , 23 Arbitration International 3 (2007),
at 429.
120. Art. 25(5) OECD Model Tax Convention; art. 25(5) (alternative B) UN Model Tax Convention; new paragraph (6) of article 26 introduced by
article 21(1) of the US-Canada Protocol.
121. US-Belgium Protocol, no. 6, first paragraph; US-Germany Protocol, article XVI, no. 22, first paragraph.
122. Ehab Farah, Mandatory Arbitration of International Tax Disputes: A Solution in Search of a Problem , 9 Florida Tax Review 8 (2009), at 713-748.
123. See Jose M. Calderón, The Taxpayer’s Right To Set the ‘Mutual Agreement Procedure’ in Motion: The Spanish Tax Court’s Approach , Intertax, vol.
29 (2001) at 362 to 364, with references to Spanish case law.
124. See section 7.3.2.1.
125. If an agreement were necessary, the system would be the same as that of other treaties expressly requiring agreement, and then the different
language would have to be considered meaningless, which does not seem a reasonable interpretation of the drafters’ intention.
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is not that situation – rather the one where the 2 years have passed – yet, none of the CAs wishes to start the proceedings
for fear of souring their relationship with the other CAs. If there was no remedy to that impasse, the “shall be resolved in
arbitration” provision would be meaningless.
One way of dealing with such an impasse, would be to give the taxpayer the possibility of going to the national courts, to
seek an order requiring the CA to start arbitration. In response to the taxpayer’s request, it does not seem that the courts
could hold that the CAs have “discretion”, or even any room for manoeuvre; hence, they should make an order but the
problem would, again, depend on the configuration of the right of access to justice, and the right to a proper remedy, in
the jurisdiction involved. Therefore, even though the language of the treaty is clear, the taxpayer would still have to show
that he has standing in order to claim its breach.
7.3.2.3. Competence-competence in tax arbitration: The elephant in the room
The most basic questions arise when we move from theorizing about tax treaties to actually considering how proceedings
are started. The first question, as seen above, is whether the taxpayer has any right to prompt the commencement of the
proceedings if CAs seem too complacent or in a gridlock. The second is whether the arbitral tribunal has the power to decide
that such proceedings can begin (which includes the power to decide whether the 2-year period has been exhausted, or
was pointless, or whether any of the impediments set forth in the treaty are present in the case).
This turns to the fundamental issue of competence-competence : the arbitral tribunal’s power to rule on its own jurisdiction.
In commercial or investment arbitration this principle is taken for granted, meaning that arbitral tribunals, almost by
definition, have the competence to rule on their own jurisdiction, according to the most important statutory rules applicable
to international adjudication and jurisdiction.[126]
In international tax arbitration, on the other hand, the standing of this principle is problematic. Regulating the arbitral
procedure as an appendix to the conciliation procedure (whether it is denominated as MAP or otherwise) or, at best,
without drawing any clear distinctions between one and the other, puts into question the very “jurisdictional” essence of the
mechanism, which is one of the keys to its success. This is seen, for example, in the emphasis on the control by the CAs
of the access to arbitral proceedings, in a similar vein as happens in the conciliatory procedure: CAs may preclude arbitral
proceedings if they agree on the issue.[127]In addition, under US treaties such as those with Germany and Belgium, the
two authorities can exclude arbitral proceedings if they “agree that the particular case is not suitable for determination by
arbitration”,[128]an agreement that, in the case of the US-France treaty, must be prior to the beginning of arbitration.[129]In
the US-Canada treaty, the focus on consent by the authorities looks almost obsessive and provides for some strange
reading, since the provision states that a case can only be decided in arbitration if it
“[…] (i) Is a case that: (A) Involves the application of one or more Articles that the competent authorities have agreed
in an exchange of notes shall be the subject of arbitration; and (B) Is not a particular case that the competent
authorities agree, before the date on which arbitration proceedings would otherwise have begun, is not suitable for
determination by arbitration; or (ii) Is a particular case that the competent authorities agree is suitable for determination
by arbitration […]”.[130]
This broad discretion of the CAs to preclude, or put an end to, the proceedings is not alien to arbitral practice, where
parties can customarily stop the proceedings, or even settle the matter, with that settlement being recorded in the form of
an award and having the same status as an award decided by the arbitral tribunal itself.[131]Therefore, an emphasis on the
parties’ control is not, per se, an obstacle to the principle of competence-competence , and may be over-interpreted in the
case of tax arbitration because one tends instinctively to see the taxpayer as a party, which, as shown above, he is not.
One can argue that this solution is skewed towards the interests of tax administrations, and against those of the taxpayer
(and the author would agree), but that objection is not the same as suggesting that competence-competence is absent.
126. This is contemplated in article 16(1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, article V(3) of the European Convention,
article 41(1) of the ICSID Convention, or article 36(6) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
127. See OECD Commentary of the Model Tax Convention, article 25, paragraphs 70 and 71; article 7(1) of the EC Convention.
128. US-Belgium Protocol, no. 6, first paragraph; US-Germany Protocol, article XVI, no. 22, first paragraph.
129. New article 26(5)(b) of the Treaty, as introduced by the Protocol, indicates that the case shall be resolved through arbitration if “the case is not a
particular case that both competent authorities agree, before the date on which arbitration proceedings would otherwise have begun, is not suitable
for determination by arbitration”.
130. US-Canada Protocol, article 21, new article XVI, no. 6.
131. See , for example, article 31 of the ICC Arbitration Rules; article 30(1) and (2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law.
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A more important test for the absence of competence-competence would be the possibility that parties (i.e. CAs) have, of
unilaterally leaving the proceedings, and here the issue is more confusing. If one relies on the OECD Model for example, its
Commentary indicates that, “ where serious violations of domestic laws resulting in significant penalties are involved, some
States may wish to deny access to the mutual agreement procedure”,[132]and later adds that, “Where the mutual agreement
procedure is not available, for example because of the existence of serious violations involving significant penalties [...], it
is clear that paragraph 5 (arbitration) is not applicable”.[133]This has led at least one author to suggest that the competence-
competence principle does not apply, with the argument that “the road to arbitration is blocked”.[134]
But precluding arbitration in some cases is not tantamount to precluding competence-competence (if so, every limit to the
possibility of arbitration would be seen as a limit to the principle). What matters is the unilateral decision to pull out once
the conditions for arbitration are fulfilled. What the OECD Model suggests is that CAs can refuse to start a MAP if the issue
is one involving penalties, in which case there would be no arbitration. The relevant question is, once the MAP has been
resorted to, and the 2-year period has expired, and the taxpayer has requested arbitration, and one of the CAs has begun
proceedings and, say, appointed a member to the arbitral tribunal: can the other authority unilaterally pull out by starting
proceedings for the imposition of penalties, so that the arbitral tribunal can say, or decide, nothing? If the answer to this
question is “yes”, the competence-competence principle would be curtailed, but the question is more contentious than the
previous, simpler, one, and the OECD Model, or its Commentary, does not provide an answer to it.
The texts that develop the US treaties regulate the matter more specifically. In particular, the vague references in the
Protocols to the requirement that CAs “agree” that the matter is “suitable” for arbitration, or that they “do not agree” that
the matter “is not suitable”, are further elaborated in the Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) signed by the CAs . Such
Memoranda include a provision on “Cases Eligible for Arbitration”, and another on “Cases Ineligible for Arbitration”.[135]The
first provision indicates that arbitration will be available in “any case where the competent authorities have endeavored
but are unable to reach an agreement”,[136]which will include cases of APAs.[137]More importantly, it indicates that “Once
a case is accepted into the mutual agreement procedure, neither competent authority will cease unilaterally to consider a
case […]”, except for the circumstances described in the provision on Cases Ineligible for Arbitration.[138]
The provision on Cases Ineligible for Arbitration contemplates the possibility, already stated in the treaties, that the
authorities agree on the case’s “unsuitability” for arbitration, which, the MoUs seem to suggest, will occur in cases where
the taxpayer has started parallel proceedings.[139]In addition to this (and what constitutes the more problematic provision),
the MoUs indicate that “Arbitration is not available for a case that neither competent authority has accepted, or in which
either competent authority ceases to provide assistance, in accordance with published guidance”.[140]Such guidance is
132. It also adds that “The circumstances in which a State would deny access to the mutual agreement procedure should be made clear in the
Convention”. See Commentary to the OECD Convention, article 25, paragraph 26.
133. Id., para. 68.
134. See Marcus Desax & Marc Veit, Arbitration of Tax Treaty Disputes: The OECD Proposal , 23 Arbitration International 3 (2007), at 315. Similar to the
EU Arbitration Convention, the Commentary to the new Article 25(5) of the Model Convention provides for the possibility for the Contracting States to
exclude recourse to arbitration in the event of a “serious violation involving significant penalties”. This is consistent with the provisions governing the
mutual agreement procedure and which state that this remedy may not be available under these circumstances. Since, in such instances, the road to
arbitration is blocked, it is not possible for the arbitrators to decide whether the conditions of a “serious violation involving significant penalty” are met
(hence no “Kompetenz-Kompetenz” with the arbitrators).
135. Secs. 1 and 2 US-Belgium MoU; secs. 2 and 3 US-Germany, US-Canada, US-France MoUs.
136. Sec. 1, first paragraph US-Belgium MoU; sec. 2(a) US-Germany, US-Canada, US-France MoUs.
137. Sec. 1, second paragraph US-Belgium MoU; sec. 2(b) US-Germany MoU; sec. 2(c) US-Canada MoU. The US-France MoU does not include such
provision.
138. Sec. 1, third paragraph US-Belgium MoU; sec. 2(c) US-Germany MoU; sec. 2(d) US-Canada MoU; sec. 2(b) US-France MoU.
139. “Seem to suggest” because the drafting is hardly enlightening. The US-Belgium MoU states that the case will be ineligible if there are parallel
proceedings; and then, in a separate paragraph, if the CAs agree that it is “unsuitable” (US-Belgium MoU, no. 2, paragraphs 4 and 5). Under the
US-German MoU, the case will be ineligible if the CAs so agree ( see US-Germany MoU, no. 3(b)); which the authorities will consider , among other
situations, when the taxpayer dockets the case or there is an administrative appeal ( see US-Germany MoU, no. 3(b)(ii-iii)) (but also when there is
an inordinate/repeated delay in the response of a taxpayer to a request of information; see id. no. 3(b)(i)). The same happens with the US-France
MoU ( see no. 3(b)(1-iii)). In the US-Canada MoU, the CAs’ agreement on the “unsuitability” of the case, and the taxpayer’s recourse to parallel
proceedings are stated as separate causes of ineligibility, as in the US-Belgium MoU, but, unlike it, the latter is stated after the former (US-Canada
MoU no. 3(b) (agreement); (c) and (d) (parallel proceedings)) rather than before , which could suggest that the scenario of parallel proceedings
is a specification of cases where the CAs will agree on the unsuitability (as in the US-Germany MoU). The possibility of CAs’ agreement on the
unsuitability of the case for arbitration in circumstances other than in parallel proceedings exists (even under US-Germany and US-France MoUs the
examples of cases where there would be agreement are not put in an exhaustive manner) but the way the provisions are drafted does not suggest
an unfettered discretion to decide on political grounds.
140. US-Belgium MoU, no. 2, first paragraph; no. 3(a) in the US-Germany, US-Canada, US-France MoUs.
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referred to in the different MoUs, and, for example for the United States, it is stipulated under section 12.02 of Revenue
Procedure 2006-54,[141]which permits the CA to cease to provide assistance, in other situations, where:
(1) competent authority determines that the taxpayer is not entitled to the treaty benefit or safeguard in question or
to the assistance requested;
(2) the taxpayer is willing only to accept a competent authority agreement under conditions that are unreasonable or
prejudicial to the interests of the U.S. Government;
[...]
which are discretionary. MAP procedures are (as shown above) subject to some degree of administrative discretion, and
it is conventional wisdom that a party can pull out of a negotiation. The question is whether it can also pull out when a
third party has been appointed. In this regard, there is a certain degree of contradiction between the Protocols, which
indicate that arbitration can only be excluded by the CAs’ agreement , and the MoUs, which suggest that CAs can pull
out unilaterally, on sheer discretionary grounds. In case of doubt the Protocol prevails, the question being whether the
regulation of the arbitral proceedings as an addition to the MAP implies the application of the MAP rules, even when they
overtly contradict the specific provisions of the arbitral proceedings.
The answer to this question would determine the nature and extent of the competence-competence principle in the context
of tax arbitration, and the question itself would turn on an interpretation of the intention of the drafters in making reference
to “arbitration”. Arbitration is not just a term of art, or a business term, but a legal term, one which has an inherently
“jurisdictional” connotation, unless one concludes that the states simply made a mistake. However, that could only happen
if the substance of the proceedings envisaged in the treaties clearly contradicted the express language, which talks of
“arbitration”.
A similar approach impinges upon the competence-competence principle. If one concludes that it stems from the arbitration
rules chosen by the parties (now most arbitration rules include it),[142]that would give rise to a circular argument: the arbitral
tribunal would have competence to rule on its own jurisdiction because the rules chosen by the parties say so, but then,
where would the competence to examine whether the parties have consented come from? That is why the source of
the competence-competence must come from a source external to the parties’ agreement. In commercial arbitration the
problem is avoided by the inclusion of competence-competence , as a matter of public policy, in most arbitration laws,[143]but
this raises the question of what happens in disputes against states, where “consent” and “law” are difficult to separate, as
the former may be manifested through the latter (as in a treaty).
In investment disputes subject to ICSID there is dissociation between the consent to arbitrate, in the investment treaty, and
the consent to the dispute being decided in the framework of ICSID, which is in the ICSID Treaty. This does not however
resolve the issue in cases where nothing is said, for example because the dispute is decided outside the ICSID framework,
by means of an ad hoc arbitration. Some ad hoc tribunals have indicated that the competence-competence principle does
not stem from statutory provisions, but is a “customary rule, which has the character of necessity, derived from the
jurisdictional nature of the arbitration, confirmed by case law more than 100 years old and recognized unanimously by
the writings of legal scholars”.[144]
The underlying rationale is that if one appoints a person to decide on something, it is only a matter of logic that that person
must decide whether to decide. Otherwise, there would be no difference between the party who decides and the parties
who dispute.[145]A similar rationale, based on logic and necessity, has historically led to the establishment of the principle
of judicial review in constitutional,[146]as well as international law.[147]Yet, what if the parties insist on being illogical and
141. Available at http://www.irs.gov/irb/2006-49_IRB/ar13.html#d0e2210.
142. See , for example, article 23(1) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules; art. 6(3) and (5) ICC Arbitration Rules; art. 23(1) LCIA Arbitration Rules;
art. 15(1) AAA International Dispute Resolution Procedures; art. 34(1) Madrid Court of Arbitration Rules.
143. That is certainly the case of those inspired in the UNCITRAL Model Law, and its article 16(1).
144. Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company/California Asiatic Oil Company v. The Government of the Lybian Arab Republic , Preliminary award on
jurisdiction, 27 Nov. 1975.
145. Hence the importance of conceptually distinguishing between “arbitration” and “mediation”, and, in this regard, the reference to “arbitration” in the
treaty provisions establishes a strong presumption in favour of its being qualified as such.
146. Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
147. Question of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Lybian Arab Jamahiriya v.
United Kingdom), Provisional Measures, Order of Apr. 14 1992 , ICJ Reports 1992, 3, paragraph 39 (where the ICJ indicated that the parties were
bound by the overriding duties imposed by the UN Charter, which included the possibility of UN Security Council sanctions, but it did not declare its
lack of jurisdiction to adjudicate on UN Security Council Resolutions).
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irrational, and exclude competence-competence in their tax treaty? The first answer to that question would turn into an
inquiry on whether the competence-competence principle, even if part of customary international law, forms part of that
selected group of norms called ius cogens or “international public order” ( ordre public international ), to which there is no
easy answer (which, in any event, would exceed the scope of the present study). The second, more pragmatic, answer,
would turn to the interpretation of the tax treaty, pursuant to the rules of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
article 31(1) of which refers to the need to interpret treaties “in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose”.[148]
Thus, the question is not only one of vocabulary (one could argue that, even bearing in mind the use of the word “arbitration”,
it is significant that the US treaties carefully avoid use of the word “tribunal”, and refer instead to a “board”) but of systematic
interpretation: if one party can unilaterally pull out of the proceedings in a discretionary manner, then the statement that the
issue “shall be resolved” in arbitration, or the one indicating that the decision “shall be binding on the Contracting States”
would be false. It would be false unless the process for pulling out of the arbitral proceedings once they had started was a
regulated process where the arbitrators have decision-making power. If the arbitrators cannot control whether the criteria
in the “published guidance” for situations where one CA can withdraw from the process, have been complied with, then
there is no competence-competence , but then, there is no “jurisdictional” mechanism, there is no “arbitration” and there is
no “final and binding” decision. Only practice and experience will determine on which side the interpretation falls,[149]but a
lot more than arbitral pride is at stake in this little matter of semantics.
7.4. The arbitral tribunal and its constraints
7.4.1. The arbitral tribunal: Appointment, challenge and removal
The first issue when one approaches the matter of the arbitrator or arbitral tribunal which must decide on the dispute,
concerns the mechanism for appointing the arbitrators. In commercial arbitration, it is customary that, in arbitration
proceedings with an odd number of arbitrators (typically three) between two parties, each party appoints an arbitrator and
the third one, the President of the arbitral tribunal, is appointed by agreement of the parties, agreement of the other two
arbitrators, or a combination thereof (e.g. by agreement of the other two arbitrators in consultation with the parties).[150]
The most important thing is that the parties, by expressly providing so in the agreement, or by making reference to
arbitration rules that so provide, include a back-up mechanism for cases where a party fails to appoint, or the parties/
arbitrators fail to agree on an arbitrator. Selecting an appointing authority thus provides certainty, and discourages delaying
tactics in the appointment process. In selecting the authority it is important to bear in mind that the task is a delicate one:
the authority will only appoint an arbitrator as a default mechanism, that is, where there has been a problem in making an
appointment. Typically, the problem involves a party’s reluctance to refer the dispute to arbitration, or a deadlock that goes
beyond a disagreement on the substance of the dispute. In such context, it is important that the appointing authority gives
an impression of competence, professionalism and neutrality so that potentially dissatisfied parties have little to cling to
in any attempt to derail the subsequent proceedings. The arbitral institution not only has to select persons with a proper
background, it also has to vet them, to check for potential conflicts of interest. The mechanism for this typically involves
the submission of a list to the parties, who can veto the names that they consider unsuitable, and rank the others in order
of preference.[151]The institution puts together the preferences of the parties, and makes a decision.
Bearing in mind the type of process involved, it is arguable whether the choice of the OECD Centre for Tax Policy and
Administration as the appointing authority[152]was an entirely wise move. Checking an arbitrator’s connections with the
parties, his prior views on an issue, etc. as a matter of course is not something the Centre is used to but institutions like
the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) are very familiar with this.[153]Also, as any member of the staff in an arbitration
institution will acknowledge, after the most rigorous process has been respected and the shortlist is short enough, the
appointment task involves a bit of an art so as to compose a tribunal that is not only neutral, but also functional. If the
concern is that the specific backgrounds of the arbitrators could be of particular importance in tax disputes (and it surely
148. Art. 31(1) 1965 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
149. A decision claiming the existence of competence-competence by the arbitrators could leave CAs baffled when experiencing first-hand that arbitration
as all “jurisdictional” mechanisms, like a jack-in-the-box, tend much more easily to spring out than to get back inside it.
150. Andrew Tweddale & Keren Tweddale, supra n. 31 , at 141.
151. See , for example, article 9(3) by reference to article 8(2) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 2010.
152. This is the choice of the OECD Model Tax Convention (to some extent, understandable), but also of the US-Germany, US-Canada and US-Belgium
tax treaties.
153. In the same sense, see William W. Park, supra n. 2 , at 815 and 816.
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is), a mixed formula could be included by which the appointing authority would have to rely on the expert lists provided
by the OECD Centre or other tax-specific institutions.
This reflection leads us directly to the issue of the arbitrators’ backgrounds, as well as their independence and impartiality.
Regarding the first, an obvious dilemma arises between the need for tax expertise and the need for expertise in (arbitral)
dispute resolution. This can be a very delicate matter in practice. A party interested in actually settling the dispute would
make sure that the arbitrator appointed knows how to conduct proceedings, and resolve matters of jurisdiction and
procedure as they arise, but that party will be even more interested in the issue being solved in its favour , and it may fear
that an expert in arbitration might be at a disadvantage in the deliberations.[154]Three experts in tax, with no background
in arbitration, however, could easily make the procedure flounder, or expose the proceedings to challenge. It would thus
be desirable to have at least one of the members of the arbitral tribunal with knowledge or experience in arbitration.[155]
Leaving these matters (which can constitute the key to the success of the arbitration but do not pose many legal challenges)
aside, it is important to move to the issues of independence and impartiality. And, here, one must emphasize that, in
arbitration, the relevant consideration is not the existence , but the appearance of bias.[156]Since it is impossible to know
what an arbitrator is thinking when he makes his decision, it is important to guard against those conditions under which a
reasonable person can conclude that the arbitrator’s judgment is compromised, and can thereby compromise the fairness
and equality of treatment principles that underpin arbitration.
Independence and impartiality are controversial and slippery issues. The general conclusion is that it is impossible to
guarantee independence or impartiality, hence the importance of appearance and in the tax field, this raises some issues
that need to be discussed. Tax arbitration, for starters, will always involve a tax authority (the way it is designed in existing
treaties, two authorities). This creates a difficulty where there are arbitrators who are, or have been, government officials.
In this regard, the OECD yielded to the pressure of its member states, and included quite lenient rules on who can, or
cannot, be an arbitrator.[157]The US treaties are stricter, in prohibiting the appointment of current or former government or
tax administration employees (depending on the treaty).[158]
However, until now the issue has solely focused on the arbitrators’ relationships with tax authorities but tax is a more
complex field for other reasons; as opposed to commercial or investment arbitration, where the interests tend to be
represented in one of the parties, in tax arbitration, despite the outward appearance of the proceedings as being between
two tax authorities, it is the interests of the taxpayer which are at stake and which have given rise to the proceedings in
the first place. Therefore, the rules (or practices) on selection and appointment would need to bear in mind the need to
avoid not only a relationship with the tax authorities, but also a relationship with the taxpayer.
More importantly, in addition to “independence’, which measures the relationship between an arbitrator and the parties,
attention must be paid to “impartiality’, which measures an arbitrator’s predisposition to rule in one direction or another. Of
course, there is always a delicate balancing act between appointing persons who are not prejudiced, and persons who are
smart and knowledgeable. Not ever writing an opinion on a controversial legal issue is a way to ensure a smooth vetting
process vis-à-vis impartiality issues, but surely not the best avenue to ensure the quality of the process and the decision.
However, in the tax field, on the opposite side of the corps of tax commissioners are the cohorts of tax advisors, who are
arguably as biased as the former and, even though the lack of public employee status makes it harder to define them as
a legal category for the purposes of disqualification for lack of independence, their constant involvement with the interests
of the taxpayer should disqualify many of them for lack of impartiality.
Which leaves the field of tax law professors as the ideal crop from which to reap the tax expertise for the composition
of arbitral tribunals. But again, even if one ought to be extremely careful before disqualifying an otherwise ideal
candidate because of views expressed in published form, regular consulting for and representation of, taxpayers’ or the
administration’s interests – though not disqualifying activities per se – should be the source of closer scrutiny.
154. Sadly, it would be unrealistic to assume a different set of expectations among the parties when it comes to selection and appointment of arbitrators,
hence the importance of notions of independence and impartiality as absolute limits on who can decide, and of proper procedures for challenge and
replacement.
155. See William W. Park, supra n. 2 , at 817 and 818.
156. Or “justifiable doubts”, as put by article 12 of the UNCITRAL Model Law. See also section 24(1-a) of the English Arbitration Act 1996.
157. Paragraph 7 of the OECD Model Sample Agreement states that: “Any person, including a government official of a Contracting State, may be
appointed as an arbitrator, unless that person has been involved in prior stages of the case that results in the arbitration process”.
158. It is not possible to appoint current tax administration employees (Protocol US-France); or current government employees (Protocols US-Belgium,
US-Germany, US-Canada); or former career government employees (Protocol US-Belgium), or former government employees, (US-Germany, US-
Canada); or former tax administration employees (Protocol US-France) within 1 year following the departure from government employment (Protocol
US-Canada), or 2 years of their last employment in the government/tax administration (Protocols US-Belgium, US-Germany, US-France).
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Carelessness or half-hearted moves in this regard could prompt strategic behaviour from the authorities, which could match
the pool of pro-taxpayer experts for hire with a pool of pro-administration experts to circumvent rules on independence
(CAs might agree on common appointment policies where the Spanish CA appoints German and French officials, German
officials appoint Spanish and French officials, and so on).
7.4.2. Constraints on decision-making (I). General and procedural constraints
Once the arbitrators are appointed, and the arbitral commission/board/tribunal is formed, it is important to establish the
constraints that operate in its decision-making role. In commercial disputes there is what scholars have denominated a
“regulatory web”[159](although the arbitrators’ flexibility and discretion are far wider than the term would suggest) comprised
of: the arbitration agreement, accompanied in some cases by the Terms of Reference (an agreed set of terms where
the parties determine the scope of the dispute, rather than letting the arbitrators do that); the arbitration rules chosen by
the parties, either for ad hoc (e.g. the Arbitration Rules by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law –
UNCITRAL), or institutional (ICC, the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA), Court of Arbitration of Madrid (CAM) ,
etc.) arbitration; the arbitration law (which will be that of the seat of arbitration), plus procedural principles drawn from
arbitral experience and precedent;[160]and instruments such as the New York Convention when it comes to enforcement.
Substantive sources constitute of another set of constraints which are addressed below.[161]
Tax arbitration, in its embryonic stage, has not yet developed such a massive body of rules and principles, which is
understandable. The problem is that its specificities, which render the system a bit dysfunctional, also make it difficult to
decide whether resort can be had to “conventional” arbitration rules in order to supplement the regulatory gaps.
The difficulty is that arbitration rules, and arbitration laws, are designed to give shape to arbitration’s general principles,
which combine party autonomy (together the parties can arrange the proceedings as they see fit) with the discretion of
the arbitrators,[162]and a need for informality, flexibility and expediency. This means that, for issues that arise during the
proceedings and where the parties are not in agreement or do not express an opinion, arbitrators usually have ample
room for manoeuvre in order to make the proceedings move forward. In tax arbitration, however, it is hard to conclude
whether this default solution would be the same, which is a question that cannot be answered with authority until one has
established the coincidence between the goals and principles of tax arbitration and “conventional” arbitration.
Some help is provided by the fact that, in the OECD Model as well as in the US treaties, there is some development of
procedural rules, in the form of a Sample Agreement in the OECD case,[163]and the combination of an MoU[164]and some
Operating Guidelines,[165]in the case of US treaties.
The content of such instruments is useful in shedding some light on how the proceedings are supposed to run. In fact,
despite the differences already highlighted in matters of consent and jurisdiction, notably, the subordination of tax arbitration
159. Julian Lew, Loukas Mistelis & Stefan Kröll, supra n. 26 , at 28 to 30.
160. Fernando Mantilla Serrano, Towards a Transnational Procedural Public Policy in E. Gaillard (ed.), Towards a Uniform International Arbitration Law ,
Juris Publishing & Staempfli, 2005, at 163.
161. See section 7.4.3.
162. William W. Park, Arbitration’s Protean Nature: The Value Of Rules and the Risks of Discretion , Annual Freshfields Lecture, London, Dec.
2002, reprinted in International Arbitration Report , vol. 19, May 2004, at 2; Adam Samuel, Jurisdictional Problems in International Commercial
Arbitration (1989); Julian Critchlow, The Authority of Arbitrators To Make Rules , 68 Arbitration 4 (2002).
163. Its structure is: “1. Request for submission of case to arbitration; 2. Time for submission of the case to arbitration; 3. Terms of Reference; 4. Failure
to communicate the Terms of Reference; 5. Selection of arbitrators; 6. Streamlined arbitration process; 7. Eligibility and appointment of arbitrators;
8. Communication of information and confidentiality; 9. Failure to provide information in a timely manner; 10. Procedural and evidentiary rules; 11.
Participation of the person who requested the arbitration; 12. Logistical arrangements; 13. Costs; 14. Applicable Legal Principles; 15. Arbitration
decision; 16. Time allowed for communicating the arbitration decision; 17. Failure to communicate the decision within the required period; 18. Final
decision; 19. Implementing the arbitration decision; 20. Where no arbitration decision will be provided”. OECD Model Tax Convention. Article 25.
Sample Model Agreement.
164. Usually they follow the structure: “Introduction; 1. Competent Authority Assistance in General; 2. Cases eligible for arbitration; 3. Cases ineligible
for arbitration; 4. Commencement Date; 5. Date Arbitration Proceedings begin; 6. Board member appointment; 7. Nondisclosure Issues; 8. List
of Chairs; 9. Proposed Resolution, Position Papers and Reply Submissions; 10. Requests for Additional Information; 11. Multiple Issues; 12.
Permanent Establishment Cases; 13. Competent Authority Initiating the Mutual Agreement Procedure; 14. Nondisclosure; 15. Communication
between the Board and the Competent Authorities; 16. Fees and Expenses; 17. Board Determination; 18. Terminating Proceedings; 19. Arbitration
and requests for Advance Pricing Agreements (APAs)” ( see , for example, Memorandum of Understanding between the Competent Authorities of
the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States of America).
165. Usually they follow the structure: “1. Chair appointment; 2. Non-disclosure; 3. Installation of Board; 4. Operating Procedures; 5. Communication
with the Competent Authorities; 6. Position papers and supporting papers; 7. Reply Submissions; 8. Requesting additional information; 9. Board
meetings; 10. A board member’s use of staff; 11. Payment of board members; 12. Inability of a board member to fulfill duties; 13. Process for board’s
determination; 14. Multiple issue cases; 15. Permanent establishment cases; 16. Board’s Determination; 17. Terminating a Proceeding” ( see , for
example, US-Germany Competent Authorities Arbitration Board Operating Guidelines.
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to the MAP (which admittedly hinders the effectiveness of the decision), once proceedings begin the principles of party
autonomy are present (though the “party” status is restricted to CAs), but so also is the principle of arbitral procedural
discretion. Perhaps the clearest formulation of the combination is contained in the OECD Model Sample Agreement, which
states:
Subject to this agreement and the Terms of Reference, the arbitrators shall adopt those procedural and evidentiary
rules that they deem necessary to answer the questions set out in the Terms of Reference. They will have access to
all information necessary to decide the issues submitted to arbitration, including confidential information. Unless the
competent authorities agree otherwise, any information that was not available to both competent authorities before
the request for arbitration was received by both of them shall not be taken into account for purposes of the decision.[166]
The US treaties also include ample powers for the arbitration “board” regarding the arbitral proceedings, since “The
arbitration board may adopt any procedures necessary for the conduct of its business, provided that the procedures are
not inconsistent with any provision of [the Treaty provisions]”.[167]
This creates the necessary scope for some kind of arbitral practice to evolve.[168]Naturally, the arbitrators’ discretion will be
subject to the other procedural rules set forth in the instruments. Such rules provide for, essentially, a process in writing,
where the CAs are supposed to deliver written submissions (of limited length, in the US case),[169]and can reply to the
other party’s submissions.
Oral presentations are not expressly contemplated, nor is there a proper “evidentiary” stage. This creates plenty of doubt as
to what approach will be followed by the arbitrators, but in light of the divergent attitudes towards evidentiary matters[170]this
is not necessarily a bad thing, to the extent that it allows arbitrators to decide on the spot on crucial issues. Whether there
will be oral appearances, whether the tribunal will be proactive and ask its own questions, or limit itself to the presentations
by the parties, whether there will be witnesses or expert testimony, in writing, orally, or with cross-examination,[171]are
delicate matters better left to the specific needs of the dispute and the ability of the arbitrators to distinguish them[172](if,
say, an oral appearance is not necessary, there is no need to rouse discrepancies in the attitudes of parties and counsel,
coaching of witnesses, cross-examination, etc.). In US instruments there are some restrictions on the power of arbitrators
to request additional information, which can consist only of existing documents and may not request new or additional
analyses .[173]
The need for expediency is reflected in the time limitations applying to submissions and to the decision by the arbitrators.
In the EC Convention, that time is 6 months from the date on which the matter was referred to it,[174]and 6 months
“from the date on which the Chair notifies in writing the competent authorities and the person who made the request for
arbitration that he has received all the information necessary to begin consideration of the case” in the OECD Sample
Model Agreement.[175]The US instruments limit only the time of the submissions (within 90 days after the appointment of
the Chair, and 180 days after the appointment of the Chair for reply submissions).[176]The OECD Sample Model Agreement
includes a streamlined arbitration process, where times are limited to 2 months for the presentation of submissions, and 1
month for the decision (total of 3 months) after the appointment of the arbitrator (which, in turn, takes place within 1 month
after the reception of the terms of reference by the person who made the request for arbitration).[177]The US treaties follow
a similar structure in the procedure, except for the times allocated for each step.
166. OECD Model Sample Agreement, no. 11.
167. Protocol to the US-Germany treaty, no. 22, f); Protocol to the US-Belgium treaty, no. 6, f); US-Canada Arbitration Board Operating Guidelines, no. 3,
a.
168. Professor Park expressed his misgivings about arbitral “discretion”, arguing that it is overrated, and argued in favour of more specific procedural
rules in his Freshfields Lecture in 2002. William W. Park, supra n. 162 , at 3 to 13. However, he also admitted that, in tax disputes, “it would seem
best to give arbitrators considerable procedural flexibility, particularly during the initial development of tax arbitration. More informed guidance will
come as specific cases contribute to the accumulation of ‘procedural capital’ in tax arbitration”. See William W. Park, supra n. 2 , at 823.
169. US-Germany MoU, no. 9; US-Belgium MoU, no. 8; US-Canada MoU, no. 9.
170. William W. Park, supra n. 2 , at 820 to 823; Siegfried Elsing & John M. Townsend, Bridging the Common Law Civil Law Divide in Arbitration , 18
Arbitration International 1 (2002), at 1 to 6.
171. Siegfried Elsing & John M. Townsend, supra n. 170 , at 4 and 5; William W. Park, supra n. 2 , at 821-822.
172. William W. Park, supra n. 2, at 823.
173. US-Germany MoU, no. 10; US-Belgium MoU, no. 9; US-Canada MoU, no. 10.
174. Art. 11 EC Convention.
175. OECD Sample Mutual Agreement, para. 16.
176. US-Germany MoU, no. 9; US-Belgium MoU, no. 8; US-Canada MoU, no. 9.
177. OECD Model Sample Agreement, para. 6.
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The only other aspect expressly contemplated in the norms is confidentiality. The issue of confidentiality in arbitration is
interesting, because even though it is highlighted as one of the fundamental distinctions between arbitration and ordinary
justice[178](parties opting for arbitration are said to have waived the right to a “public” hearing) it is still a matter of debate
whether “privacy” as a normal feature of arbitral practice gives rise to a default, or even mandatory requirement , or even
a right to the confidentiality of the proceedings and the award.[179]Some question the existence of such “inherent” rule or
right, in the absence of specific mention.[180]Since the parties hardly regulate this issue in the arbitration agreement, some
arbitration rules include such a mention.[181]In order to make sure that the issue is not subject to the uncertainty of an
abstract discussion on the “inherent” arbitral rights/duties, on top of another abstract discussion on the applicability of such
rights/duties in tax arbitration proceedings, international instruments include an express reference to it.[182]
In addition to the general debate on confidentiality in arbitration, the issue has particular implications in tax arbitration, since
it is unclear whether the purpose is to protect taxpayer information from mishandling by the tax authorities, information
of the tax authorities from mishandling by the taxpayer, or both. In principle, the taxpayer enjoys a status that is closer to
a “third party” in the sense that arbitration law understands the concept. Therefore, the proper legal term to address this
issue would be that of arbitration “privacy”, i.e. the right of the actual parties to prevent any other party from attending the
hearings, rather than “confidentiality”, which concerns the disclosure of material information.[183]In such context, the risk is
that the third party will reveal information from the proceedings, and there seems to be a wider consensus that “strangers”
may be excluded from arbitration hearings unless all parties agree.[184]
A tendency to import the conclusions from the arbitral experience into the tax field without any filter, however, would risk
reading the problem backwards. In tax arbitration the taxpayer, even if treated as a sort of “third party”, is the party with
more at stake, and more to lose if sensitive information is revealed. That is why the common point for the confidentiality
rules of all instruments is the protection of taxpayer information. The EC Convention indicates so in a direct but broad
way, by stating that the members of the advisory commission shall keep secret all matters they learn as a result of the
proceedings.[185]The OECD is more specific, albeit more indirect, since, in order to protect confidentiality, it assimilates
arbitrators to CA representatives for the sole purposes of the application of articles 25 and 26, and domestic laws of the
contracting states concerning communication and confidentiality.[186]It remains to be seen whether this entails an absolute
duty of confidentiality, or if the duty varies vis-à-vis the authority of which the arbitrator is considered a representative,
the other authority and the taxpayer, as this would clearly influence the remedy to which the aggrieved party would be
entitled to.
Finally, the US approach is the most stringent vis-à-vis confidentiality. The US treaties not only include a duty of non-
disclosure by the arbitrators, their staff or the CAs,[187]in order to start the proceedings, each “concerned person” must
178. Andrew Tweddale & Keren Tweddale, supra n. 31 , at 349.
179. Id., at 353, opposing the views of England and France (where an obligation of confidentiality is held to exist) to those of Australia, Sweden or the
United States, where such an obligation is put into question. See also ICC Report on Confidentiality as a Purported Obligation of the Parties in
Arbitration (April 2002).
180. Y. Fortier, The Occassional Unwarranted Assumption of Confidentiality , Arbitration International, vol. 15 (1999), at 131; Expert Report of Dr Julian
Lew in Esso Plowman (1995), 11 Arbitration International 3 (1995), at 283. Against, see Fouchard, Gaillard & Goldman, International Commercial
Arbitration (1999), paragraph 1412.
181. See , for example, article 30 of the LCIA Arbitration Rules.
182. Art. 9(6) EC Convention, OECD Model Convention, Sample Agreement, no. 8; US-Germany Arbitration Board Operating Guidelines, no. 16, f; US-
Canada Arbitration Board Operating Guidelines, no. 13, g).
183. See Andrew Tweddale & Keren Tweddale, supra n. 31 , at 350. Both have been held to be “two sides of a same coin”. See Esso Australia Ltd v.
Plowman (1995), 183 Commonwealth Law Reports 10; Arbitration International, vol. 11 (1995), no. 3.
184. Oxford Shipping Co. Ltd v. Nippon Yusen Kaisha [1984] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 373 at 379. See also Andrew Tweddale & Keren Tweddale, supra n. 31 , at
351 and 352, with references to arbitration rules of the UNCITRAL, ICC or LCIA.
185. Art. 9(6) EC Convention.
186. Sample Agreement, no. 8.
187. US-Germany Arbitration Board Operating Guidelines, no. 16, f; US-Canada Arbitration Board Operating Guidelines, no. 13, g) states that:
No information relating to the Proceeding (including the board’s determination) may be disclosed by the members of the arbitration board
or their staffs or by either competent authority, except as permitted by the Convention and the domestic laws of the Contracting States. In
addition, all material prepared in the course of, or relating to, the Proceeding shall be considered to be information exchanged between the
Contracting States. All members of the arbitration board and their staffs must agree in statements sent to each of the Contracting States
in confirmation of their appointment to the arbitration board to abide by and be subject to the confidentiality and nondisclosure provisions
applicable to proceedings of Exchange of Information and Administrative Assistance.
In the US-Belgium Memorandum of Understanding the mechanism is different, and equivalent to that used for “concerned persons” in the other
instruments, i.e. by means of an agreement by the members of the arbitration board. The relevant provision states that:
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deliver a statement to the CAs agreeing not to disclose any information received during the course of the proceedings
from either contracting state or from the arbitration board.[188]The structure chosen to impose these two types of duty is
revealing of the standing of the different parties in the process. Whereas the CAs and the members of the arbitration board
form the core of the process, and thus the law can directly impose duties upon them, the “concerned persons” do not
(even though they have the most at stake) and so the imposition of a duty directly by law looks a bit contrived in relation
to constitutional guarantees to say, or disclose, whatever one wants, hence the need to rely on an indirect mechanism,
by which the law relies on a requirement to the CAs to have received the parties’ statement, and on the parties’ statement
to limit their disclosure.
All in all, the impression of the rules of procedure for tax arbitration contained in international instruments is more positive
than that of the general tax arbitration approach. It encompasses an interesting combination of autonomy, discretion and
expediency. Whether arbitrators will succeed in using this tenuous guidance as a basis for evolving a sort of international
tax arbitration “practice” and principles is a matter yet to be seen.
7.4.3. Constraints on decision-making (II). Substantive constraints
7.4.3.1. The sources of the decision (I). International (tax) arbitration and substantive law
The relationship which arbitrators have with the law, especially substantive law, is somewhat ambivalent. On the one
hand, they want to be granted a large discretion when applying it. Arbitration laws tend to establish that, failing agreement
between the parties on an applicable set of rules, the arbitrators will determine which law to apply by reference to the
conflict of laws rules which they consider appropriate .[189]Arbitration rules by the UNCITRAL (for ad hoc proceedings) or by
the main arbitral institutions give arbitrators even more leeway, by providing, again in the absence of agreement between
the parties, that an arbitral tribunal can decide on the basis of the laws that it considers appropriate (thereby extending
the discretion from the selection of the conflict rules, to the direct selection of the applicable law).[190]Furthermore, the
definition of “laws” is sufficiently generic as to include “rules of law”,[191]thereby opening the door for a decision on the basis
of usages, or uniform “a-national” principles. Then, there is the discretion of the arbiters as to how to apply the law, since
their decision can only be challenged to the extent that it is contrary to public policy , thereby excluding cases of “error” in
law.[192]Modern “de-nationalized” arbitration approaches only further this trend, by arguing an ever looser requirement for
arbitrators to adhere to the rules of a particular legal system.
Yet, on the other hand, the decision by an arbitral tribunal on the basis of the law is what gives arbitration a certain status,
and differentiates it from other dispute resolution mechanisms, such as “adjudication” or “expert determination”. Also,
arbitration rules, even while providing for ample discretion on the selection of the applicable rules, fall shy of doing the
same when it comes to the ability of the arbitrators to decide ex aequo (i.e. on equity) or acting as amiable compositeurs ,
something that requires a specific authorization by the parties.[193]
Thus, the option which is chosen when establishing the relationship of an arbitration tribunal (or board, panel or
commission) to the law, reveals much about the underlying idea as to the role that arbitrators will play in the dispute. In this
Upon confirmation of appointment of the arbitration board, each board member must agree in a statement to abide by and be subject to the
confidentiality and nondisclosure provisions of Article 25 of the Convention and the applicable domestic laws of the Contracting States, as
well as to this Agreement and the Arbitration Board Operation Guidelines.
US-Belgium MoU, no. 13.
188. US-Germany MoU, no. 7; US-Canada MoU, no. 7.
189. Art. 28(2) UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration; sec. 46(3) English Arbitration Act 1996.
190. See article 35(1) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules; article 21(1) of the Arbitration Rules of the ICC International Arbitration Court; article 28(1) of
the International Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association; article 22.3 of the Arbitration Rules of the London Court of International
Arbitration, or article 21(1) of the Arbitration Rules of the Court of Arbitration of Madrid.
191. Art. 35(1) UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules; art. 21(1) Arbitration Rules of the ICC International Arbitration Court; art. 28(1) International Arbitration Rules
of the American Arbitration Association; art. 22.3 Arbitration Rules of the London Court of International Arbitration; art. 21(1) Arbitration Rules of the
Court of Arbitration of Madrid.
192. Art. V(2)(b) New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards; art. 36(1)(b)(ii) UNCITRAL Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration. Section 69 of the English Arbitration Act allows, unless the parties agree to the contrary, an “appeal” of
the award with a leave from the court; and its paragraph (3)(b) provides that such leave will be granted, in addition to cases of “general public
importance” where “the decision of the tribunal is at least open to serious doubt”, in cases where “the decision of the tribunal on the question is
obviously wrong”, yet English courts are generally prudent when deciding on such appeals.
193. Art. 35(2) UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules; art. 21(3) Arbitration Rules of the ICC International Arbitration Court; art. 28(3) International Arbitration Rules
of the American Arbitration Association; art. 22.3 Arbitration Rules of the London Court of International Arbitration; art. 21(2) Arbitration Rules of the
Court of Arbitration of Madrid.
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regard, for example, the EC Convention provides that the “commission” must base its opinion on article 4 of the Convention
(i.e. the applicability of the arm’s length principle),[194]without further specification. This shows that the European countries
envisaged a procedure closer to fact-finding than actual arbitration. This can cause problems when the issue of “prices”
cannot be resolved without resort to legal principles (i.e. when characterizing a payment as dividend, royalties, interest or
management fees) which may act as an implicit carve-out for the commission’s competence (though given the authorities’
control over the proceedings, and the arbitrators’ limited discretion it is hard to speak of “competence” or “jurisdiction” in
the traditional sense).
The OECD Sample Agreement provides a solution closer to “normal” arbitration, albeit not quite, by stipulating that
arbitrators shall decide in accordance with the treaty, and, subject to it, the domestic law provisions, and that they may
resort, for interpretive purposes, to the principles of interpretation of articles 31 to 34 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, and (of course) to the OECD Commentaries on the Model Tax Convention and the OECD Transfer Pricing
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations (as well as any sources identified by the competent
authorities in the Terms of Reference).[195]
The US approach in the treaties with Germany and Belgium follows the same principle as in the OECD Model (i.e. a
decision in “law”, not fact, or equity, albeit with limited sources) but it goes one step further in constraining the sources the
arbitrators may use, by establishing a descending order of priority, as follows: (i) provisions of the convention; (ii) agreed
commentaries or explanations of the contracting states concerning the convention; (iii) laws of contracting states to the
extent they are not inconsistent with each other; and (iv) OECD Commentary, Guidelines or Reports regarding relevant
analogous portions of the OECD Model Tax Convention.[196]
This creates a problem for applying the principles of interpretation of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties. A
reasonable view would be to hold that they cannot be ruled out unless expressly excluded, due to their having the character
of customary rules, and to the fact that some interpretative principles will always be needed (even to interpret the meaning
of the applicable law clause), and that despite the peculiar nature of tax arbitration, one cannot presume that the intention
of states is to create a separate set of norms for these disputes which are unaffected by the international legal order.
A second problem is whether resort to the principles of the Vienna Convention could open the door to the applicability of
precedent (judicial or arbitral). The current view in international law and in arbitration is that there is no such thing as a
doctrine of precedent;[197]this does not however prevent international courts and arbitral tribunals from referring to previous
decisions of other courts or other arbitral tribunals as an instructive and persuasive source.[198]Thus, the question is whether
precedent could be referred to in the same manner in tax arbitration. The answer, in the case of the United States, would
be “no”, at least in light of what the treaties say, something that may have unintended (and harmful) consequences.[199]
A third problem concerns the authoritative nature of the OECD Commentaries. Of course, no one can deny their usefulness
as an updated and thorough analysis of the OECD Model Tax Convention in light of principles and practices of international
taxation. The problem is when this source is given pre-eminence over any “international” source other than the treaty itself,
which is what the abovementioned US treaties do.[200]This, when it comes to OECD members, might be acceptable, but
the problem would arise if the same policy were maintained in the US treaties with non-members.
Maybe because of these or the other numerous problems which arise when one tries to restrict the sources on which an
arbitral body can draw for its decision, or even inspiration, posterior treaties with Canada and France do not include a similar
clause. This does not solve the problem, because then the question is whether the arbitrators’ decision will be grounded
on the law, as in the OECD Model and other US treaties, or mainly on fact, as in the EC Convention, or maybe equity.
194. Art. 11(1) EC Convention.
195. OECD Sample Agreement, no. 14.
196. US-Germany Protocol, no. 22, (i); US-Belgium Protocol, no. 7, (i).
197. Articles 38(d) and 59 of the ICJ Statute (judicial decisions are only a secondary source, the ICJ decision is binding on the parties, and no one else);
article 1136(81) (in the same sense) of the NAFTA; article 53(1) of the ICSID Convention (decision binding on the parties, no mention whatsoever of
binding nature upon anyone else); M.L. Shahabuddeen, Precedent in the World Court , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996; Christopher
Schreuer & Matthew Weiniger in Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino & Christopher Schreuer (eds.), supra n. 111 , at 1188 to 1207; Amco v. Indonesia ,
decision on Annulment, 16 May 1986, 1 ICSID Reports 509.
198. The phenomenon is very clear in investment arbitration, where decisions tend to be based on grounds previously held by other
decisions. See LETCO v. Liberia , Award, 31 Mar. 1986, 2 ICSID Reports 346; Feldman v. Mexico , Award, 16 Dec. 2002, 7 ICSID Reports 341,
paragraph 107; Encana v. Ecuador , Award, 3 Feb. 2006, paragraph 189.
199. See section 7.5.3.
200. First comes the treaty, then the commentaries and explanations agreed by the contracting states, then domestic laws not inconsistent with each
other; then the OECD materials but given that, if a case proceeds to arbitration, there will be a lack of agreement, the OECD materials could be
second in importance only to the treaty.
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D. Ramos Muñoz, Chapter 7: A Game of Snakes and Ladders – Tax Arbitration in an International and EU Setting in Litigating EU Tax Law in International, National and Non-EU National Courts (D. Sarmiento & D.J.
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The requirement that each CA must present a submission of 5 pages maximum, which must determine “each specific
amount of income, expense or tax at issue”, shows that the focus is on the figures.[201]Yet, figures cannot exist in a vacuum,
and thus the law also provides that the 5-page submission can be accompanied with a supporting position paper of 30
pages max, and that the Proposed Resolution may also address any related issues that are required to determine those
amounts (e.g. the existence of a permanent establishment).[202]Also, each CA can submit a Reply Submission to the board
to address any points raised by the Proposed Resolution or Position Paper submitted by the other CA (MoUs).[203]This
suggests that, even though the purpose of the procedure is to come up with a specific figure, the decision will most likely
be taken on grounds of law (though which law remains to be seen).
7.4.3.2. The sources of the decision (II). International (tax) arbitration and EU law
An issue that merits special consideration in this study is the role that EU law plays in international arbitration disputes. An
accurate summary of the status quo would be that, when it comes to EU law, arbitral tribunals are caught between a rock
and a hard place. On the one hand, arbitral tribunals are expected to apply EU law.[204]Disregarding EU law can be a cause
for setting aside an arbitral award or denying its enforceability.[205]It is interesting to note, in this regard, that the policy in
favour of arbitration can clash with the effet utile of some European provisions. According to the former, the justifications
for refusing recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award are very limited and, leaving aside the constitution of the
arbitral tribunal, excesses of jurisdiction or equal treatment, a substantive rule can only result in non-enforcement when
the rule is a public order rule.[206]This status is reserved only to the most fundamental policies of a state, and thus not all
mandatory rules form part of the public order.
Pursuant to this, for some states, competition rules may not form part of that state’s public order. Yet, in Ecoswiss v.
Benetton , the ECJ expressed the view that the effet utile of the rule would be affected if arbitral tribunals were entitled to
disregard it, without the risk of non-enforceability,[207]and therefore the wrong application of EU competition rules should
be a cause for not enforcing the award.[208]
The ECJ, however, does not seem to require the state to establish in practice a two-lane system, with a narrow lane
for “typical” objections to enforceability, and a wider, and more intrusive one, for matters of EU law, at least not from a
procedural perspective. Conformity with EU law will be appraised at the stage of recognition and enforcement of the award,
and subject to existing deadlines.[209]If that objection has not been raised on time, the courts are not compelled to facilitate
a longer period, provided the one existing is not artificially short, or prevents in practice an actual scrutiny.[210]The author is
also of the view that conformity with EU law should be examined within the (restricted) parameters for review of the award.
That is, the lack of compliance with EU law must be a source for setting aside or refusing the enforcement of the award
only if it results in: (i) the violation of limitations to the capacity of the parties, or invalidity of the arbitration agreement; (ii)
inequality of treatment of the parties or another important procedural irregularity; (iii) excess of power (decision beyond
the scope of the submission to arbitration); (iv) irregular composition of the arbitral tribunal; or (v) non-arbitrability of the
subject matter, or the violation of public policy if the award is enforced.[211]Normally the infringement of EU law will fall
within the “public policy” exception, provided some flexibility is employed in its definition.
If, on the other hand, “conformity with EU law” were framed as an autonomous ground for setting aside the award or
refusing its enforcement, that would be contrary to the states’ policy in favour of arbitration, and against legal certainty.
Even in tax disputes, public policy and expediency recommend that, once the need to apply EU law is acknowledged,
201. US-Germany Protocol, no. 22, (g); US-Belgium no. 6, (g); US-Canada MoU, no. 9; US-France MoU, no. 9.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. ECJ,Case 102/81, Nordsee Deutsche Hochseefischerei GmbH v. Reederei Mond Hochseefischerei Nordstern AG & Co KG et al. [1982] ECR 1095,
para. 14. See also ECJ, Case C-126/97 , Eco Swiss China Time Ltd and Benetton International NV [1999] ECR I-3079; ECJ, 6 Oct. 2009,Case
C-40/08, Asturcom Telecomunicaciones SL v. Cristina Rodríguez Nogueira .
205. ECJ, Case C-126/97 , Eco Swiss China Time Ltd and Benetton International NV [1999] ECR I-3079; ECJ, 6 Oct. 2009,Case C-40/08, Asturcom
Telecomunicaciones SL v. Cristina Rodríguez Nogueira .
206. See , for example, articles V.1(c) and II(b) of the New York Convention of 1958 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.
207. ECJ, Case C-126/97 , Eco Swiss China Time Ltd and Benetton International NV [1999] ECR I-3079, para. 40.
208. Id., paras. 35-40.
209. Id., paras. 44-48.
210. Id., para. 45.
211. The scheme follows article V of the New York Convention 1958 for the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, but the same
structure of limited grounds for setting aside or refusing enforcement of the award is replicated in most modern arbitration laws for both domestic and
international disputes.
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arbitrators should be given flexibility as to how to apply and accommodate it within the existing parameters of arbitration
law. Otherwise the system would suffer from unpredictability.
A quick analysis of recent case law, such as Asturcom Telecomunicaciones ,[212]however, could lead to the conclusion that
the ECJ has thrown caution to the wind. In that case, which concerned a consumer dispute, the ECJ stuck to the more
protective reading of its previous decision in Mostaza Claro ,[213]and held that the national court had to check ex officio the
conformity of the decision with EU law, even if no party had raised this during the proceedings.[214]It is submitted, however,
that the ECJ’s decision was in part motivated by the importance, from a public policy perspective, of consumer rights.
However, the ECJ could have been clearer in stressing this point, since any misapplication of a provision of EU law, no
matter how unimportant, obscure or arcane, could result in the refusal of enforcement of an arbitral award, even if none
of the parties have alleged that during the proceedings, or even the enforcement.
The position of arbitral tribunals is aggravated by the fact that they are excluded from making preliminary references to
the ECJ, in the same way domestic courts can. The ECJ has found in its case law that, while statutory arbitral tribunals
that function in a manner similar to courts can make preliminary references,[215]arbitral tribunals appointed for one dispute
cannot do so.[216]
One view would be to find this arrangement unfair, since arbitral tribunals must apply EU law (as we have seen above)
but cannot inquire as to its content. A more careful view, however, shows that the reasons for this arrangement are
rooted in arbitration’s special status as a mechanism of dispute resolution. The arbitral tribunals’ ability to pose preliminary
references would only be justified if they were “court or tribunals of a Member State ” [emphasis added], pursuant to
article 267, paragraph 2 of the TFEU .[217]
This would mean siding with the so-called “jurisdictional theory” of arbitration, under which the nature of arbitration is that
of a jurisdictional mechanism, akin to normal courts, which is in clear contrast with the so-called “contractual theory” of
arbitration, which defends the view that the source of arbitration is a contract (the arbitration agreement), and the more
recent “autonomous theory”, which justifies arbitration’s current status in terms of its ability to provide the “service” needed
by the parties, and thereby fulfill their needs.[218]
Current positions vary, but pure “jurisdictional” views are unheard of. Neither courts nor arbitrators want arbitration to
become a sort of parallel system of courts. Also, even if we consider arbitral tribunals as courts or tribunals “of a Member
State” in the sense of article 267 of the TFEU , that would not put an end to the problem, because the next question would
be whether they would fall under the general rule applicable to “any” court or tribunal, under which the latter “may” pose
preliminary references, or the specific rule for courts or tribunals “against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy
under national law”, under which the latter “shall bring the matter before the Court”.[219]What would “remedy” mean in this
case? Arbitral awards are not subject to appeal, but to a specific process, with limited grounds for review. Would that count
as a “remedy”? Would it depend on the level of review granted to domestic courts? Too many questions, and too much
uncertainty, only to distinguish whether arbitrators “may” or “shall” make preliminary references. Few arbitrators would
want to relinquish their flexibility in exchange for more clarity regarding EU law.
Nonetheless, domestic laws may give arbitrators the possibility of asking the ECJ in an indirect way. Section 45 of the
English Arbitration Act provides arbitral tribunals with the possibility of consulting domestic courts concerning matters of
English law.[220]To the extent that English law includes EU law, it would be possible for an arbitral tribunal to pose a question
212. ECJ, 6 Oct. 2009,Case C-40/08, Asturcom Telecomunicaciones SL v. Cristina Rodríguez Nogueira .
213. ECJ,Case C-168/05, Elisa María Mostaza Claro v. Centro Móvil Milenium SL [2006] ECR I-10437.
214. ECJ, 6 Oct. 2009,Case C-40/08 Asturcom Telecomunicaciones SL v. Cristina Rodríguez Nogueira , at 30-32, 53-55.
215. ECJ,Case 61/65, Vaassen-Göbbels v. Management of the Beambtenfonds voor het Mijnbedrijf [1966] ECR 583; ECJ,Case C-393/92, Municipality of
Almelo v. NV Energiebedrijf IJsselmij [1994] ECR I-1477.
216. See ECJ,Case 102/81, Nordsee Deutsche Hochseefischerei GmbH v. Reederei Mond Hochseefischerei Nordstern AG & Co KG et al. [1982] ECR
1095. To this extent, it is irrelevant that the arbitration is institutional or ad hoc. In institutional arbitration the institution does not decide the dispute,
but only assists the parties in appointing the members of the arbitral tribunal, and the tribunal itself for matters like administration or remuneration.
217. “Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the
question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court to give a ruling thereon” .
218. Julian Lew, Loukas Mistelis & Stefan Kröll, supra n. 26 , at 81-82.
219. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of article 267 of the TFEU .
220. Section 45 of the English Arbitration Act provides that:
Determination of preliminary point of law.
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to an English court, with the aim that such question be “forwarded” to the ECJ in the form of a preliminary reference issued
by the domestic court.[221]
Other laws, such as those inspired by the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, do not provide
for a specific right of consultation, but they allow plenty of discretion to arbitral tribunals to order the process as they see
fit.[222]Under the provisions of, say, the Spanish Arbitration Act,[223]which mimics the UNCITRAL Model Law in this sense,
it would arguably be possible, upon that general power to order the proceedings, to make a request to domestic courts to
make a preliminary reference, albeit the matter has not yet arisen.
In the case of tax arbitration there would be more uncertainty. The power of arbitrators formed under the “arbitration”
provisions in a BTT to make a request resulting in a preliminary reference would depend not only on the procedural flexibility
granted to the arbitrators (we saw earlier that this was probably one of the laudable aspects of the provisions) but on the
admissibility of such request by domestic courts. The power of the arbitrators to conduct the proceedings in such manner
as it considers appropriate can be read to imply the power to refer a question to the courts only if supplemented with the
provisions on domestic court assistance,[224]which are absent from tax arbitration rules. Thus, the extent to which domestic
arbitration laws can be used to supplement such tax arbitration provisions in this regard heavily depends on whether one
considers tax arbitration as an “actual” arbitration, i.e. one that can take advantage of arbitration law provisions.
It would be neither in the interest of transparency, nor that of certainty and expediency, if one of the consequences of tax
arbitration’s bizarre nature were to be the risk of non-compliance with EU law, especially if such risk was impossible to
avoid for lack of a proper reference mechanism.
(1) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the court may on the application of a party to arbitral proceedings (upon notice to the other
parties)
determine any question of law arising in the course of the proceedings which the court is satisfied substantially affects the rights of one or
more of the parties. An agreement to dispense with reasons for the tribunal’s award shall be considered an agreement to exclude the court’s
jurisdiction under this section.
(2) An application under this section shall not be considered unless–
(a) it is made with the agreement of all the other parties to the proceedings, or
(b) it is made with the permission of the tribunal and the court is satisfied–
(i) that the determination of the question is likely to produce substantial savings in costs, and
(ii) that the application was made without delay.
(3) The application shall identify the question of law to be determined and, unless made with the agreement of all the other parties to the
proceedings, shall state the grounds on which it is said that the question should be decided by the court.
(4) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral tribunal may continue the arbitral proceedings and make an award while an
application to the court under this section is pending.
(5) Unless the court gives leave, no appeal lies from a decision of the court whether the conditions specified in subsection (2) are met.
(6) The decision of the court on the question of law shall be treated as a judgment of the court for the purposes of an appeal. But no appeal
lies without the leave of the court which shall not be given unless the court considers that the question is one of general importance, or is one
which for some other special reason should be considered by the Court of Appeal.
221. Julian Lew, Loukas Mistelis & Stefan Kröll, supra n. 26 , at 481. See also Johan Eraw, Reference by Arbitrators to the European Court of Justice for
Preliminary Rulings in CEPANI, Arbitration and European Law (1997) at 132.
222. Article 19 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration provides that:
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Law, the parties are free to agree on the procedure to be followed by the arbitral tribunal in conducting the
proceedings.
(2) Failing such agreement, the arbitral tribunal may, subject to the provisions of this Law, conduct the arbitration in such manner as it
considers appropriate. The power conferred upon the arbitral tribunal includes the power to determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality
and weight of any evidence.
223. Art. 25 Spanish Arbitration Act 60/2003.
224. See , for example, article 6 of the Spanish Arbitration Act.
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7.5. Decision, finality and enforcement
7.5.1. The decision. Of facts, law and baseball
The typical way for arbitral proceedings to finish is by means of a decision by the arbitral tribunal in the form of an arbitral
“award”. The many peculiarities of tax arbitration run so deep that they even affect the definition of the equivalent decision
by the arbitrators, so that it is difficult in tax arbitration to talk about an “award” in the sense it is understood in arbitration.
First, there is the issue of the reasoned nature of the arbitrators’ decision. Detractors of this solution could argue that
including such reasons makes the award vulnerable to challenges.[225]It is easier to set aside an award for being wrong
when the arbitrators include their arguments. Parties do not necessarily resort to arbitration, rather than adjudication,
because of the knowledge or skills of the arbitrators, as opposed to those of judges (although sometimes that may be a
factor in specific matters). They do so in the expectation that the dispute will be more quickly and satisfactorily solved,
which relies upon the dispute resolution skills of the arbitrators (which can include, but are not necessarily limited to, their
legal backgrounds) but also the flexibility of the procedure, and the single-minded attention which the arbitrators apply to
the case.[226]The parties expect to be listened to carefully and their submissions properly taken into consideration, but do
not necessarily expect the award to resemble a treatise that distills eloquence and legal acumen.
Advocates of the need to justify awards, on the other hand, argue that if decisions are not taken in a vacuum, but follow a
process where facts and law are weighed by the arbitrators, the decisions should somehow reflect that process. Also, the
supposed “vulnerability” highlighted above as a negative point has the advantage that it ensures that the decision, and the
process, enjoy minimum guarantees.[227]An award without justification is an open door for a lack of accountability.
With that in mind, the different instruments all give importance to the need for expediency (it is normal to require arbitrators
to decide in a short period, normally of 6 months)[228]but, regarding the need for justification, they opt for different systems.
Under the OECD Model the arbitrators are expected to state the reasons for the decision, including sources of law.[229]The
EC Convention, on the other hand, is silent on this point, which is not unreasonable given the heavily factual task of
arbitrators, and the paucity of detail as to the legal sources, if any, that the members of the commission can use.
Then, US treaties, like those with Germany, Belgium or France, provide that the arbitrators will not state a rationale,[230]and
the same solution is adopted with Canada, albeit in the Operating Guidelines subscribed by both tax authorities.[231]In
this regard, US treaties have adopted a format closer to the OECD’s streamlined version of the proceedings and, more
importantly, they involve a form of so-called “baseball arbitration”.[232]In baseball arbitration, the arbitrators are not expected
to make their own assessment of the sums due, but to lean towards the solution proposed by the parties that seems more
reasonable.[233]This creates an incentive for parties to behave reasonably when making their assessment, and helps in
the resolution of disputes that involve monetary sums. It has been very popular in sports arbitration (one of the reasons
why it is called “baseball” arbitration).[234]
Besides the positive incentive for tax authorities to settle or moderate their positions, the “baseball” approach, focused on
figures and not on rationales, is a manifestation of the concerns of national authorities, that tax arbitrators may develop
an autonomous body of law outside the control of domestic legislatures and authorities.
225. Robert Coulson, Business Arbitration , 4th edn (1991) at 30, referring to the practice of the AAA for domestic awards. See the reference in William W.
Park, supra n. 2 , at 823, who does not side with this opinion.
226. This does not imply that arbitrators do not have anything to do other than to decide on the case, as much as it means that a long list of pending
issues does no longer constitute a valid excuse for a lack of expediency on the arbitrators’ side.
227. William W. Park, supra n. 2 , at 823.
228. US-Belgium Protocol, no. 6, (h); US-Germany Protocol, article XVI, no. 22, (h); US-Canada Arbitration Board Operating Guidelines, no. 12, (j); US-
France Arbitration Board Operating Guidelines, no. 18, (a).
229. According to the OECD Sample Agreement, arbitrators “shall indicate in writing the sources of law relied upon and the reasoning which led to its
result, unless otherwise provided in the Terms of Reference”.
230. US-Germany Protocol, no. 22, (j); US-Belgium Protocol, no. 6, (j); US-France Protocol to the Income Tax Treaty, MoU, letter (j).
231. US-Canada Arbitration Board Operating Guidelines, no. 13, (e).
232. Lawrence M. Hill & Tamara Ashford, Baseball and Taxes: United States Makes Similar Agreements with France and Germany Detailing Mandatory
Binding Arbitration Procedures for Unresolved Competent Authority Disputes , unpublished manuscript, at 1.
233. Julian Lew, Loukas Mistelis & Stefan Kröll, supra n. 26 , at 13.
234. Id.
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In this regard, it is telling that the two sentences, “The determination of the board will not state a rationale” and “It will have
no precedential value” are tied together in US treaties;[235]yet, it is submitted that this is a mistake as the implications of the
lack of precedential value are not nearly as serious as the implications of a lack of stated rationale. It is true, in a similar
way to sports arbitration, or other fields where baseball arbitration has been popular, that in international taxation the final
sum matters very much, but, as opposed to other fields, it is not the only thing that matters. Very complex issues of fiscal
sovereignty are at stake, and the reasons for reaching a conclusion may be as important as the conclusion itself. In this
regard, the positive effect of creating an incentive for the parties to settle or moderate their positions can be offset by the
lack of transparency of the process, which in a field as sensitive as taxation, endangers certainty and the rule of law.
Perhaps tax authorities were concerned that the lack of an express doctrine of precedent has not prevented commercial
and investment arbitration from developing a whole body of (case) law, without accountability to national parliaments and
authorities, on the sole basis that the rationale of certain decisions may be “persuasive” and should be followed. Perhaps
they wanted to ensure that this did not happen in taxation, hence the lack of rationale. If anything, however, such “creeping
codification” of a lex mercatoria in the absence of a doctrine of stare decisis should serve as a basis for enhancing the need
for a rationale in tax arbitration decisions, not the opposite. If, despite a lack of legal or constitutional foundation, it is a
fact that arbitrators tend to look back to past decisions, and to trust the judgment of certain persons, this process is not
going to be stopped because of a legal mandate not to state a rationale. (Tax) lawyers and arbitrators will keep meeting
in proceedings, symposia, conferences, moot courts, etc, and will keep exchanging views. Matters will still be discussed
without giving confidential details, but with sufficient accuracy as to predict the next decision by the same arbitrator for
those with access. The absence of publicity and rationale will have the effect only of creating a division between “insiders”
and “outsiders”, or lawyers and arbitrators who are “in the know” and those who are not. Given that the commercial and
investment arbitration field is already accused of being excessively hermetic and endogenic, this policy approach can only
aggravate the problem in the tax field. So much for “no taxation without representation”.
7.5.2. The finality of the decision and parallel proceedings
7.5.2.1. Parallel proceedings, tax arbitration and the backlash for middle-of-the-road
solutions
In tax arbitration the award’s finality poses problems of its own. In the former treaties of the United States with other
countries, before the introduction of “mandatory” arbitration,[236]one requirement for the commencement of arbitration
was the taxpayer’s consent in advance to the arbitration and its agreement in advance to be bound by the arbitration
decision.[237]In the versions subsequently modified, proceedings cannot begin until both competent authorities have
received from each concerned person (typically, taxpayers) an agreement not to disclose any information received during
the course of the proceedings from either country or the board, other than the determination of the board (the “nondisclosure
agreement”),[238]but the treaties do not require that the taxpayer presents an agreement not to resort to other mechanisms,
such as administrative or regular courts.
Since the risk of parallel proceedings is a clear and present one, it constitutes an issue that should be addressed by the
arbitral provisions. The way in which the issue is dealt with varies among the different instruments. Both the OECD and the
UN Model Tax Conventions state that issues shall not “be submitted to arbitration if a decision on these issues has already
been rendered by a court or administrative tribunal of either State”.[239]In order for the proceedings to begin, the request
should be accompanied by statements indicating that no such decision has been rendered.[240]In the US tax treaties, the
CAs can consider a case as “not suitable” for arbitration if the courts do not allow for suspension of litigation proceedings
until there is a CA resolution, and arbitral proceedings may also be temporarily deferred if there is an administrative appeal
and the appeal proceedings have not been suspended.[241]
235. US-Germany Protocol, no. 22, (j); US-Belgium Protocol, no. 6, (j); US-France Protocol to the income tax treaty, MoU, letter (j); US-Canada Arbitration
Board Operating Guidelines, no. 13, (e)-(f).
236. The meaning of this reference has been clarified earlier, as pre-dispute consent. See section 7.3.2.
237. See Joint Committee on Taxation, Explanation of Proposed Income Tax Treaty Between the United States and Belgium (JCX-45-07), 13 July
2007, at 86; Joint Committee on Taxation, Explanation of Proposed Protocol to the Income Tax Treaty Between the United States and Germany
(JCX-47-07), 13 July 2007, at 73.
238. Protocol Amending the Convention between the United States of America and The Federal Republic of Germany for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital and Certain Other Taxes, no. 22, art. 25.5.(d).
239. Art. 25(5) OECD Model Tax Convention; art. 25(5) UN Model Tax Convention.
240. OECD Commentary on Sample Agreement, para. 6.
241. MoU US-Belgium, no. 2; MoU US-Germany, no. 3, (b)(ii)-(iii); MoU US-Canada, no. 3, (c); MoU US-France, no. 3, (b)(ii)-(iii).
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Even if a decision has not been rendered, or proceedings have not been commenced, the issue is left dangling as long
as such administrative or litigation proceedings can be opened afterwards. The possibilities are twofold: that proceedings
are opened during arbitral proceedings or after their conclusion. The parties that can open them are also two: CAs and
taxpayers.
The risk of CAs starting parallel proceedings is lesser. For the situation during arbitral proceedings one must bear in mind
that judicial or administrative proceedings do not begin as a result of the administration suing the taxpayer, but as a result of
the latter appealing a decision of tax authorities. For the situation after arbitral proceedings, the risk of the CAs re-opening
the proceedings is ultimately tamed by the “binding”, “final” or even “enforceable” decision of the arbitrators, and will thus
be examined below.[242]
In this subsection it suffices to say that, under the EC Convention, the submission of a case to the advisory commission
shall not prevent a contracting state from initiating or continuing judicial proceedings for administrative penalties in relation
to the same matters.[243]In such a case, the state can suspend the arbitral proceedings and continue with the proceedings
for the imposition of serious penalties.[244]The view that access to arbitration (or conciliation) should be denied in situations
giving rise to serious penalties (or even abuse) is acknowledged by the OECD Commentary, albeit not endorsed in its
text.[245]
The risk of the taxpayer resorting to domestic proceedings is a more serious one. In order to mitigate that risk during the
arbitral proceedings, US treaties reserve to CAs the possibility not only of considering the case ineligible when arbitration
is requested, but also of deferring arbitral proceedings in case of parallel administrative or judicial proceedings.[246]In both
the OECD and the UN Model this possibility can be considered implicit, given the CAs’ status as the only parties to the
proceedings (enhanced in the UN Model by the requirement that they agree to arbitration once the dispute has arisen and
the 3 years for the MAP have lapsed), provided they do so by agreement . The possibility of a CA unilaterally withdrawing
from arbitral proceedings because the taxpayer has initiated parallel proceedings is not contemplated.[247]It seems, thus,
that a decision from the arbitral tribunal would be needed.
The EC Convention provides for a more radical solution. Where domestic law does not permit CAs to derogate from judicial
decisions, arbitral proceedings cannot start unless the associated enterprises have allowed the time provided for appeal
to expire, or withdrawn the appeal before a decision has been delivered.[248]That way the risk of parallel proceedings is
minimized. While the OECD does not endorse this, or another approach in the text of the Convention, it indicates in the
Commentaries that a similar solution could be adopted by states who want to deal with this risk, by tinkering with the 3-year
period in which the taxpayer must request the MAP.[249]One possibility is to suspend the 3-year period; another would be
to let the 3-year period run without suspension (i.e. the taxpayer must present the MAP request before the 3 years expire)
but with “[…]the competent authorities not entering into talks in earnest until the domestic law action is finally determined
[…]”; another, “[…]having the competent authorities enter into talks, but without finally settling an agreement unless and
until the taxpayer agrees to withdraw domestic law actions[…]”.[250]
242. See section 7.5.3.
243. Art. 7(2) EC Convention.
244. Art. 8(1) EC Convention.
245. Some States may deny the taxpayer the ability to initiate the mutual agreement procedure under paragraph 1 of Article 25 in cases where the
transactions to which the request relates are regarded as abusive. This issue is closely related to the issue of “improper use of the Convention”
discussed in paragraph 9.1 and following of the Commentary on Article 1. In the absence of a special provision, there is no general rule denying
perceived abusive situations going to the mutual agreement procedure, however. The simple fact that a charge of tax is made under an avoidance
provision of domestic law should not be a reason to deny access to mutual agreement. However, where serious violations of domestic laws resulting
in significant penalties are involved, some States may wish to deny access to the mutual agreement procedure. The circumstances in which a State
would deny access to the mutual agreement procedure should be made clear in the Convention. See Commentary OECD Model Tax Convention,
art. 25, para. 26.
246. MoU US-Belgium, no. 2; MoU US-Germany, no. 3, (b)(ii)-(iii); MoU US-Canada, no. 3, (c); MoU US-France, no. 3, (b)(ii)-(iii).
247. Also, given that access to the MAP is provided regardless of the availability of domestic remedies ( see Commentary OECD Model Tax Convention,
article 25, paragraph 31), it does not seem reason enough to withdraw unilaterally.
248. That does not affect the appeal in regard to matters other than those resolved under these proceedings. See article 7(3) of the EU Convention.
249. Three years since the taxpayer was notified of the action not in conformity with the Treaty.
250. Commentary OECD Model Tax Convention, art. 25, para. 25.
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7.5.2.2. Parallel proceedings, procedural guarantees and tax arbitration
7.5.2.2.1. Limits on the reach of procedural guarantees in tax cases
The peculiar nature of the solutions is a consequence of the peculiar nature of tax arbitral proceedings, which affect
taxpayers without properly involving them and, despite aiming to be binding, do not involve the courts. Still, despite
such consistency the solution looks contrived and awkward for someone used to “regular” arbitration. Arbitral (or judicial)
mechanisms to avoid parallel proceedings are mainly: (i) the requirement to exhaust local remedies;[251](ii) the subjection of
the country (including its courts) to the decision of an international tribunal;[252]or (iii) so-called “fork-in-the-road” provisions,
by which the private party is given the option to either resort to domestic courts or exercise its rights before an international
tribunal.[253]
The systems envisaged in tax treaties clearly exclude the second option and, since tax authorities cannot normally
contradict the findings of the courts, they do not opt for the first (exhaustion of local remedies). Rather, they “nudge” the
taxpayer towards choosing between the MAP plus arbitration, or domestic courts but they do so indirectly, by means of
a right of tax authorities to suspend the proceedings, rather than a requirement that the taxpayer waives his right. So the
question is: why not include an actual “fork-in-the-road”?
The answer is that this would give rise to inconvenient questions about the nature of the proceedings, and the rights that
are discussed therein, and how they affect the taxpayer’s access to justice. In theory, all modern human rights charters
(whether or not embedded in a constitution) grant citizens access to justice. In this particular field, however, the issue
becomes more convoluted, as we see if we take the case law on the European Convention of Human Rights (ECvHR) by
the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) as a blueprint.
First, the right of access to justice is not infringed if resort to “regular” courts is simply replaced by an alternative system
such as arbitration.[254]This conclusion, however, is not unqualified because not every dispute resolution system will do:
only one which provides the same procedural guarantees as are required of the judicial process.[255]
Second, the fundamental right of access to justice, and the procedural guarantees of a fair and public hearing, independent
and impartial tribunal, and public judgment, are granted to every person only for “the determination of his civil rights
and obligations or of any criminal charge against him”.[256]If we leave out proceedings for the imposition of fines and
imprisonment for tax fraud, and focus only on those where the issue is the measure of the tax liability, it is difficult to conclude
whether tax proceedings are included among those for the determination of the person’s “civil rights and obligations”. The
251. This requirement was typical when the litigation was undertaken between states by virtue of the right of diplomatic protection. A prerequisite to
exercise that right was for the citizen of the country exercising diplomatic protection to have exhausted the judicial remedies before the other country,
i.e. to have given that state the opportunity to correct the situation by itself. In investment treaties it is now atypical to include such a clause, because
the delays involved in exhausting local remedies would hinder the effectiveness of the protection dispensed by the treaty. Yet there are still some
examples where such requirement is included. See Christopher Schreuer, Calvo’s Grandchildren: The Return of Local Remedies in Investment
Arbitration in The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals , 2005, ch. 4. See also Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. The Kingdom of Spain ,
Decision on Jurisdiction, 25 Jan. 2000, 16 ICSID rev – FILJ 203 (2001).
252. The issue of lis alibi pendens and res judicata has been the subject of analysis and debate in the field of international commercial arbitration or
investment arbitration; and there is no consensus as to the ideal solution in some cases (the issue heavily depends on attitudes as to the power and
discretion of courts and arbitral tribunals, the criteria to determine the identity of the disputes, and the relationship between proceedings undertaken
under courts, arbitral tribunals or international courts). See Resolution 1/2006 72th Conference of the International Law Association held in Toronto,
Canada, 4-8 June 2006; Katia Yannaca-Small, Parallel Proceedings in Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino & Christopher Schreuer, supra n. 111 , at
1008 to 1048. Still, the matter is in a better state than in tax arbitration, where those principles do not apply (or, rather, they apply, but one cannot
consider that the MAP and judicial proceedings belong to the same legal order, hence the lack of identity, and of res judicata or lis alibi pendens ).
253. Christopher Schreuer, Travelling the BIT Route – Of Waiting Periods, Umbrella Clauses and Forks in the Road , JWIT, vol. 5 (2004), at 239 et seq.
254. Regent Company v. Ukraine , ECHR 3 Apr. 2008, no. 773/03; Deweer v. Belgium, ECHR 27 Feb. 1980, no. 6903/75; Pastore v. Italy , ECHR 25 May
1999, no. 46483/99; Jakob Boss Söhne v. Germany , ECHR 2 Dec. 1991, no. 18479/91; Suovaniemi and others v. Finland , ECHR 23 Feb. 1999,
no. 31737/96. See also Charles Jarrosson, L’arbitrage et la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme, Revue de l’arbitrage 1989; Thomas
Schultz, Human Rights: A Speed Bump for Arbitral Procedures? An Exploration of Safeguards in the Acceleration of Justice , 9 International
Arbitration Law Review 1 (2006), at 10-12.
255. Article 6(1) of the ECHR states that:
[...] everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.
Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public
order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require,
or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.
256. Art. 6(1) ECHR.
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issue was raised in 2001 in the case of Ferrazzini v. Italy .[257]Despite holding that the notion of “civil rights and obligations”
was an “autonomous” one, not dependent on national categorizations,[258]that legal concepts must be interpreted in the
light of present-day conditions in democratic societies,[259]and that “[r]elations between the individual and the State have
clearly evolved in many spheres during the fifty years which have elapsed since the Convention was adopted, with State
regulation increasingly intervening in private-law relations”,[260]it also found that “pecuniary” is not akin to “civil”[261]and,
most importantly, that the developments occurring in democratic societies have not affected “[…]the fundamental nature
of the obligation on individuals or companies to pay tax […]”, nor have they “[…] entailed a further intervention by the State
into the “civil” sphere of the individual’s life […]”. Tax matters, according to the Court, “still form part of the hard core of
public-authority prerogatives, with the public nature of the relationship between the taxpayer and the community remaining
predominant”,[262]and thereby the Court refused to review its previous position. Tax matters, thus, were not covered by
article 6(1).
The issue, however, is not entirely settled. First, there were six dissenting judges in Ferrazzini ,[263]and the reference to
“civil” rights and obligations is absent from other texts such as article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, or article 8 of the American Convention on Human Rights (which makes express reference to “fiscal” obligations).
Second, tax proceedings, the purpose of which is the imposition of a fine on the taxpayer, can be considered “criminal” in
nature, and therefore covered by the procedural guarantees of article 6, as the Court held in Jussila v. Finland .[264]One can
argue that, since “criminal” proceedings are also excluded from tax arbitration, there is no room for overlap (i.e. there are
no cases that are considered “criminal” pursuant to article 6, and yet are covered by the MAP and arbitration procedures);
yet, that depends on the coincidence of the criteria employed to characterize such “criminal” proceedings.
The troublesome (and, admittedly, unlikely) scenario would be one where tax authorities determine the taxable base, the
taxpayer resorts to the MAP before the authorities of one country, which accept the request, while the authorities of the
other country are starting administrative proceedings to impose, let us say, a “surcharge” (whose nature as a fine can be
a matter of contention).
The most likely scenario would be for both authorities to drop the MAP and arbitral proceedings, but if they are not dropped,
the matter of whether article 6 applies could arise. The existing treaty materials do not expressly exclude proceedings
for the imposition of sums that could qualify as “fines” from the MAP or arbitration. Only the EC Convention makes such
a reference, but it does so by introducing a new source of uncertainty, when referring, alternatively, to proceedings to
impose “administrative penalties”,[265]and proceedings for the imposition of “serious” penalties.[266]Since the seriousness
of the penalty is only one criterion to classify proceedings as “criminal”,[267]could there arguably be proceedings where
the issue is decided on arbitration, and yet is subject to article 6? The answer is: “most likely, no”. The purpose of the
257. Application 44759/98, Ferrazzini v. Italy , 12 July 2001. In that case an Italian citizen alleged that the excessive length of the proceedings had
breached article 6(1), whereas the Italian government argued that the case was inadmissible, since proceedings had been instituted for the
determination of the taxable income and rates, and thus were not “criminal” – something on which Ferrazini agreed – and, as a matter of “public” law,
the determination of tax liability did not involve “civil rights” – which Ferrazzini disputed. The Court held that the case could not be directly dismissed,
since there were complex matters that could not be determined without looking at the merits (it consequently declared the case admissible).
258. Application 44759/98, Ferrazzini v. Italy , 12 July 2001, para. 24.
259. Id.,para. 26.
260. This “has led the Court to find that procedures classified under national law as being part of ‘public law’ could come within the purview of article 6
under its ‘civil’ head if the outcome was decisive for private rights and obligations, in regard to such matters as, to give some examples, the sale of
land, the running of a private clinic, property interests, the granting of administrative authorisations relating to the conditions of professional practice
or of a licence to serve alcoholic beverages” . Application 44759/98, Ferrazzini v. Italy , 12 July 2001, para. 27.
261. Id., para. 25.
262. Id., para. 29.
263. The dissenting opinion illustrates, by reference to the travaux préparatoires, that the reference to “civil” may not have been meant to exclude “fiscal”
or “tax” obligations, but, rather, to leave out matters that might be subject to administrative discretion (something that does not characterize tax
obligations, which are a result of the application of legal provisions). It also pointed out that the current division created important inconsistencies
when purely economic rights were at stake (for example, between taxes and social security contributions). See Application 44759/98, Ferrazzini v.
Italy , 12 July 2001, dissenting opinion of Judge Lorenzen, joined by Judges Rozakis, Bonello, Strázniká, Bîrzan and Fischbach.
264. Application 73053/01, Jussila v. Finland , 23 Nov. 2006.
265. Art. 7(2) EC Convention.
266. Art. 8(1) EC Convention.
267. In Jussila v. Finland , the Court extensively discussed its case law, such as Öztürk v. Germany , 21 Feb. 1984, paragraph 54, series A, no. 73; see
also Lutz v. Germany , 25 Aug. 1987, paragraph 55, series A, no. 123; Bendenoun v. France (24 Feb. 1994, series A, no. 284; Ezeh and Connors v.
the United Kingdom ([GC] nos. 39665/98 and 40086/98, paragraph 82, ECHR 2003-X; Janosevic v. Sweden (no. 34619/97, ECHR 2002-VII); Morel
v. France (Dec., no. 54559/00, ECHR 2003-IX). It concluded that, even though in some cases, such as Morel v. France , significant importance was
attached to the seriousness of the penalty to classify proceedings as “criminal” in nature, the approach of the Court is more global, such as the one
employed in Janosevic or Ezeh , and thus a proceeding for the imposition of a surcharge would be deemed “criminal”, and thereby subject to article 6
guarantees. See Jussila v. Finland , paragraphs 34 to 38.
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MAP or arbitral proceedings is to determine the proper interpretation of the treaty (or, in the case of the EC Convention,
the application of the arm’s length principle), which establishes the taxpayer’s liability as a consequence. The treaties do
not go as far as to determine the consequences beyond such liability (e.g. fines or surcharges), and the arbitral tribunal
could not go further than the scope of the treaty it is supposed to interpret.[268]In cases, however, where the interpretation
of the treaty is so closely linked with the determination of crucial aspects leading to the imposition of surcharges or fines
(i.e. the “reasonableness” of the taxpayer’s interpretation, and therefore his culpability), one cannot entirely rule out the
operation of procedural safeguards.
7.5.2.2.2. Circumventing limits on (procedural) guarantees in tax cases through the (substantive)
rules on the protection of property
Finally, and most importantly for our purposes, in addition to the right of access to justice there is the protection of the
peaceful enjoyment of property, pursuant to article 1 of Protocol 1 to the Convention on Human Rights.[269]Even though the
protection of property does not fetter a state’s right to enforce the laws necessary to secure the payment of taxes,[270]any
deprivation must be subject to certain guarantees.
A strict interpretation could allow a neat distinction between a first stage, for the determination of the tax liability, where the
only provision potentially relevant would be article 6(1) of the Convention, and it would not apply, pursuant to Ferrazzini ,
and a second stage, for the actual enforcement of the claim against the taxpayer’s property, where article 1 of Protocol 1
would apply. Provided that the MAP plus arbitration envisaged in the treaties affects primarily the first stage, states might
introduce a “fork-in-the-road” provision without being inconvenienced by article 6(1) issues.
Case law of the ECHR shows, however, that things are a little more complicated than that. In cases such as Regent
Company v. Ukraine the Court has established that a “claim” can constitute a “possession” within the meaning of article 1
of Protocol 1 if it is sufficiently established as to be enforceable.[271]In that case, the claim had been upheld by a court.
However, the Court has been even more flexible, at least in tax cases. Pursuant to Pressos Compañia Naviera , the
“property” protected by article 1 of Protocol 1 encompasses “claims”, including claims against the state,[272]provided the
holder of the claim has a “legitimate expectation” regarding it[273]and, therefore, state action (including legislative) interfering
with the exercise of the claim can constitute a deprivation of property.[274]
In Dangeville , the Court further held that such assets could include a claim for the reimbursement of taxes unduly paid.[275]In
that case, the taxpayer’s claim was based on the non-conformity of French VAT law with the VAT Directive (something
that was acknowledged by a circular), and it was only denied by the Conseil d’Etat on the basis of the French procedural
doctrine of “classification of proceedings” ( principe de la distinction des contentieux ),[276]and the interference with the
268. See the issue of “applicable law” in section 7.4.3.
269. Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Paris, 20 March 1952. Article 1 states that:
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in
the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law [...]
270. Second paragraph of article 1 of Protocol 1 reads:
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the
use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.
271. Regent Company v. Ukraine , no. 773/03, ECHR, 3 Apr. 2008, paragraph 61, citing Burdov v. Russia , no. 59498/00, ECHR 2002-III, paragraph 40,
and Poltorachenko v. Ukraine , no. 77317/01, 18 Jan. 2005, paragraph 45.
272. Application 17849/91, Pressos Compania Naviera and Others v. Belgium , 20 Nov. 1995, para. 31. The judgment is a bit unclear, however, on
whether and to what extent the classification of such claim as an asset was dependent on the “autonomous” interpretation of article 1 of Protocol 1,
or the domestic law applicable to the claim. The Court held that:
In order to determine whether in this instance there was a “possession”, the Court may have regard to the domestic law in force at the time
of the alleged interference, as there is nothing to suggest that that law ran counter to the object and purpose of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
(P1-1). The rules in question are rules of tort, under which claims for compensation come into existence as soon as the damage occurs. A
claim of this nature “constituted an asset” and therefore amounted to a possession within the meaning of the first sentence of Article 1 (P1-1).
This provision (P1-1) was accordingly applicable in the present case. Ibidem
In a similar sense, see Van Marle and Others v. the Netherlands judgment of 26 June 1986, series A, no. 101, at 13, paragraph 41.
273. Application 17849/91, Pressos Compania Naviera and Others v. Belgium , 20 Nov. 1995, para. 31.
274. Id., paras. 33-34.
275. Application 36677/97, Dangeville v. France , 16 Apr. 2002, para. 48.
276. The taxpayer’s right had been recognized by the Paris Administrative Court of Appeal, and was only overturned by the Conseil d’Etat on the
procedural grounds of the “classification of remedies” doctrine. See Application 36677/97, Dangeville v. France , 16 Apr. 2002, paragraph 22. The
“classification of remedies” doctrine was some sort of extension of the res judicata principle, and prevented a party from bringing an action under
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claim based on procedural grounds was considered a “deprivation of possessions” pursuant to the Pressos Compania
Naviera doctrine.[277]Furthermore, the Court held that the interference with property was not required in the general
interest,[278]nor was it proportionate, partly as a result of the absence of proper procedures to exercise the claim.[279]
The Dangeville case begs the question whether the ECHR would have been equally proactive, and unforgiving with the
domestic authorities if the right involved had arisen from the determination by tax authorities of a tax liability in breach of
a bilateral tax treaty, rather than EU law provisions; the reference in the text of article 1 of Protocol 1 to “general principles
of international law” suggests that it should. If so, the author must conclude that a procedural obstacle to the recovery
of sums resulting from tax liabilities unduly determined, may not constitute a breach of article 6(1) of the ECvHR but it
impinges upon the right to enjoyment of property, pursuant to article 1 of Protocol 1.
The second question which this gives rise to, is whether, to claim that there has been a breach of the right to enjoy one’s
possessions, an absolute procedural rule that definitely excludes the substantive right is necessary (as in Dangeville ) or the
mere absence of guarantees that can potentially result in that loss is sufficient. Given the wide reference to “interference”
we would be inclined towards the second alternative. In such context, in cases where a decision by state authorities
impinges upon a taxpayer’s patrimony, even if the taxpayer is deprived of the article 6 right to due process as such, the
“procedural” side of the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions acts in practice as a way to circumvent that limitation.
7.5.2.2.3. Back to square one. Procedural guarantees and arbitration
The problem is that case law is not sufficiently developed to enable a determination as to whether, and to what extent, the
right to enjoy one’s possessions affords, as an autonomous source of rights, the same or equivalent procedural guarantees
as when exercised in conjunction with article 6, or if it only offers something less. If it does provide equivalent guarantees
(admittedly, a big if), this only takes us to square one, that is, such guarantees apply, in the absence of a waiver , such
as the one implicit in arbitration. Thus, we need to examine whether and to what extent the guarantees can be waived
pursuant to the Court’s case law on arbitration agreements and arbitral proceedings.
On a strict theoretical view of arbitration, instruments such as the ECvHR are based on the idea of state responsibility for
wrongful acts, and since arbitral tribunals are not organs of the state they are not directly subject to the ECvHR provisions,
including article 6.[280]In practice, however, arbitral awards need to be enforced, and since states will be liable for the
actions of their national courts, where a court has enforced an arbitral award in contravention of the ECvHR, national
courts will decline to enforce such awards. Since arbitrators are supposed to render enforceable awards, they will therefore
definitely consider the ECHR and other instruments. This means that, even according to the view grounded on the theory
of arbitration, procedural guarantees come into play, albeit in an indirect way.[281]
Of course, there is no guarantee that the ECHR views the issue in the same light, for it has no duty to be consistent
with the theoretical foundations of arbitration; its duty is to be consistent with the ECvHR. In fact, in Regent Company v.
Ukraine , the Court upheld the private party’s right to the enforcement of an award as being protected by article 6(1) of the
ECvHR[282]but it did so by affirming that the reference to “tribunal” in article 6(1) “is not necessarily to be understood as
signifying a court of law of the classic kind, integrated within the standard judicial machinery of the country”, and further
that “the Arbitration Tribunal was a tribunal established by law” because it was in conformity with the arbitration law of
the general law of tort (in this case, liability would arise from non-compliance with the EU VAT Directive) when it had been refused under a special
procedure. Id., para. 54.
277. Id., para. 51.
278. The Court dismissed France’s arguments regarding case law where statutes of limitations had operated as a bar to the claim as being different,
since the case at hand did deal with such type of limitations, but with “a refusal to take the right to reimbursement itself into account”. Application
36677/97, Dangeville v. France , 16 Apr. 2002, para. 56. The Court also held that the fact that the taxpayer had not alleged the breach of EU law
in its first appeal was not an impediment, as the Conseil d’Etat should have realized that by itself. Id., para. 57. To sum up, the Court held that
the taxpayer should not “be required to suffer the consequences of the difficulties that were encountered in assimilating Community law or of the
divergences between the various national authorities”. Id., para. 57.
279. Id., para. 61 states that:
Both the negation of the applicant company’s claim against the State and the absence of domestic procedures affording a sufficient remedy
to ensure the protection of the applicant company’s right to the peaceful enjoyment of its possessions upset the fair balance that must
be maintained between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s
fundamental rights.
280. Thomas Schultz, supra n. 254 , at 7.
281. Id., at 8.
282. Regent Company v. Ukraine , no. 773/03, ECHR, 3 Apr. 2008.
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the seat of the arbitration.[283]Although the Court formulated this construction to protect the arbitral award (and the party’s
expectations in relation to it), it could be read backwards to justify the application of guarantees to arbitration in the same
way as they apply to regular courts, which could be seen as an “interference” by the arbitral community[284]or even a
“judicialization” of arbitration, which would be in accordance with a strict “jurisdictional” theory of the institution,[285]a view
clearly discredited.[286]In other decisions, such as Transado ,[287]the Court did not point out the peculiarities of arbitration
vis-à-vis procedural guarantees, but went on to examine whether they had been respected in the case (specifically the
right to an independent and impartial tribunal) and concluded they were.
One could argue that such concerns are, to some extent, a storm in a teacup. Detractors of the ECHR’s “jurisdictional”
stance towards arbitration do not argue that arbitration should be detached from procedural guarantees, but only that such
guarantees should come not from the ECHR but from a truly international public order.[288]This is all very well, but states
whose courts do not check the compliance of a decision with the ECvHR will incur international liability and it is somewhat
unrealistic for arbitration to expect an absolute protection from the courts. Few would trust a system where awards do not
pass any scrutiny concerning at least the most fundamental policies, domestic or international, and ECvHR guarantees
should fall into both categories.
On the other hand, it is not true that the ECHR examines arbitral awards in the same light as it scrutinizes court decisions.
The ECHR is well aware that, in an arbitration, a party has waived his right to take the dispute to a court established by law,
or to a public hearing, and it sees no problem in that, as it expressed in Deweer v. Belgium. [289]The question is whether
this constitutes a carte blanche for arbitration or if it is only justified to the extent that arbitral proceedings respect certain
basic procedural safeguards. The view in cases such as Pastore v. Italy ,[290] Jakob Boss v. Germany [291]or Suovaniemi v.
Finland [292]is that rights other than access to a court of law or public hearing can be waived, but it is unclear which rights
these are and what the limit is.[293]
The issue is particularly problematic because, if the approach in tax treaties evolves from ‘nudging’ the taxpayer towards
choosing between domestic courts or MAP plus arbitration, to effectively ‘asking’ or ‘forcing’ the taxpayer to do so, there
are obvious oddities in the arbitral proceedings vis-à-vis basic procedural rights, such as the taxpayer’s lack of party status,
which entails the absence of a “right” to rebut the views of the tax authority with which he disagrees.[294]Also, the approach
towards the independence and impartiality of some treaties would raise the eyebrows of many an arbitral connoisseur even
when one considers the proceedings only as between tax authorities;[295]yet, even under the stricter US approach,[296]the
fact that an arbitrator has a sufficient degree of independence and impartiality vis-à-vis the tax authorities does not mean
that his independence and impartiality vis-à-vis the taxpayer can be taken for granted without a reassessment. The issue
becomes particularly problematic under, for example, the OECD Model, where the taxpayer’s liability could ultimately be
decided by a person working at the tax administration.
However, courts such as the ECHR have given significant leeway to international arbitration. For example, in Suovaniemi
v. Finland , where Mr Suovaniemi did not challenge an arbitrator who had been counsel for one of the parties in the past,
283. Id., para. 54.
284. The comments on the decision express that view. See Regent Company v. Ukraine , comments by Jean Baptiste Racine, Revue de l’arbitrage 4
(2009), at 805 and 806.
285. To justify the expansion of the definition of a “tribunal established by law” to the arbitral tribunal the Court made reference to Lithgow and Others
v. the United Kingdom , judgment of 8 July 1986 (series A, no. 102, at 72 and 73, paragraph 201), where the arbitral tribunal in question was
established by norm, and not by the parties’ choice.
286. Most experts adhere to a combination of the “jurisdictional” theory with the “contractual” theory, in what has come to be called the “mixed” or “hybrid”
theory, by which the arbitral tribunal is established by contract, but then has to respect the specific laws that constitute the “regulatory web” of
reference, and the framework of reference for the arbitrators’ decision. See Julian Lew, Loukas Mistelis & Stefan Kröll, supra n. 26 , at 76-82.
287. Transado – Transportes fluviais do Sado, S.A. v. Portugal , no. 35943/02, ECHR, referred to in the comments to Regent Company v. Ukraine , Jean
Baptiste Racine, supra n. 284 , at 806.
288. Charles Jarrosson, L’arbitrage et la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme , Revue de l’arbitrage (1989) at 607.
289. Deweer v. Belgium , ECHR 27 Feb. 1980, no. 6903/75.
290. Pastore v. Italy , ECHR 25 May 1999, no. 46483/99.
291. Jakob Boss Söhne v. Germany , ECHR 2 Dec. 1991, no. 18479/91.
292. Suovaniemi and others v. Finland , ECHR 23 Feb. 1999, no. 31737/96.
293. See Thomas Schultz, supra n. 254 , at 10-12.
294. According to the OECD Model the taxpayer can present her positions, and, with the permission of the arbitral board , present them orally. Nothing
is said about the possibility of rebutting the CAs’ positions. In the US Model a reference is made to the possibility of the “Presenter of the case” to
submit positions in writing. In the EC Convention a reference is made to the possibility of the “enterprises” to appear or be represented before the
advisory commission (article 10(2)); and the possibility that such enterprises may provide any information, evidence or documents which seem to
them likely to be of any use to the advisory commission in reaching a decision (article 10(1)).
295. See section 7.4.1. Especially the OECD Model allows for persons currently working for the tax administration to act as arbitrators.
296. Arbitrators cannot have worked for any of the tax administrations in the past 2 years. See section 7.4.1.
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the Court rejected Mr Suovaniemi’s subsequent claim of a breach of article 6, and held that the right to an independent and
impartial tribunal had been waived.[297]According to the scholars, a waiver of this kind is admissible if: (i) it is unequivocal;
and (ii) it is made with informed consent, which, in turn, means: (a) the party is aware of the rights and risks involved and (b)
the waiver is accompanied with “guarantees commensurate to the importance of the right being waived”.[298]In Suovaniemi ,
for example, the party was assisted by counsel; yet, in that case there was no question as to Mr Suovaniemi’s right to
challenge the arbitrator, or his right to be heard and to present his case for that matter, things that are not remotely clear
in case of tax arbitration proceedings.
In summary therefore, the question is whether a party, even with unequivocal and informed consent, can waive in
advance [299]a right to proper proceedings in exchange for proceedings to which it is not even a party , and thereby enjoys
none of the guarantees which apply. Even after having shown, in the context of the ECvHR, (i) that proceedings for
determining tax liabilities are not subject to article 6’s procedural guarantees; (ii) that some sort of undefined guarantees
come into play only indirectly as a result of the application of article 1 of Protocol 1 (right to enjoyment of possessions); (iii)
that even if such guarantees are equivalent to those of article 6 they can be waived if the right to a court is replaced by a right
to arbitral proceedings; and (iv) that the ECHR is quite generous in its interpretation of which procedural guarantees can be
waived by choosing arbitration, we are nowhere near to answering that question. Furthermore, since one can imagine that
countries ratifying tax conventions containing arbitration clauses will have conducted their own similar analyses, this may
explain their careful attitude towards “fork-in-the-road” provisions, or any options that may formally deprive the taxpayer
of his right to access to the ordinary courts.
7.5.3. Recognition and enforcement
Provided the taxpayer does not resort to other mechanisms beyond the arbitral proceedings (i.e. he agrees with the solution
rendered by the arbitration board), the question is what happens next. It is at this crucial point that the paucity of details
of the different instruments becomes unnerving. Even if arbitrators manage to nudge the proceedings forward despite the
limitations, and make a decision, there is still plenty that competent tax authorities could do to avoid the decision: they could
refuse enforcement arguing that the arbitral board got the facts wrong or resorted to the wrong interpretation of the tax
treaty, that the decision is contrary to domestic public policy or that the award is unenforceable for budgetary reasons. What
is worse, any of these reasons (except maybe for the budgetary ones) could be used by a court to refuse enforcement.
Therefore, the fact that little is said about the avenues for enforcement of the arbitral decision that are available to the
taxpayer, can change a system that, as we have seen, is merely mediocre into simply irrelevant. States cannot simply
say that the issue slipped their mind.
Yet, the language employed seems solid. Supposedly, the decision is “final and binding” on the tax authorities. This is
the solution adopted under the EC Convention, which, despite allowing the authorities to depart from the opinion of the
Commission, also states that, failing an agreement in favour of a different decision, the authorities shall implement that
opinion.[300]Yet, no mention whatsoever is made of the implications of that “shall” if the authorities fail to implement the
solution. A similar solution is adopted by the UN Convention, which indicates that the decision shall be binding unless the
authorities, within 6 months, adopt a different solution (or the person affected fails to accept the arbitration decision).[301]The
solution in US treaties focuses more on the acceptance/rejection by the taxpayer, but it does not say much about the
consequences vis-à-vis the CAs and their governing states other than that “[…]the determination of the arbitration board
297. Suovaniemi and others v. Finland , ECHR, 23 Feb. 1999, no. 31737/96.
298. Id.
299. It could be argued that Mr Suovaniemi’s right was not only waived in advance when he opted for arbitration, but at the time of attending to the
constitution of the arbitral tribunal, i.e. when the breach of article 6 occurred.
300. Article 12 of the EC Convention states that:
(1) The competent authorities party to the procedure referred to in Article 7 shall, acting by common consent on the basis of Article 4, take a
decision which will eliminate the double taxation within six months of the date on which the advisory commission delivered its opinion; (2) The
competent authorities may take a decision which deviates from the advisory commission’s opinion. If they fail to reach an agreement, they
shall be obliged to act in accordance with that opinion.
301. Article 25(5) of the UN Model Convention stipulates that:
The arbitration decision shall be binding on both States and shall be implemented notwithstanding any time limits in the domestic laws of
these States: (1) unless both competent authorities agree on a different solution within six months after the decision has been communicated
to them or (2) unless a person directly affected by the case does not accept the mutual agreement that implements the arbitration decision.
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in a particular case shall be binding on the Contracting States […]”,[302]that it will have the nature of a resolution by mutual
agreement and that the taxpayer will have to accept it.[303]
So far, the only text that provides a reference to enforcement issues is the OECD Model Tax Convention. It states that
the decision shall be final and binding , as the other texts do, and it also states that it shall be implemented no matter
what the limitation provisions say.[304]But the OECD Sample Agreement between tax authorities makes reference to the
enforcement process in the following terms:
The arbitration decision shall be final, unless that decision is found to be unenforceable by the courts of one of
the Contracting States because of a violation of paragraph 5 of Article 25 or of any procedural rule included in the
Terms of Reference or in this agreement that may reasonably have affected the decision. If a decision is found to be
unenforceable for one of these reasons, the request for arbitration shall be considered not to have been made and
the arbitration process shall be considered not to have taken place.[305]
Nevertheless, it requires the CAs to implement the arbitration decision within 6 months from the communication of the
decision to them by reaching a mutual agreement on the case that led to the arbitration. [306]
The OECD Model includes the first attempt to confront the cumbersome issue of enforcement, which makes it a better
mechanism than those of any other instruments (it is especially regrettable that the US instruments, detailed in other
respects, are so conspicuously silent when it comes to enforcement). Yet, the model provisions leave open more questions
than they answer. First, enforcement is referred to in the Sample Agreement, which is supposedly signed between CAs.
This raises doubts as to the aim of the provision. If its aim is to deal with the consequences of non-enforcement by the
courts as a matter of fact , it can certainly do so. However, it is doubtful whether it can regulate individual stages in the
enforcement process, which it arguably does by stating the reasons for non-enforcement by the courts: (i) a violation of
paragraph 5 of article 25; (ii) the violation of any procedural rule included in the Terms of Reference; or (iii) in this agreement
(the Sample Agreement), provided that it may reasonably have affected the decision ) ( see above).
The question is: what happens if the courts refuse enforcement for reasons that have nothing to do with those contemplated
under an agreement (e.g. as a result of finding that the decision violates international public policy) or simply analyse
enforcement from the perspective of a framework that has nothing to do with the one stipulated under the OECD Sample
Agreement? In that event, there would be little the CAs could do.
That is why the proper solution would have been to include the enforcement process in the Tax Treaty (or Model
Convention) itself, and then, to have cross-referenced it with an internationally accepted mechanism of enforcement, such
as the one envisaged under the NY Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.[307]This
would create problems of interpretation, since the NY Convention is deemed to refer to “commercial” disputes, which could
give rise to complex arguments on the nature of a tax dispute[308]and stalling tactics, which could endanger the expediency
of the process; yet, such problems would be much less likely if there were an express reference in the tax treaty to the
fact that, for the purposes of the NY Convention, the disputes would be considered as “commercial”.[309]
But one should be realistic with this: the absence of any reference to the enforcement process is not a casual oversight,
but a deliberate omission sought after by the states, as a consequence of both: (i) the close association of the arbitration
process with the administrative (i.e. non-judicial) MAP; and (ii) the states’ unwillingness to relinquish their sovereignty, no
302. US-Belgium Protocol no. 6, (j); US-Germany Protocol, article XVI no. 22, (j); US-Canada Protocol, article 21(7)(e); US-France Protocol, article X,
no. 6, (e).
303. US-Belgium Protocol no. 6, (k); US-Germany Protocol, article XVI, no. 22, (k); US-Canada Protocol, article 21(7)(e); US-France Protocol, article X,
no. 6(e).
304. Article 25(5) of the OECD Model Tax Convention states that: “Unless a person directly affected by the case does not accept the mutual agreement
that implements the arbitration decision, that decision shall be binding on both Contracting States and shall be implemented notwithstanding any
time limits in the domestic laws of these States”.
305. OECD Model Sample Agreement no. 18.
306. Id., para. 19.
307. We do agree with Professor Park in so far as the enforcement model for tax arbitration under bilateral tax treaties should not be a self-contained
one, as the one under ICSID. William W. Park, supra n. 2 , at 838 to 848. The circumstances that gave rise to the prominence of ICSID and the
Washington Convention are arguably not present today, and tax (we have seen it) remains an area more sensitive as a matter of policy (and politics)
than investment protection.
308. For a similar problem about the “commercial” nature of the dispute, see United Mexican States v. Metalclad , [2001] B.C.D. Civ. J. 1708. See
also William W. Park, supra n. 2 , at 841.
309. See William W. Park, supra n. 2 , at 841.
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matter that this comes at the cost of casting a(nother) shadow of uncertainty over what is already a process notable for
its lacklustre solutions.
7.6. Conclusions
It is expected that, by now, an alert reader will have found the rationale for the title of this article. “Snakes and ladders”
is a classic board game where players must move their pieces across the board (usually by throwing a dice). The catch
with the game is that specific board squares are connected by “ladders” and “snakes” (or “chutes”), which make the player
advance or go back multiple positions, thereby helping or hindering his game. The fun is in not knowing whether a player
will be unexpectedly helped, or pushed back to start all over again.
Even if this uncertainty is exciting in the context of a board game, it is frustrating when associated to a legal process; yet,
states have managed to create a king-sized game of snakes and ladders when it comes to tax arbitration. In some cases
the taxpayer and tax administration alike can be unexpectedly helped by an alignment of circumstances that render them
willing to resolve the issue as soon as possible, as well as by the discretion of the arbitrators, which, well-exercised, can
make the process run smoothly. If the solution is quick and fair, perhaps the “losing” tax authority may even be interested
in implementing it with equal swiftness, if only to ensure that next time, when the decision is favourable to it, it gets the
money on time.
This rosy picture, with so many ladders, should not mask the reality that this is indeed a game filled with snakes. These
come in various forms, but perhaps the most insidious are: (i) the emphasis in attaching the arbitral process as an appendix
to the “conciliatory” procedure (called MAP or something else); (ii) the tax authorities’ absolute (and unnecessary) control
of all stages of the process; and (iii) the taxpayer’s secondary role. All these elements create incentives for opportunistic
behaviour by one, or both, tax authorities, who can stall or “play the referee”, knowing that the arbitrators have a more
insecure position than those, say, in investment arbitration.
This may have been accepted as a necessary evil (or even created on purpose) by states and tax authorities. In fact, the
current system is consistent with the view of arbitration as a sort of “Damoclean sword”, hovering over the tax authorities’
heads, and ready to strike if they procrastinate too much. In addition to being shocking for someone accustomed to the
clear benefits of arbitration, this view, and the type of mechanisms that it has engendered, has further consequences that
seriously question the judgment of the states and authorities who designed the process.
First, the mechanism can take an excessive amount of time, which may not be in the interests of states who are under
budgetary pressures, although it can be argued that the incentive is reduced to the extent that the taxpayer can be forced
to bear the cost of double taxation in the meantime. Second, the control which tax authorities exercise over the process
hides another truth: parties to an arbitration, especially if they are public authorities, have many virtues: skilled and smart
professionals but they are awful managers of arbitral proceedings. They lack flexible procedures (and mentality) and too
often let formality triumph over expediency. Flexibility is what justifies arbitration in the first place. Making restrictive rules
on the proceedings (such as those on the extension and written nature of the submissions) can work depending on the
nature of the issue they apply to. This self-evident fact was probably what led states to accept (probably grudgingly) wider
discretion for arbitrators in establishing procedural rules, albeit that this has not been extended to the legal sources, or the
nature of the decision, which, at least in the case of US instruments, must only state the result and not provide a rationale;
something dangerous, since it can give rise to a division between “insiders” and “outsiders” more patent than the one
existing in commercial and investment arbitration.
Third, the lack of taxpayer involvement allows tax authorities a certain degree of control, and the possibility of saying “no”,
which lets them align the existence of tax “arbitration” with their goals on pursuing tax avoidance and tax fraud. At the same
time, the taxpayer’s secondary role creates very serious problems where he is forced by the tax authorities to choose
between domestic courts and a clumsy procedure to which he is not a party. Also, all investment in the process might be
to no avail if the taxpayer decides to withdraw from the proceedings, or even if he refuses to adhere to the final decision,
where he is not happy with the process and its outcome. There are also very serious questions left unanswered when it
comes to the taxpayer’s basic right to a due process.
Which leads us to the last problem: the most serious doubt concerns whether one can consider tax arbitration as an actual,
and serious, arbitral “process”, or a game not to be taken seriously. A process entails certain duties, but enjoys legal
protection. Actual arbitrators can request judicial assistance for matters of fact or evidence, something that a tax authority
may be interested in, especially if the courts are those of another country. Arbitration is a system properly coordinated with
the administration of justice. Courts have to accept the decisions emanating from arbitral tribunals as binding decisions
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“in law” and cannot brush them aside as the result of administrative horse-trading, a threat that always exists with current
proceedings.
All in all, such guarantees are not present in the legal provisions of the system, which is worrying for a mechanism that is
still in its infancy. Fortunately, the experience with arbitration tells us that not even the “conventional” arbitration procedure
used in commercial cases has always enjoyed its current level of legal protection. The main doctrines that today constitute
its pillars were not created through legislation, but from the acceptance of the arbitrators’ auctoritas by parties that knew that
the system itself (not the result) was in their best interests and the crystallization of such “practice” in a body of principles
used time and again. Since this basic body of principles is already in place, its adjustment to the tax field requires only that
arbitrators are given some room by the parties in tax arbitration. This will only happen when tax authorities start treating
arbitration not as a threat, but as an opportunity. The potential positive consequences: quick settlement of disputes, the
certainty of solutions, and the taxpayers’ rights and interests, or even the development of an international lex tributaria (in
the distant future), depend on this change of mentality.
Issue OECD Model UN Model US Model EC Convention
Relationship to conciliatory
proceedings
Paragraph 5 of provision on
MAP (art. 25)
Unable to reach an
agreement within 2 years
from the presentation of the
case to the CA of the other
contracting state
Paragraph 5 of provision on
MAP (art. 25) (alternative B)
Unable to reach an
agreement within 3 years
from presentation of the case
to the CA of the other
contracting state
Paragraph in provision on
MAP (art. 26(5) and (6))
CAs have endeavoured but
are unable to reach an
agreement (treaties)
The later of:
(i) 2 years after
“Commencement Date” of
MAP (date when CAs
confirm to each other that
they have received sufficient
information to proceed with
the MAP) “ […]unless both
competent authorities have
agreed prior to the date
arbitration proceedings begin
to a different date”,
(ii) Date of reception of
non-disclosure agreements
signed by taxpayers by CAs
(MoUs)
Separate provisions (arts. 6,
and 7 et seq.)
Article 7(1). “If the competent
authorities fail to reach an
agreement that eliminates the
double taxation referred to in
Article 6 within two years on
the date on which the case
was first submitted to one of
the competent authorities
enterprises may have
recourse to the remedies
available to them under
the domestic law of
the Contracting States
concerned; however, where
the case has so been
submitted to a court or
tribunal, the term of two
years referred to in the
first subparagraph shall be
computed from the date on
which the judgment of the
final court of appeal was
given”
Issue OECD Model UN Model US Model EC Convention
Formal act to begin an
arbitration
Request by taxpayer Request by CAs Automatic (provided there
was a request for assistance
that originated the MAP). CAs
can agree to postpone the
date, but, in the absence of
agreement, one can directly
appoint a board member
The CAs shall set up a
commission. There is no




Article 25(5) “any unresolved
issues arising from the
case shall be submitted to
arbitration” [emphasis added]
Article 25(5) ( alternative
B ) “any unresolved
issues arising from the
case shall be submitted to
arbitration” [emphasis added]
A case shall not be submitted
to arbitration if the CAs of both
contracting states consider
that such a case is not
suitable for arbitration and
neither of them makes a
request (Commentaries)
Binding arbitration “ shall
be used [...] unless the
competent authorities agree
that the particular case is not
suitable for determination by
arbitration”
(treaties) [emphasis added]
The CAs will consider such
agreement if:
(i) “There is an inordinate
and/or repeated delay in the
response of a taxpayer to a




Article 7(1). If the competent
authorities fail to reach an
agreement “[...] they shall set
up an advisory commission
[…]” charged with delivering
its opinion on the elimination
of the double taxation in
question
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Issue OECD Model UN Model US Model EC Convention
Issues included “[…]actions of one or both of
the Contracting States have
resulted for that person in
taxation not in accordance
with the provisions of this
Convention” (art. 25(5)(a))
Same as in the OECD Model Application of articles 4
(Residence) (but only insofar
as it relates to the residence
of a natural person), 5
(Permanent Establishment),




The CAs may, on an ad
hoc basis, agree that binding
arbitration shall be used in
respect of any other matter to
which article 25 applies (US-
Germany)
Disagreement on the
application of the Convention,
including MAPs originated in
APAs (US-Belgium and US-
France)
Application of one or more
Articles that the competent
authorities have agreed in
an exchange of notes




Issues arising out of the
cross-border taxation of
business profits of associated
enterprises, where conditions
are made or imposed which
differ from those which
would be made between
independent enterprises
(arts. 1 and 4) (Transfer
Pricing Issues)
Issue OECD Model UN Model US Model EC Convention
Arbitrators 1. Appointment Each CA will appoint an
arbitrator, and the two of
them will appoint the Chair. In
case of non-appointment, the
OECD Centre for Tax Policy
and Administration shall do it
within 10 days of receiving
a request from the person
who made the request for
arbitration.
The same procedure shall
apply in case of replacement
(Sample Agreement)
Unspecified Each CA will appoint a
member to the arbitration
board by sending a written
communication indicating
their appointment to the other
CA within 60 days (90 in
US-France treaty) of the
commencement of arbitration
Within 60 days of the date
on which the second such
communication is sent, the
two members appointed by
the contracting states will
appoint a third member, who
will serve as Chair of the
board
In case of failure to appoint,
the appointment will be
made by the highest-ranking
member of the Secretariat at
the Centre for Tax Policy and
Administration of the OECD
who is not a national of either
state
In case an arbitrator is unable
to fulfill its duties CAs have
14 days to replace (one can
presume that, in the absence
of replacement, the OECD
Centre performs the same
role)
The committee will be
composed of a Chairman and:
– two representatives of each
CA (CAs can reduce the
number to one by agreement)
– an even number of
independent persons of
standing
The persons of standing shall
be appointed by agreement
In the absence of agreement
they shall be appointed by the
drawing of lots by the CAs
involved
The representatives and
persons of standing shall
appoint a Chairman from
among the list of persons of
standing
(art. 9(1)-(5))
Issue OECD Model UN Model US Model EC Convention
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Arbitrators 2. Eligibility “Any person, including a
government official of a
Contracting State, may be
appointed as an arbitrator,
unless that person has been
involved in prior stages of
the case that results in the
arbitration process ” (Sample
Agreement, para. 7)
Unspecified The CAs will develop a non-
exclusive list of individuals
with familiarity in international
tax matters who may
potentially serve as the Chair
of the board.
The Chair shall not be a
citizen of either contracting
state
(Treaties)
Also, there is a restriction not
to appoint:













– 1 year following the
departure from government
employment (US-Canada)





The list of persons of
standing will be made with
the five independent persons
nominated by each state
(each state shall inform
the Secretary-General of the
Council of the EC). They
must be nationals of a
contracting state, resident
within the territory where
the Convention applies,
competent and independent
The Chairman must have
fulfilled the conditions for
appointment to the highest
judicial office in his country,
or be a jurisconsult of
recognized competence
Issue OECD Model UN Model US Model EC Convention
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“The competent authorities
will appoint members who
have significant international
tax experience. They
need not, however, have
experience as either a judge
or arbitrator.
Every member of an
arbitration board shall be
impartial and independent
of the contracting states
and the Concerned Persons
at the time of accepting
an appointment to serve,
and shall remain so
during the entire arbitration
proceeding (all Memoranda)
and for a reasonable time
thereafter” (US-Germany,
US-Canada, US-France)
CAs will jointly agree to a
list of persons (5-10 US-
Germany, US-Belgium; at
least 10 US-Canada) who are
qualified and willing to serve
as a Chair for an arbitration
board; and will review or
revise this list every third
year. Persons on the list will
have significant international
tax experience, but need not
have experience as a judge
or arbitrator. Same language
applies on independence and
impartiality
If lots are drawn for the
appointment of the persons
of standing, a state can
object to the appointment of
an independent person of
standing:
– in any circumstance agreed
in advance by the CAs
involved
– where the person belongs
to or is working on behalf of
one of the tax administrations
concerned
Issue OECD Model UN Model US Model EC Convention
There are no provisions on
challenge and removal, other
than the statement that “If a
board member is unable to
fulfill his or her duties the
chair will notify the competent
authorities.”, and that
“the competent authorities
will consult with the
remaining board members
to determine whether a




member to “disclose to both
competent authorities any
fact or circumstance likely to
give rise to justifiable doubts
as to the Board Member’s
impartiality or independence”
The duty is an ongoing one
during the proceedings.
(MoUs)
– where the person has, or
has had, a large holding in or
is or has been an employee of
or adviser to one or each of
the associated enterprises
– where the person does not
offer a sufficient guarantee of
objectivity for the settlement
of the case/s
The CAs can also object
to the appointment of
the Chairman under these
circumstances
(art. 9(1)-(5))
Issue OECD Model UN Model US Model EC Convention
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Parallel proceedings Issues shall “not be submitted
to arbitration if a decision
on these issues has already
been rendered by a court
or administrative tribunal of
either State” (art. 25(5))
Issues shall “not be submitted
to arbitration if a decision
on these issues has already
been rendered by a court
or administrative tribunal of
either State” (art. 25(5))
If the taxpayer dockets the
case for which it requested
CA assistance, the case will
be considered as not suitable
for arbitration if the court does
not allow for suspension of
the litigation proceedings until
there is a CA resolution
Arbitration proceedings may
also be temporarily deferred
if there is an administrative
appeal if the appeals
proceedings have not been
suspended
The submission of the
case to the advisory
commission shall not prevent
a contracting state “ from
initiating or continuing judicial
proceedings for administrative
penalties in relation to the
same matters” (art. 7(2))
[emphasis added]
Where domestic law does
not permit CAs to derogate
from judicial decisions,
the proceedings cannot
start unless the associated
enterprises have allowed the
time provided for appeal
to expire, or withdrawn the
appeal before a decision has
been delivered (that does
not affect the appeal in
regard of matters other than
those resolved under these
proceedings) (art. 7(3))
The CA is not obliged
to follow proceedings when
the adjustment of profits
gives rise to liability to a
serious penalty for at least
one of the enterprises (art.
8(1)). If both proceedings are
simultaneous the CA can stay
the arbitration
Issue OECD Model UN Model US Model EC Convention
Procedure Within 3 months after the
reception by both CAs of
the request for arbitration
they shall agree on the
questions to be resolved by
the arbitration panel, which
will be the Terms of Reference
(Sample Mutual Agreement
on Arbitration)
In the Streamlined Arbitration
Process each CA shall submit
its own response to the
questions raised in the Terms
of Reference within 2 months
from the appointment of the
arbitrator
The arbitrators shall adopt
those procedural and
evidentiary rules that they
deem necessary to answer
the questions set out in the
Terms of
Unspecified Submission by each CA of a
proposed resolution paper (5
pages max) with a supporting
position paper (30 pages
max)
The Proposed Resolution
should provide a resolution
for each specific amount of
income, expense or tax at
issue in the case. It may also
address any related issues
that are required to determine
those amounts (e.g. the
existence of a permanent
establishment)
If it so desires, each CA can
submit a Reply Submission
to the board to address any
points raised by the Proposed
Resolution or Position Paper
submitted by the other CA
(MoUs)
Enterprises and CAs shall
give effect to any request by
the advisory commission to
provide information, evidence
or documents. However, the
CAs will not be obliged to:
– carry out administrative
measures at variance with
domestic law or normal
administrative practice
– supply information not
obtainable under its domestic
law or in its normal
administrative practice
Issue OECD Model UN Model US Model EC Convention
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Reference
They will have access to
all information necessary to
decide the issues submitted
to arbitration, including
confidential information
Any information that was not
available to both CAs before
the request for arbitration was
received by both of them shall
not be taken into account
for purposes of the decision,
unless otherwise agreed by
the CAs (Sample Agreement,
para. 11)
The CAs may derogate
or vary procedural rules
of agreement in the
Terms of Reference (Sample
Agreement, para. 3)
Additional information may
be submitted to the board
only at its request, (Treaties,
Memoranda and Guidelines)
The board may request
additional information that
consists only of existing
documents and may not
request new or additional
analyses
The arbitration board may
adopt any procedures
necessary for the conduct
of its business, provided
that the procedures are
not inconsistent with any
provision of the Protocol
(Protocol and Arbitration
Board Guidelines)
– supply information that
would disclose any trade,
business, industrial or
professional secret or trade
process, or information the
disclosure of which would
be contrary to public policy
( ordre public )
(art. 10(1))
CAs can agree on additional
rules of procedure (art. 11(2))
Issue OECD Model UN Model US Model EC Convention
Taxpayer participation Terms of Reference will
be communicated to the
person who made the request
for arbitration (Sample
Agreement, para. 3)
The person who made the
request for arbitration may
present his position to the
arbitrators in writing to the
same extent that he can do so
during the MAP
With the permission
of the arbitrators, the





Unspecified The presenter of the case
may submit five copies
of a position paper (the
Presenter Position Paper)
not to exceed 30 pages,
plus annexes. The positions,
arguments or analyses raised
in the supporting position
paper must be positions,
arguments or analyses
previously provided to the
CAs for their consideration
prior to the beginning of
arbitration. Any annex to the
Presenter Position Paper also
must be a document made
available to the CAs for
their consideration prior to
the beginning of arbitration
(Arbitration Board Guidelines)
Each of the enterprises
may, at its request, appear
or be represented before
the advisory commision. The
enterprise may also appear
if the commision so requests
(art. 10(2))
The enterprises may provide
any information, evidence or
documents which seem to
them likely to be of any use
to the advisory commission
in reaching a decision (art.
10(1))
Issue OECD Model UN Model US Model EC Convention
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Confidentiality For the sole purposes
of the application of the
provisions of articles 25 and
26, and of the domestic




information related to the
case that results in the
arbitration process, each
arbitrator shall be designated
as authorized representative
of the CA that has
appointed that arbitrator or,
if that arbitrator has not
been appointed exclusively
by one CA, of the CA
of the contracting state
to which the case giving
rise to the arbitration was
initially presented (Sample
Agreement, para. 8)
Unspecified In order for proceedings
to begin the CAs need
to have received from
each concerned person a
statement agreeing that the
concerned person and each
person acting on its behalf
will not disclose to any
other person any information
received during the course
of the Proceeding from
either contracting state or
the arbitration board, other
than the determination of the
Proceeding
“No information relating to
the Proceeding (including
the board’s determination)
may be disclosed by the
members of the arbitration
board or their staffs or by
either competent authority,
except as permitted by the
Convention and the domestic
laws of the Contracting
States. In addition, all material
prepared in the course of,
or relating to, the Proceeding
shall be considered to
be information exchanged
between the Contracting
States. All members of
the arbitration board and
their staffs must agree
in statements sent to
each of the Contracting
States in confirmation of
their appointment to the
arbitration board to abide
by and be subject to
the confidentiality and
nondisclosure provisions […]”
applicable to proceedings of
Exchange of Information and
Administrative Assistance
The members of the advisory
commission shall keep secret
all matters they learn as a
result of the proceedings (art.
9(6))
Issue OECD Model UN Model US Model EC Convention
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Sources of the decision “The arbitrators shall decide
the issues submitted to
arbitration in accordance with
the applicable provisions of
the treaty and, subject to
these provisions, of those
of the domestic laws of the
Contracting States. Issues of
treaty interpretation will be
decided by the arbitrators in
the light of the principles of
interpretation incorporated in
Articles 31 to 34 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of
Treaties, having regard to
the Commentaries of the
OECD Model Tax Convention
as periodically amended, as
explained in paragraphs 28
to 36.1 of the Introduction
to the OECD Model Tax
Convention. Issues related
to the application of the
arm’s length principle should
similarly be decided having
regard to the OECD
Transfer Pricing Guidelines
for Multinational Enterprises
and Tax Administrations. The
arbitrators will also consider
any other sources which
the competent authorities
may expressly identify in
the Terms of Reference”.
(Sample Agreement, para.
14)
Unspecified The board will apply, as
necessary and in descending
order of priority:
(a) provisions of the
Convention
(b) agreed commentaries
or explanations of the
contracting states concerning
the Convention
(c) laws of contracting states
to the extent they are not




portions of the OECD Model
Tax Convention
The commission must base
its opinion on article 4 of
the Convention (no further
specifications) (art. 11(1))
Issue OECD Model UN Model US Model EC Convention
Decision Simple majority, 6 months,
and shall indicate in writing
the sources of law relied
upon and the reasoning which
led to its result, unless
otherwise provided in the
Terms of Reference. It has no
precedential value (Sample
Agreement, para. 15)
Unspecified Limited to a determination
regarding the amount of
income, expense or tax
reportable to the contracting
states
The determination of the
board will not state a
rationale. It will have no
precedential value
The determination of an
arbitration board shall
constitute a resolution by
mutual agreement
(US-Belgium Protocol 6, (h);
US-Germany Protocol, article
XVI, no. 22, (h); US-Canada
Arbitration Board Operating
Guidelines, no. 12, (j); US-
France Arbitration Board
Operating Guidelines, no. 18,
(a))
6 months, simple majority,
does not specify contents (art.
11(1))
Issue OECD Model UN Model US Model EC Convention
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Binding and final decision “Unless a person directly
affected by the case does
not accept the mutual
agreement that implements
the arbitration decision, that
decision shall be binding
on both Contracting States
and shall be implemented
notwithstanding any time
limits in the domestic laws of
these States” (art. 25(5))
“The arbitration decision shall
be final, unless that decision
is found to be unenforceable
by the courts of one of the
Contracting States because
of a violation of paragraph 5
of Article 25 or of any
procedural rule included in
the Terms of Reference or
in this agreement that may
reasonably have affected the
decision. If a decision is
found to be unenforceable
for one of these reasons,
the request for arbitration
shall be considered not to
have been made and the
arbitration process shall be
considered not to have taken
place” (Sample Agreement
para. 18)
The arbitration decision shall
be binding on both states
and shall be implemented
notwithstanding any time
limits in the domestic laws of
these states:
“(1) unless both competent
authorities agree on a
different solution within six
months after the decision has
been communicated to them
or
(2) unless a person directly
affected by the case does




No reference is made to
enforcement
Each concerned person must,
within 30 days of receiving
the determination of the board
from the CA to which the
case was first presented,
advise that CA whether that
concerned person accepts
the determination of the board
If any concerned person fails
to so advise the relevant CA
within this time frame, the
determination of the board will
be considered not to have
been accepted in that case
No reference is made to
enforcement
“1. The competent authorities
party to the procedure
referred to in Article 7 shall,
acting by common consent on
the basis of Article 4, take a
decision which will eliminate
the double taxation within six
months of the date on which
the advisory commission
delivered its opinion.
2. The competent authorities
may take a decision which
deviates from the advisory
commission’s opinion. If they
fail to reach an agreement,
they shall be obliged to act in
accordance with that opinion.”
(art. 12)
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